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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the dissertation. Firstly, the background of 
the study is discussed stressing the importance of the research phenomenon under 
consideration. Then the chapter points out the important research gaps in the liter-
ature that provides the rational of this study. Based on the research gaps, research 
questions and the study objectives are constructed. Next, the chapter addresses the 
positioning of the study in relation to previous studies, and the potential contribu-
tions of the study. In order to offer readers a realistic view about the study context 
and applications of the study findings, the scope and limitations of study are also 
discussed in this chapter. The chapter concludes with providing definitions of the 
key terms used as well as explaining the structure of the dissertation.  
1.1 Background of the research 
During the last two decades, the economies around the world have become inte-
grated through the reduction of barriers to the movement of trade, capital, tech-
nology, and people (Daniels, Radebaugh & Sullivan 2009). These trends of glob-
alization have forced the companies to pursue business opportunities aggressively 
in other countries in order to remain competitive in this fast-paced global market. 
At the same time, companies lacked all need resources to effectively pursue busi-
ness opportunities in global arena and found it expensive to develop all kind of 
sophisticated technologies in house and solely develop distribution channels in 
numerous countries around the world. These challenges posed a continuous pres-
sure on the companies to find and implement new ways of organizing their busi-
ness activities around the world (Parkhe 1998a; Kauser & Shaw 2004). 
As a means of meeting these business opportunities created by globalization, 
many companies realized that they must find partners to gain access to needed 
resources and share the risk of international expansion. Hence, cooperation 
through international strategic alliances (ISAs) became a key trend (Silva, Brad-
ley & Sousa 2012). ISAs are the generic form of cooperation between companies 
that range from relational contracts to international joint ventures (IJVs) (Contrac-
tor  &  Lorange  2002).  An  IJV  is  a  special  case  of  ISAs,  where  cooperation  be-
tween two or more companies is cemented by ownership sharing through equity 
holdings in the form of both shared greenfield and partial acquisition (Hennart 
1988, 2008). Over the past thirty years, IJVs have been an important means of 
doing business across national boundaries (Beamish & Banks 1987; Madhok 
1995a, 1995b; Robson, Leonidas & Katsikeas 2002; Luo 2007a; Hsieh, Rodrigues 
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& Child 2010). It is this importance of IJVs, very much discussed by academics, 
which constitute the subject matter of present dissertation. 
However, despite the attractiveness of using IJVs as an important means of con-
ducting international business, they are not always seen as a panacea for firms’ 
competitive woes (Madhok 1995a, 1995b, 2006). It should be stressed here that 
IJVs have been characterized by a high rate of failure, ranging from 34% to 50% 
in previous research (Steensma et al. 2008; Pak, Ra & Park 2009). According to 
international business literature, one of the biggest reasons behind these failed 
IJVs is the lack of attention towards the management of IJV relationships between 
IJV partners (Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Brouthers & Bamossy 2006; 
Madhok 1995a, 2006). Entering in an IJV means that two or more partners are 
going to work together for deciding the strategic direction and operational issues 
of the IJV. To successfully manage these IJVs, partners should know how to work 
with each other, to each other and through each other. They should know what to 
expect, how to get what they expect, and how to tackle foreseen and unforeseen 
circumstances during the life span of an IJV. Therefore, establishing a good inter-
partner relationship is a prerequisite and major contributor to the performance of 
IJVs (Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Silva 2007).  
In IJV literature, one relational element that has received an utmost importance is 
trust between IJV partners (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 1998; Buckley & Glaister 2002; 
Nielsen & Nielsen 2009). Prior research suggests that trust between IJV partners 
increases the quality of inter-partner relationships (Arino, de la Torre & Ring 
2001), broadens the band of tolerance (Madhok 1995b), improves inter-partner 
flexibility (Madhok 1995b; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema 1999), lowers transaction 
costs (Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone 1998; Dyer & Chu 2003), reduces conflicts 
(Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone 1998), and facilitates learning, innovation (Nielsen 
& Nielsen 2009) and competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen 1994). Thus, not 
surprisingly, literature on IJVs places great emphasis on the importance of creat-
ing trust between IJV partners (e.g. Beamish & Banks 1987; Madhok 1995a, 
1995b; Inkpen & Currall 1998; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Nielsen 2001; Buckley & 
Glaister 2002; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003), and looks at it as the chief de-
terminant of IJV performance (e.g. Madhok 1995b; Inkpen & Currall 1998; Cul-
len, Johnson & Sakano 2000; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007; Nielsen 2007).  
Although trust has become a central concept in the JV literature (Madhok 1995a, 
1995b; Inkpen & Currall 1998; Buckley & Glaister 2002), there is limited under-
standing of antecedent factors by which firms build and maintain a relationship 
characterized by trust, and limited empirical examination of trust-performance 
relationship in IJVs.  Several studies on trust in IJVs call for more systematic re-
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search on the antecedent factors of trust, and trust-performance relationship in 
IJVs (Madhok 1995b; Inkpen & Currall 1997; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). This 
is also the main focus of this dissertation. It examines IJVs as a form of coopera-
tive strategy, and in light of this, discusses the antecedent factors of trust, and 
trust-performance relationship in IJVs. 
1.2 Research gaps  
Despite the much appreciation of importance of trust in the management of IJV 
relationships, gaps remain in our understanding of the antecedents of trust and 
trust-performance relationship in IJVs. Firstly, there is a general consensus 
among trust researchers that “trust arises when the parties are willing to ‘increase 
one’s vulnerability to another whose behavior is not under one’s control” (Zand 
1972 referred in Hennart & Zeng 2005: 113). This exposure to vulnerability may 
hinder the development of trustful relationships in IJVs. Because of this vulnera-
bility, roots of trust must be deeply grounded. This means that what builds a trust-
ing relationship should be known and nurtured. However, the available literature 
on the antecedents of trust, though limited, is highly fragmented with very little 
cumulative learning. There is no comprehensive framework on the antecedents of 
trust as previous researchers focus on a limited set of antecedents, and identify 
different antecedents of trust. Empirical studies on the antecedents of inter-partner 
trust in IJVs have examined factors such as risk, prior inter-partner relations, de-
cision making and forbearance (Inkpen & Currall 1997), distributive fairness and 
partner similarity (Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008), goal congruence, cultural 
similarity, resource complementary, fairness, flexibility, and communication 
(Kwon 2008), collaborative know-how and knowledge protectiveness (Nielsen & 
Nielsen 2009), resource complementary (Deitz et al. 2010), shared values, com-
munication, and opportunism (Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). These different an-
tecedents of trust reflect that there is a limited understanding of what explains 
trust in IJVs.  
Further, the empirical work on the antecedents of trust mainly focuses on the so-
cial antecedents of trust (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 1997; Kwon 2008; Robson, 
Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). This mainly focus on 
social antecedents of trust downplays the importance of structural factors of IJV. 
This may be a serious omission especially where interest is on trust in IJVs. As 
Hennart and Zeng (2005: 113) argued that “this willingness to be vulnerable (i.e. 
trust) will obviously be greater if the partners have the same goals, or if the struc-
ture or the contractual stipulations of the joint venture limit the extent to which 
they can be opportunistic”. This idea is in line with the work of Parkhe (1998a, 
4      Acta Wasaensia 
1998b) who claims that in addition to social factors, structural factors of IJV are 
also important antecedents of trust. The underlying logic is that the chosen struc-
tural characteristics of IJV limits the perceived opportunistic behavior of partner 
and engenders trust (Parkhe 1998a, 1998b). Unlike to this reasoning, there is also 
another interpretation of structural antecedents of trust. Some studies suggest that 
chosen structural characteristics of IJV can be interpreted as a symbol or sign of 
commitment that leads to trust (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Lui, Wong & Liu 
2009). Although, the structural characteristics of IJV are subject to different in-
terpretation, it is important to investigate their relationship with trust. However, 
our understanding of structural antecedents of trust is very limited and remains at 
theoretical level (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Nielsen 2001; Hennart & Zeng 2005). 
The above discussion suggests that previous research on antecedents of trust in 
IJVs, although very limited, has produced somewhat divergent social antecedents 
of trust and has largely ignored the structural antecedents of trust. The first at-
tempt to study the structural and social antecedents of trust was by Parkhe (1998a, 
1998b). These studies, however, were theoretical and empirical evidence is still 
lacking. Therefore, a comprehensive framework that explains structural as well as 
social factors as antecedents of trust within an integrated theoretical and empirical 
model is warranted. This integrated framework of social and structural anteced-
ents of trust in IJVs will help the managers to better understand the importance of 
structural and social antecedent factors necessary to establish a trustful relation-
ship with their IJV partners.  
Secondly, the central concern in the IJV literature has been the parent’s dissatis-
faction with IJV performance. Madhok (1995b) is one of the first authors, which 
criticized the-then existing IJV literature as putting too much emphasize on “hard 
issues of ownership and control”, and ignoring the relational element of trust that 
better explains the performance of IJVs. He posited that “trust has efficiency im-
plications, and its potential cost reduction and value enhancing properties need to 
be recognized” (Madhok 1995b: 126). The focal logic in his argumentation is that 
trust affects IJV performance by increasing the quality of inter-partner relation-
ships, because trust fosters inter-partner cooperation and coordination, broadens 
the band of tolerance for temporary periods of inequity, reduces conflicts and per-
ceptions of relational risk, and heightens the flexibility within the IJV relationship 
(Madhok 1995b; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven 1997).  
Though previous theoretical research (e.g. Beamish & Banks 1995; Madhok 
1995b; Inkpen & Currall 1998; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b) provides general support 
for the idea that trust is important to achieve superior IJV performance, empirical 
work on trust-performance relationship is limited and presents contradictory re-
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sults. Some studies find that trust improves IJV performance (e.g. Chen & Boggs 
1998; Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007; Nielsen 2007; Kwon 
2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Bener & Glaister 2010), some others reveal the 
absence of a significant direct link between trust and IJV performance (e.g. Ink-
pen & Currall 1997; Muthusamy, White & Carr 2007), some studies reveal the 
conditions under which trust matters more to IJV performance (e.g. Luo 2002b; 
Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012), and one study 
points out that under some circumstances, trust may even negatively affect the 
IJV performance (e.g. Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven 2006). Such discordant 
findings about trust-performance link have also been pointed out by Robson, 
Katsikeas and Bello (2008) and Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012). Specially, Silva, 
Bradley and Sousa (2012: 294) concluded that “such discordant findings suggest 
not only that trust’s relationship to performance is complex and poorly under-
stood but also that trust may not improve outcomes under all circumstances”. 
Many studies suggest that further evidence is necessary on the impact of trust on 
IJV performance (Inkpen & Currall 1997; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007).  
Further, Robson, Katsikeas and Bello (2008) and Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012) 
suggest that  future research should identify the conditions under which trust  im-
pacts IJV performance. However, there is no general theory regarding the condi-
tions under which trust facilitates or hinders IJV performance. But, prior research 
while discussing the importance of trust for IJV performance has largely ignored 
the importance of structural characteristics of IJV. This criticism closely follows 
the one proposed by Hennart and Zeng (2005: 113), who suggest that “while there 
is no doubt that process variables are an important determinant of the perfor-
mance of alliances, process-based explanations of alliance dynamics often under-
emphasize structural explanation. Some (but not all) process variables seem also 
to be repackaged structural variables. The prime example is trust, which has been 
extensively used as an independent variable to explain alliance performance”. 
Madhok (1995b: 122) also share the view that trust is not sufficient in and of it-
self to hold IJV performance for long time until structural bases of IJV are strong. 
Robson, Skarmeas and Spyropoulou (2006: 603) also suggest that “empirical at-
tempts combining the behavioral paradigm (e.g. trust from social exchange theo-
ry) with other, dissimilar theoretical perspectives (e.g. structural characteristics 
from transaction costs economics) are to be encouraged in future research as 
they can expedite the development of richer, more complete explanations of IJV 
performance”. Therefore, studying the impact of structural characteristics of IJV 
on trust-performance link will help the managers to understand the importance of 
structural characteristics of IJV under which trust facilitates or hinders IJV per-
formance. 
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The above discussion suggests that previous research on trust-performance rela-
tionship in IJVs, although limited, has produced somewhat contradictory results 
and has largely ignored the role of structural characteristics of IJV in explaining 
trust-performance relationship. Considering the manager’s high dissatisfaction 
with IJV performance, it is important to investigate the trust-performance rela-
tionship in IJVs and identify the structural characteristics of IJV under which trust 
matters more to IJV performance.  
1.3 Research questions and objectives of the study 
The preceding discussion about the research gaps on trust research in IJVs steers 
the course of the present dissertation. The basic objective of this dissertation is to 
investigate the antecedents of trust and to examine the trust–performance relation-
ship in international joint ventures. Accordingly, the main research question is: 
What are the antecedents of inter-partner trust in IJVs and what is the impact of 
inter-partner trust on the performance of IJVs? 
The main research question is approached and addressed by the following two 
sub-questions: 
 
(1) What are the social and structural antecedents of inter-partner trust in 
IJVs? 
 
(2) What is the impact of inter-partner trust on IJV performance, and does the 
resource complementary moderate the impact of trust on IJV perfor-
mance?  
 
In order to answer the research question and to achieve the objective, this disser-
tation has both theoretical and empirical objectives. These objectives are: 
 
(1) To develop a comprehensive framework by integrating social exchange 
theory and transaction cost theory to investigate the social and structural 
antecedents of trust, the impact of trust on IJV performance, and the mod-
erating role of resource complementary in trust-performance relationship 
 
(2) To empirically test the developed research framework to analyze social 
and structural antecedents of trust, the impact of trust on IJV performance, 
and the moderating role of resource complementary in trust-performance 
relationship in the context of Nordic firm’s IJVs in Asia, Europe, and 
America. 
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1.4 Positioning and potential contribution of the study 
Research on IJVs has received an increasing attention in international business 
literature during the last three decades, reflecting the importance of IJVs in con-
ducting international business (Beamish & Banks 1987; Hennart 1988; Madhok 
1995a, 1995b; Robson, Leonidas & Katsikeas 2002; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007). Ear-
lier literature on IJVs has been occupied with two broad research streams. The 
first stream has been focusing on the choice of IJVs over other entry modes (e.g. 
Anderson & Gatignon 1986; Beamish & Banks 1987; Williamson 1985; Hennart 
1988; Gulati 1995; Oxley 1999; Globerman & Nielsen 2007), and partner selec-
tion issues (e.g. Geringer 1991; Glaister & Wang 1993; Glaister & Buckley 1997; 
Hitt  et  al.  2000).  The  other  research  stream  has  been  focusing  on  the  IJV  out-
comes  and  impact  of  IJVs  on  the  partner  firms  (e.g.  Beamish  1985;  Gomes-
Casseres 1987; Kogut 1989; Geringer & Hebert 1991; Reuer & Miller 1997; Reu-
er 2000, 2001; Kumar 2005). Although, these both streams contributed towards 
our understandings of IJV formation, partner selection issues, IJV outcomes and 
impact of IJV on partner firms, but success of IJVs remained mediocre. Research-
ers point out that IJVs often suffer a high failure rate and a high level of parent 
dissatisfaction (e.g. Madhok 1995a, 1995b; Steensma et al. 2008; Pak, Ra & Park 
2009).  
In looking for the reasons behind failed and successful IJVs, researchers turned 
their focus on the management of IJV. Here researchers focused on structural 
characteristics of IJV, like ownership distribution between IJV partners (e.g. Kill-
ing 1982; Geringer & Hebert 1989; Bleeke & Ernst 1991; Ramaswamy, Gomes & 
Veliyath 1998; Child 2002; Lu & Hebert 2005), contracts (e.g. Luo 2005, 2009; 
Gong et al. 2007), co-specialized investments (e.g. Zeng 1998; Das & Rahman 
2002; Hennart & Zeng 2005), and nature of resources invested in IJV (e.g. Hen-
nart & Zeng 2005). These researchers suggest that proper structuring of IJV helps 
to manage IJVs (i.e. reducing opportunism) and leads to superior IJV perfor-
mance. While there is no doubt that structural factors of IJV are important, but 
structure based explanations of IJV management often under-appreciate the im-
portance of relationship characteristics. Madhok (1995b) is one of the first au-
thors, which criticized the-then existing IJV literature as putting too much empha-
size on “hard issues of ownership and control”, and ignoring the relational ele-
ment of trust that better explains the performance of IJVs. He borrowed the con-
cept of trust from social exchange theory and transferred it to the IJV settings, and 
posited that “trust has efficiency implications, and its potential cost reduction and 
value enhancing properties need to be recognized” (Madhok 1995b: 126). His 
study sparked another research focus in IJVs with the idea that IJV management 
and IJV performance can better be explained by the relationship factor of trust. 
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Consequently, recent research in IJVs has well appreciated the importance of trust 
in IJVs (e.g. Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Nielsen 2007; Kwon 2008; Rob-
son, Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 
2012). For example, Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003) and Silva, Bradley and 
Sousa (2012) suggest that that entering in an IJV means that two or more partners 
are going to work together for deciding the strategic direction and operational 
issues of the IJV. To successfully manage these IJVs, partners should know how 
to work with each other, to each other and through each other. This all makes 
trust important for successfully managing the IJV. In the following, we discuss in 
detail the theoretical roots and important research streams of trust research in 
IJVs. 
As discussed above, Madhok’s (1995b) seminal study on trust in IJV settings has 
utilized the insights from social exchange theory. This theory is a sociological 
theory, which was initially developed to analyze the people’s social behavior in 
terms of exchange of resources. The basic premise of the theory is that “self-
interested actors need trust to get involve in reciprocal exchange of needed re-
sources, and this trust is further promoted when reciprocal exchange becomes 
ongoing (Blau 1964: 94)”. Trust is thus considered essential for the stable social 
relations between exchange actors (Blau 1964: 99). Following Madhok (1995b), 
researchers recognized that implications of trust in social exchange, as described 
by social exchange theory, have similarities to those in IJVs (Das & Teng 2002). 
Therefore, social exchange theory became the most important theory to the study 
of trust in IJVs (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 1997; Luo 2002b; Muthusamy, White & 
Carr 2007; Kwon 2008; Lin & Wang 2008; Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008). 
Seppanen et al. (2007: 254) evaluated the used theoretical approaches to the study 
of trust and found that the most important one is SET. In addition, there are some 
IJV studies which integrate the concept of trust in TCT (e.g. Boersma, Buckley & 
Ghauri 2003; Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven 2006; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007), 
but in fact borrow the concept of trust from SET. This is understandable, as trust 
has not traditionally been a focal concept in TCT. All these studies claim that the 
bond  of  trust  between  IJV  partners  is  an  important  management  factor  of  IJVs.  
According to SET, IJVs are reciprocal exchanges among partner firms that are 
characterized by incomplete contracts with long term duration and are governed 
by trust relationships (Das & Teng 2002: 444). The prior research on trust in IJVs 
driven by social exchange theory can be divided into two broad areas. These 
broad areas are the (1) antecedents of trust in IJVs, and (2) the impact of trust on 
IJV performance (see Table 1). 
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First stream of research focuses on the antecedents of trust in IJVs with the logic 
that  what  creates  a  trusting  relationship  with  IJV  partner  should  be  known  and  
nurtured. Empirical studies on the antecedents of inter-partner trust in IJVs, 
through limited, have examined factors such as risk, prior inter-partner relations, 
decision making control and forbearance (Inkpen & Currall 1997), distributive 
fairness and partner similarity (Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008), goal congru-
ence, cultural similarity, resource complementary, fairness, flexibility, and com-
munication (Kwon 2008), collaborative-know-how and knowledge protectiveness 
(Nielsen & Nielsen 2009), resource complementary (Deitz et al. 2010), shared 
values, communication, and opportunism (Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). These 
different antecedents of trust reflect that there is a limited understanding of what 
explains trust in IJVs. There is no comprehensive framework on the antecedents 
of trust as previous researchers focus on a limited set of antecedents, and identify 
different antecedents of trust. 
Further the empirical work on the antecedents of trust, though grounded in social 
exchange theory, mainly focuses on social antecedents of trust (e.g. Inkpen & 
Currall 1997; Kwon 2008; Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Silva, Bradley & 
Sousa 2012). This mainly focus on social antecedents of trust downplays the im-
portance of structural factors of IJV. This may be a serious omission especially 
where interest is on trust in IJVs. Especially, Hennart and Zeng (2005: 113) criti-
cize the prior empirical research for merely focusing on social antecedents of trust 
and ignoring the structural antecedents of trust. They assert that trust between IJV 
partners  will  obviously  be  greater  if  the  partners  have  the  same  goals,  or  if  the  
structure or the contractual stipulations of the IJV limit the extent to which the 
partners can be opportunistic. This idea is in line with the work of Parkhe (1998a, 
1998b) who claims that in addition to social factors, structural factors of IJV are 
also important antecedents of trust. The underlying logic is that the chosen struc-
tural characteristics of IJV limits the perceived opportunistic behavior of partner 
and engenders trust (Parkhe 1998a, 1998b). Unlike to this reasoning, there is also 
another interpretation of structural antecedents of trust. Some studies suggest that 
chosen structural characteristics of IJV can be interpreted as a symbol or sign of 
commitment that leads to trust (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Lui, Wong & Liu 
2009). Although, the structural characteristics of IJV are subject to different in-
terpretation, it is important to investigate their relationship with trust. However, 
our understanding of structural antecedents of trust is very limited and remains at 
theoretical level (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Hennart & Zeng 2005). 
The above discussion regarding the antecedents of trust in IJVs suggests that pre-
vious  research  on  antecedents  of  trust  in  IJVs,  although  very  limited,  has  pro-
duced somewhat divergent social antecedents of trust and has largely ignored the 
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structural antecedents of trust. The first attempt to study the structural and social 
antecedents of trust was by Parkhe (1998a, 1998b). These studies, however, were 
theoretical and empirical evidence is still lacking. Therefore, a comprehensive 
framework that explains structural as well as social factors as antecedents of trust 
within an integrated theoretical and empirical model is warranted. This integrated 
framework of social and structural antecedents of trust in IJVs will help the man-
agers to better understand the importance of structural and social antecedent fac-
tors necessary to establish a trustful relationship with their IJV partners. There-
fore, present dissertation integrates social exchange theory and transaction cost 
theory with the premise that in addition to social factors (as antecedents of trust 
from social exchange theory), structural factors from transaction cost theory are 
also important antecedents of trust in IJVs. 
Second stream of research on trust in IJVs, though driven by social exchange 
theory, focuses on the impact of trust on the IJV performance. Madhok (1995b) is 
one of the first authors, who posited that “trust has efficiency implications, and its 
potential cost reduction and value enhancing properties need to be recognized” 
(Madhok 1995b: 126). The focal logic in his argumentation was that trust affects 
IJV performance by increasing the quality of inter-partner relationships, because 
trust fosters inter-partner cooperation and coordination, broadens the band of tol-
erance for temporary periods of inequity, reduces conflicts and perceptions of 
relational risk, and heightens the flexibility within the IJV relationship (Madhok 
1995b; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven 1997).  
Though previous theoretical research (e.g. Beamish & Banks 1995; Madhok 
1995b; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Inkpen & Currall 1998) provides general support 
for the idea that trust is important to achieve superior IJV performance, empirical 
work on trust-performance relationship is limited and presents contradictory re-
sults. Some studies find that trust improves IJV performance (e.g. Chen & Boggs 
1998; Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007; Nielsen 2007; Kwon 
2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Bener & Glaister 2010), some others reveal the 
absence of a significant direct link between trust and IJV performance (e.g. Ink-
pen & Currall 1997; Muthusamy, White & Carr 2007), some studies reveal the 
conditions under which trust matters more to IJV performance (e.g. Luo 2002b; 
Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012), and one study 
points out that under some circumstances, trust may even negatively affect the 
IJV performance (e.g. Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven 2006). Such discordant 
findings about trust-performance link have also been pointed out by Robson, 
Katsikeas and Bello (2008) and Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012). Specially, Silva, 
Bradley and Sousa (2012: 294) concluded that “such discordant findings suggest 
not only that trust’s relationship to performance is complex and poorly under-
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stood but also that trust may not improve outcomes under all circumstances”. 
Many studies suggest that further evidence is necessary on the impact of trust on 
IJV performance (Inkpen & Currall 1997; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007).  
Further, Robson, Katsikeas and Bello (2008) and Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012) 
suggest that  future research should identify the conditions under which trust  im-
pacts IJV performance. However, there is no general theory regarding the condi-
tions under which trust facilitates or hinders IJV performance. But, prior research 
while discussing the importance of trust for IJV performance has largely ignored 
the importance of structural characteristics of IJV. This criticism closely follows 
the one proposed by Hennart and Zeng (2005, 113), who assert that there are 
many unanswered questions regarding the impact of trust on IJV performance, 
and call attention to the need to regard the role of structural characteristics of IJV 
in studying the trust-performance relationship. Madhok (1995: 122) also share the 
view that trust  is  not sufficient in and of itself  to hold IJV performance for long 
time until structural bases of IJV are strong. Robson, Skarmeas and Spyropoulou 
(2006: 603) also support this proposal with their assertion that empirical attempts 
combining the behavioral paradigm (e.g. trust from social exchange theory) with 
other, dissimilar theoretical perspectives (e.g. structural characteristics from 
transaction cost theory) are to be encouraged in future research as they can expe-
dite the development of richer, more complete explanations of IJV performance. 
However, despite the call attention from these studies (e.g. Madhok 1995; Hen-
nart & Zeng 2005; Robson, Skarmeas & Spyropoulou 2006), the role of structural 
characteristics of IJV in studying the trust-performance relationship has not yet 
been investigated. 
Therefore, studying the impact of structural characteristics of IJV on trust-
performance link will help the managers to understand the importance of structur-
al characteristics of IJV under which trust facilitates or hinders IJV performance.  
The above discussion on trust-performance relationship in IJVs suggests that pre-
vious research on trust-performance relationship in IJVs, although limited, has 
produced somewhat contradictory results and has largely ignored the role of 
structural characteristics of IJV in explaining trust-performance relationship. 
Considering these limitations, this dissertation transfers the concept of trust from 
social  exchange  theory  to  IJV  setting  to  investigate  its  impact  on  IJV  perfor-
mance. Further, following the suggestion from the studies of Hennart and Zeng 
(2005), Madhok (1995b), and Robson, Skarmeas and Spyropoulou (2006), this 
study borrows the concept of resource complementary (i.e. an important structural 
characteristic of IJV) from transaction cost theory to examine the extent to which 
the effect of trust on IJV performance is moderated by resource complementary 
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between IJV partner firms. Figure 1 presents the focus of previous studies on trust 
in IJVs. 
 
 
Figure 1. Focus of the previous studies on trust in IJVs 
Figure 2 presents the focus,  as well  as the potential  contribution of the disserta-
tion. This dissertation incorporates social exchange theory (SET) and transaction 
cost theory (TCT) to develop a comprehensive framework that addresses both the 
antecedents of trust, and trust-performance relationship in IJVs. In doing so, pre-
sent dissertation contributes to existing research on trust in IJVs in the following 
ways.  
Firstly, an important contribution of present dissertation is that it utilizes struc-
tural factors of IJV from TCT and social factors from SET to provide a more 
thorough understanding of antecedents of trust in IJVs. It has been suggested by 
Madook (1995), Parkhe (1998a, 1998b), and Hennart and Zeng (2005) that future 
research should examine structural and social antecedents of trust. Therefore, hy-
pothesizing and testing a theoretically pluralistic model (i.e. model combing SET 
and TCT) for the possible structural and social antecedents of trust in IJVs is ex-
pected to offer new insights to the existing research on trust in IJVs which is 
mainly driven by SET, and merely focuses on social antecedents of trust in IJVs.  
Secondly, present dissertation also extends the previous research on antecedents 
of trust grounded in SET by analyzing five social antecedent factors of trust in 
IJVs (i.e. prior alliance experience with the partner, reputation, communication, 
cultural sensitivity, expected longevity of IJVs). While importance of these social 
antecedent factors of trust has been identified by theoretical papers by Parkhe 
(1998a, 1998b; Nielsen 2001), but a comprehensive model consisting of these 
social antecedent factors of trust has not been empirically analyzed in the context 
of IJVs.  
Thirdly, present dissertation also extends the previous research on the anteced-
ents of trust grounded in TCT by analyzing two structural antecedent factors of 
trust in IJVs (i.e. ownership share, and interdependence). While importance of 
these structural characteristics of IJV to curb opportunism has been identified by 
 Acta Wasaensia     15 
  
theoretical paper by Hennar and Zeng (2005), but importance of these factors as 
antecedents of trust has not been empirically analyzed in IJVs.  
Fourthly, by unifying SET and TCT, a full set of social and structural antecedent 
factors of trust is analyzed by two pathways: (1) a direct path to analyze the social 
and structural antecedent factors of trust, and (2) an indirect path of social and 
structural antecedent factors of trust by influencing opportunism. As outlined in 
research gaps section, the structural characteristics are subject to two different 
interpretations. Some studies (e.g. Hennart & Zeng 2005) suggest that structural 
characteristics of IJV engender trust by limiting the extent to which partners can 
be opportunistic. Some other studies (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Lui, Wong & Liu 
2009) suggest that chosen structural characteristics of IJV can be interpreted as a 
symbol or sign of commitment that leads to trust. Therefore, investigating the 
direct and indirect path of social and structural antecedent factors to trust will 
contribute to the literature on antecedents of trust by clarifying that which social 
and structural antecedents directly leads to trust and which indirectly leads to trust 
by reducing opportunism.  
Fifthly, figure 2 also shows an important contribution of present dissertation is 
that it addresses the interaction effects of trust and structural factor of resource 
complementary in relation to IJV performance. The trust-performance link in pre-
vious empirical research on IJVs, although equivocal, has been widely criticized 
by Hennart and Zeng (2005) for ignoring the structural factors of IJV. Hennart 
and Zeng (2005: 113) assert that:  
“Researchers in the process tradition have typically regressed performance on 
variables such as trust, communication, and commitment, often without much 
control for structural variables. This raises the possibility that much of the vari-
ance in performance attributed to process variables may in fact be due to struc-
tural conditions”.  
Therefore, hypothesizing and testing a theoretically pluralistic model (i.e. model 
combining SET and TCT) for the possible interaction effects of trust and structur-
al factor of resource complementary in relation to IJV performance is expected to 
offer new insights to the existing research on trust in IJVs where previous re-
search has produced equivocal findings about trust-performance link in IJVs.  
Finally, so far the studies addressing the antecedents of trust and trust-
performance relationship in IJVs have used sample based on IJVs made by Japa-
nese firms (Inkpen & Currall 1997), United States firms (Muthusamy, White & 
Carr 2007) United Kingdom firms (Kauser & Shaw 2004); Danish firms (Nielsen 
2007; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009), United States, United Kingdom, and Japanese 
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firms (Kwon 2008; Luo 2008); United States, Western Europe, and Far East firms 
(Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008). This dissertation focuses on Nordic firm’s 
(Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish) IJVs operating into Asia, Europe, and 
America to analyze the antecedents of trust and trust-performance relationship in 
IJVs. Outward FDI from Nordic region is significantly increasing (e.g. Danish 
outwards FDI increased from 8206 MD in 2006 to 23413 MD in 2011, and simi-
lar  trends  can  be  observed  for  Finnish,  Swedish,  and  Norwegian  outward  FDI)  
(UNCTAD 2012). Therefore, this empirical setting will provide new evidence on 
the antecedents of trust and trust-performance relationship in IJVs. 
 
 
Figure 2. Focus of the present dissertation compared to prior studies 
1.5 Scope and limitations of the study 
The scope of this dissertation is to address the antecedents of trust, and trust-
performance relationship in IJVs. The conceptual framework of this dissertation 
is based on the integration of SET and TCT. SET is a sociological theory which 
was initially developed to analyze the people’s social behavior in terms of ex-
change of resources. Theory puts trust at the center of social exchange and con-
siders it an essential ingredient for the stable social relations between exchange 
actors (Blau 1964: 99). Madhok’s (1995b) seminal study is one of the earlier stud-
ies that borrowed the concept of trust from social exchange theory and transferred 
it to the IJV setting. From SET, there are several social factors (i.e. social ante-
cedent factors) that build trust between exchange partners (i.e. between IJV part-
ners). Parkhe (1998a, 1998b) addressed the importance of ‘prior alliance experi-
ence with the partner’, ‘reputation’, ‘communication’, ‘cultural sensitivity’, and 
‘expected  longevity  of  IJVs’  as  primary  means  of  developing  trust  between IJV 
partners. Therefore, SET assumes that trust between exchange partners is engen-
dered by social antecedent factors.  
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However, this logic of developing trust between exchange partners is increasingly 
viewed as incomplete when transferring it to IJV setting whereby exchange part-
ners are also embedded in the structure of IJV. Specially Hennart and Zeng 
(2005), and Parkhe (1998a, 1998b) studies claim that in addition to social factors, 
structural factors of IJV are also important antecedents of trust. Therefore, ‘equity 
ownership’ and ‘interdependence level’ between IJV partners are the important 
structural factors from TCT that are viewed as an antecedents of trust in this dis-
sertation. However, these structural characteristics of IJV are subject to different 
interpretations. Some studies (e.g. Hennart & Zeng 2005) suggest that structural 
characteristics of IJV engender trust by limiting the extent to which partners can 
be opportunistic. Other studies (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Lui, Wong & Liu 
2009) suggest that chosen structural characteristics of IJV can be interpreted as a 
symbol  or  sign  of  commitment  that  leads  to  trust.  Therefore,  we  develop  two  
paths: (1) a direct path to analyze the social and structural antecedent factors of 
trust, and (2) an indirect path of social and structural antecedent factors of trust by 
influencing opportunism. Therefore, findings will help to resolve the contradicto-
ry claims.  
Further, SET considers that trust between IJV partners is the main factor that in-
creases IJV performance. Specially, Madhok (1995b) is one of the first authors, 
who posited that “trust has efficiency implications, and its potential cost reduction 
and value enhancing properties need to be recognized” (Madhok 1995b: 126). 
However, this logic of trust-performance relationship is also increasingly viewed 
as incomplete because it ignores the structural characteristics of IJV.  Specially, 
Hennart and Zeng (2005: 113) suggest that “While there is no doubt that process 
variables are an important determinant of the performance of alliances, process-
based explanations of alliance dynamics often under-emphasize structural expla-
nation. Some (but not all) process variables seem also to be repackaged structur-
al variables. The prime example is trust, which has been extensively used as an 
independent variable to explain alliance performance”.  
By agreeing with criticism, this dissertation incorporates the structural factor of 
‘resource complementary’ as an important moderator of trust-performance rela-
tionship in IJVs. 
In spite of using an integrated framework of SET and TCT to investigate the ante-
cedents of trust and trust-performance relationship in IJVs, the conceptual frame-
work has an important limitation. The study incorporates only one structural fac-
tor of ‘resource complementary’ as an important moderator of trust-performance 
relationship in IJVs. However, the other structural characteristics of IJV (e.g. eq-
uity ownership and interdependence) could also be incorporated as moderators of 
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trust-performance relationship. But doing so would make the framework more 
complex because of overlap between structural antecedents of trust, and the struc-
tural factors as moderators of trust-performance relationship. There is also an im-
portant empirical limitation. The dissertation concentrates on Nordic firms’ IJVs 
operating into Asia, Europe, and America. Therefore, the results may not be gen-
eralizable to the IJVs from other countries or regions.  
1.6 Definitions of key terms in the study 
The key terms in this dissertation have been identified based on their importance 
in understanding the research phenomenon under study. These terms include: In-
ternational joint venture (IJV), Trust, Prior alliance experience with the partner, 
Partner reputation, Communication, Cultural sensitivity, Expected longevity of 
IJV, Opportunism, Ownership share, Resource complementary, Interdependence, 
and IJV performance. The  definitions  of  key  terms  used  in  this  dissertation  are  
summarized and presented in the Table 2 along with the relevant references, so 
that the reader can follow the conceptualization of these terms in this dissertation. 
1.7 Structure of the study 
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. The first chapter (Introduction) 
starts with a discussion about the study background and identification of research 
gaps. This discussion is followed by the research question and study objectives. 
Next, the chapter addresses the positioning of the study in relation to previous 
studies, and the potential contributions of the study. Then the scope and limita-
tions of study are addressed in order to clarify the limits of the study context and 
its applicability to the readers. Finally, the chapter presents definitions of key 
terms used in this dissertation along with offering discussion about the structure 
of the dissertation.  
The second chapter (Theoretical Perspectives on the Formation and Management 
of IJV Relationships) aims to be a theoretical chapter. The chapter offers an in-
depth review of roots of transaction cost theory and social exchange theory, and 
the logic of IJV formation and management in the light of these two theories. 
Next, the chapter discusses the key construct used in this i.e. trust in detail. Here, 
the conceptualization of trust is explained especially by reviewing its different 
conceptualizations used in past studies. In the next section, the importance of trust 
in IJVs and the antecedents of trust are discussed in the light of past studies. Fi-
nally, the rationale of integrating the social exchange theory and transaction cost 
theory to study the ‘antecedents of trust and trust-performance relationship in 
IJVs’ are discussed.  
 Acta Wasaensia     19 
  
Table 2. Definitions of key terms in the present dissertation  
 
  
Key terms Definitions References 
International joint 
venture (IJV) 
A joint venture arises whenever two or more sponsors 
bring given assets to an independent legal entity and 
are paid for some or all of their contribution from the 
profits earned by the entity, or when a firm acquires 
partial ownership of another firm. A joint venture is 
considered international when the nationality of one 
or more parents of joint venture is other than the 
country of residence of joint venture.  
Hennart (1988: 361); Brouthers 
and Hennart (2007: 398) 
Trust Trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability to 
another party (i.e. to rely) in an IJV relationship 
based on the positive expectations\believes of coun-
terpart’s reliability, fairness, and goodwill. 
Dyer and Chu (2003: 58);  
Krishnan, Martin and  
Noorderhaven (2006: 895) 
Prior alliance 
experience with 
the partner 
 
It refers to the previous alliance experience with  
the partner firm before the establishment of current 
IJV. 
 
Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 
(1999: 45); Glaister and  
Buckley (1999: 134); Nielsen 
(2007: 349) 
Partner reputation 
 
It refers to the cumulative record of partner’s past 
behavior in prior alliances with other firms before the 
establishment of current IJV.  
Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri 
(2003: 1034): Nielsen (2007: 
341) 
Communication 
 
Communication refers to the information exchanged 
between IJV partners and is defined as ‘formal and 
informal sharing of meaningful and timely infor-
mation between IJV partner firms’.  
Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 
(1999: 445);  Silva, Bradley and 
Sousa (2012: 295) 
Cultural  
sensitivity 
Cultural sensitivity refers to a firm’s awareness of 
cultural differences between it and its IJV partners, 
and effectively dealing and managing these differ-
ences. 
Johnson et al. (1996: 985); Voss 
et al. (2006: 613) 
Expected  
longevity of IJV 
Expected longevity of IJV reflects a firm’s expecta-
tions that the IJV relationship with partner firm will 
continue on a long-term basis. 
Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay 
(1996: 1011); Muthusamy, 
White and Carr (2007: 71) 
Opportunism 
 
Opportunism is defined as ‘self-interest seeking with 
guile’ and is manifested in acts such as withholding 
critical information, misrepresenting facts, shirking 
obligations, failing to keep promises, or taking ad-
vantage of its partner with little regard for ethics. 
Williamson (1985: 47); Hsieh, 
Rodrigues and Child (2010: 3); 
Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012: 
296) 
Ownership share Ownership share refers to the ratio of equity distribu-
tion between the IJV partners. 
Luo (2002b: 681); Hsieh,  
Rodrigues and Child (2010: 9) 
Resource  
complementary 
 
Complementary is the extent to which IJV partners 
bring different resources that cover each other weak-
nesses and provide a better fit to achieve IJV objec-
tives  
Donnell (2005: 145); Deitz et 
al. (2010: 3) 
Interdependence 
 
It refers to the extent to which both IJV partners 
interlock each other in an IJV by investing transac-
tion specific assets that have little value outside the 
IJV  
Williamson (1985: 191);  
Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 
(1999: 442); Ybarra and Turk 
(2009: 66) 
IJV performance 
 
It is extent to which the foreign parent of IJV (i.e. 
Nordic parents of IJV) are satisfied with IJV with 
respect to overall performance, profitability, market 
share, and  achievement of goals set for IJV 
Lane, Salk and Lyles (2001: 
1148); Krishnan, Martin and 
Noorderhaven (2006: 900); 
Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012: 
303) 
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Chapter three (Study Hypotheses and Research Model) develops the hypotheses 
and presents the final research model of the dissertation. Firstly, the hypotheses 
are developed regarding the social antecedent factors of trust and opportunism 
from social exchange theory, and structural antecedent factors of trust and oppor-
tunism from transaction cost theory. Next, the chapter includes the hypotheses 
about the trust-performance relationship in IJVs, and the potential moderating 
influence of resource complementary on trust-performance relationship. The 
chapter concludes with development of the research model, thereby achieving one 
of the key sub-objectives of study. 
Chapter four (Research Methodology) starts with the philosophical stance fol-
lowed in this dissertation. The discussion of chosen philosophical stance leads to 
research methodology, and method of data collection in this dissertation. Next, 
the chosen method of data analysis is discussed in detail. The chapter concludes 
with the operationalization of key constructs in the dissertation. 
Chapter five (Empirical Analysis and Results) explains the empirical results of 
the dissertation. The chapter starts explaining the study sample and its key charac-
teristics with the help of histograms and pie charts. Afterwards, the two common 
sources of error in mail-survey research, that are, non-response biasness and 
common method biasness are discussed. Next, the chapter describes the results 
from the measurement and structural model. The chapter concludes with showing 
the results of hypotheses in the dissertation. 
Chapter six (Summary and Conclusions) is the last chapter of this dissertation. 
This chapter starts with a summary discussion about the key results of this study. 
The next section refers explicitly to the key contributions of the dissertation both 
at theoretical and empirical levels. This discussion is followed by the managerial 
implication based on the findings of the study. The last section refers to the limi-
tations of the study, and the research areas that can be explored in future research. 
Based on the discussion offered so far, the structure of dissertation is presented in 
a graphical format in the following Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Structure of the dissertation 
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2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
FORMATION AND MANAGEMENT OF IJVS 
This chapter starts with the review of two main theories that frame this study: 
transaction cost theory (TCT) and social exchange theory (SET). Firstly, the TCT 
is discussed by providing an overview of its historical development, its applica-
tion to hybrids and IJVs formation, and its structural approach to the management 
of  IJVs.  Further  on,  summary  and  criticism  on  TCT’s  approach  to  the  manage-
ment of IJVs is presented. Next, the SET is discussed by providing an overview 
of its historical development and its application to IJVs formation and manage-
ment. Further on, summary and criticism on SET’s approach to the formation of 
IJVs is presented. The discussion is continued in the next section about conceptu-
alization of trust in different past studies, as there has been a lot of variance in 
past  studies  in  this  concern.  This  review  builds  the  basis  for  discussion  on  the  
conceptualization of trust in the current study. In the next section, the importance 
of trust in IJVs and the antecedents of trust are discussed in the light of past im-
portant studies. Finally, the rationale of integrating the SET and TCT for studying 
the antecedent factors of trust and trust-performance relationship in IJVs is dis-
cussed.  
2.1 Transaction cost theory of IJVs 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) was developed by Coase (1937) and further pro-
gressed by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1991) and Hennart (1988, 1993, 2008, 2010). 
However, the logic of the theory to the formation of IJVs substantially differs 
between Williamson and Hennart. Further, TCT has been applied to the manage-
ment of IJVs (i.e. reducing opportunism) based on the structural characteristics of 
IJV (e.g. Zeng 1998; Luo 2002a, 2005, 2007; Hennart & Zeng 2005), but there 
are substantial differences between TCT scholars the way they identify and cate-
gorize the structural characteristics of IJV used for managing IJVs (i.e. reducing 
opportunism). In the following, earlier development of TCT, application of TCT 
to hybrids and IJV formation, and structural approach to the management of IJVs 
is discussed in detail. Figure 4 presents the sequence of discussion about the TCT 
of IJVs. 
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Figure 4. Sequence of discussion about the transaction cost theory of IJVs 
2.1.1 Earlier development of transaction cost theory 
The  early  development  of  the  TCT  dealt  with  the  question  of  the  ‘existence  of  
firms’ in relation to ‘markets’ (Williamson 1993a: 7). In 1937, Coase made two 
important contributions to economics: distinguishing ‘firms’ from ‘markets’, and 
explaining the ‘existence of firms’. He distinguished ‘firms’ from ‘markets’ with 
the arguments: “evidently there are at least two coordinating mechanisms: within 
markets the price system signals (decentralized) resource allocation needs and 
opportunities; but firms employ a different organizing principle, that of hierarchy, 
whereupon authority is used to effect resource reallocations” (Coase 1993: 3). 
To explain the ‘existence of firm’, Coase (1993: 22) argued that “the operation of 
a market costs something (i.e. costs associated with determining relevant prices, 
negotiating, and concluding contracts) and by forming an organization and al-
lowing some authority (i.e. an “entrepreneur”) to direct resources, certain mar-
keting costs are saved”. This means that Coase compared transaction costs (i.e. 
cost of conducting transaction in market) against management costs (i.e. cost of 
internalizing transaction) to arrive at the formal condition that defines the bounda-
ry of the firm. To explain the limits of firm boundary, he concluded that, “a firm 
will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the 
firm becomes equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of 
an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm” 
(Coase 1993: 23).  
However, Coase did not identify the factors which cause transaction cost differ-
ences. Williamson concludes that, “the general comparison of firm (management 
costs) in relation to market (transaction costs) was the basic concern of Coase. A 
predictive theory of which transactions would be organized by which mode of 
organization (i.e. firm and\or market) and why was plainly not Coase’s concern 
in 1937” (Williamson 1993a: 7). Therefore, the reasons for organizing some 
transactions in firm and others in the market remained necessary obscure, until 
the factors responsible for transaction cost differences could be identified (Wil-
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liamson 1985: 4). Figure 5 depicts the Coase (1937) explanation of the existence 
of firm in comparison to market.  
 
 
Figure 5. Firm boundary and market 
This comparative logic of firm with relation to market in economizing transaction 
costs was further led by Williamson (1975). He offered the underlying factors 
(i.e. the factors that cause market imperfection, and therefore increase transactions 
costs) that are relevant for the choice between internalizing the governance of 
transactions within firms as opposed to affecting them through market exchanges. 
In other words, he explained the choice of efficient governance structure (i.e. 
firms opposed to markets) by focusing on the underlying factors that cause market 
imperfection. These underlying factors are; human factors (opportunism, bounded 
rationality), environmental factors (small number, uncertainty and complexity), 
and derivative condition of information impactedness. For Williamson (1975), the 
set of environmental factors (i.e. small number, uncertainty and complexity) lead 
to market failure, but these factors need not impede the exchange on market until 
joined with human factors (i.e. opportunism, bounded rationality). He summa-
rized  this  argument:  “the environmental factors that lead to prospective market 
failure are uncertainty and small numbers exchange relationships. Unless joined, 
however by a related set of human factors, such environmental conditions need 
not impede market exchange. The pairing of uncertainty with bounded rationality, 
and joining of small number with what I shall refer to as opportunism are espe-
cially important” (Wiliamson 1975: 9).  
The above pairing of opportunism with small number, and uncertainty with 
bounded rationality led Williamson to explain the impediment of market ex-
change and a reason for internalization. The concept of opportunism, which Wil-
liamson (1975: 26) defines as, “self-interest seeking with glue”, plays an im-
portant role in the choice of governance structure. Williamson does not assume 
that everyone will behave opportunistically. He argues that: “since these types 
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(i.e. opportunism) cannot be distinguished ex ante from sincere types, relying on 
such promises exposes sales contracts to hazards during the contract execution 
and at the contract renewal interval” (Williamson 1975: 27). 
For Williamson, opportunism becomes a real threat in the face of small number 
condition. A situation of small number prevails when a large numbers of qualified 
bidders at the outset become a small numbers supply at contract renewal (1975: 
27). These small numbers enjoy nontrivial cost advantages over non-winners dur-
ing the contract renewal stage. In a small number situation, Williamson argues 
that “it is in the interest of each party to seek terms most favorable to him, which 
encourages opportunistic representations and haggling” (1975: 27). Hence, this 
pairing of opportunism with small number will push the transaction towards hier-
archy.  
The concept of bounded rationality, which Williamson (1975: 21) defines as, 
“human behavior that is intendedly rational, but only limited so”, also plays an 
important role in the choice of governance structure. Williamson (1975: 9) argues 
that when market conditions are uncertain and complex, then it is very costly or 
impossible for bounded rational humans to identify future contingencies and spec-
ify, ex-ante, appropriate adaptations thereto. This pairing of uncertainty and com-
plexity with bounded rationality pushes the transaction towards hierarchy. Wil-
liamson (1975: 9) summarized as: “if, in considerations of these limits (i.e. 
bounded rationality), it is very costly or impossible to identify future contingen-
cies and specify, ex ante, appropriate adaptations thereto, long term contracts 
may be supplanted by internal organization”. 
Finally, the condition of ‘information impactedness’ exists, “when true underly-
ing circumstances relevant to the transaction, or related set of transaction are 
known to one or more parties but cannot be costlessly discerned by or displayed 
for others” (Williamson 1975: 31). However, this condition of information im-
pactedness does not impair market exchange if the parties are (1) not opportunis-
tic,  (2) an unbounded rationality condition was to obtain,  (3) or a large numbers 
competition condition prevails (both presently and prospectively). However, if all 
above conditions are violated, a shift of transaction from market to hierarchy is 
proposed by Williamson (1975: 33). Figure 6 explains the Williamson’s (1975) 
logic of the choice of market or hierarchy based on underlying human and envi-
ronmental factors. 
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Figure 6.  Human and environmental factors leading to the choice of market or 
hierarchy (Adopted and modified from Williamson 1975: 40) 
In conclusion, the core message of Coase’s TCT was that the choice of firm over 
market reflects efforts to economize on transaction costs (See figure 5). Thus, the 
objective function in TCT is to minimize the transaction costs of the exchange. 
This insightful contribution to economics by Coase led the Williamson (1975) to 
identify the underlying factors for the choice of firm over market (see figure 6). 
These underlying factors comprise of; human factors (opportunism, bounded ra-
tionality), environmental factors (small number, uncertainty and complexity), and 
derivative condition of information impactedness. 
2.1.2 Application of transaction cost theory to hybrids formation 
Until now, the above discussion depicts that the main focus of Coase (1937) was 
to explain the rise of the firm in response to market failures, and the same stance 
was adopted by Williamson (1975), though with more elaboration with factors 
leading to the choice of firm over market. However, the proliferation of various 
forms of inter-organizational collaborations in the 1980s was beyond the explana-
tion domain of TCT. Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978 referred in Coase 1993: 
49) say this: “once we attempt to add empirical detail to Coase’s fundamental 
insight that a systematic study of transaction costs is necessary to explain particu-
lar forms of economic organization, we find that his primary distinction between 
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transactions within a firm and transactions made in the market place may often 
be too simplistic. Many long-term contractual relationships (such as franchising) 
blur the line between the market and the firm”.  
To make up for this deficiency, Williamson (1985: 16, 1991) extended his analy-
sis to strategic alliances, or what he called the hybrid mode of governance, which 
he considered to occupy the position between the two ends of the market-
hierarchy continuum. These hybrids embody the elements of both market and 
hierarchy. For Williamson (1985, 1991), hybrids consist of long term supply con-
tracts, licensing contracts, franchising contracts and JVs.  
TCT maintains that there are “rational economic reasons” for organizing some 
transactions one way and other transactions another (Williamson 1985: 52). This 
is further explained by Williamson (1985: 18) with argumentation that transac-
tions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, i.e. 
market, hybrid, or hierarchy, in a discriminating (i.e. transaction-cost-
economizing) way. In other words, the governance mode (hierarchy, hybrid, or 
market) that minimizes transaction costs is the preferred option. The principal 
attributes of transactions, according to TCT, are asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency (Williamson 1985: 52).  
In  his  1985  analysis,  Williamson  gives  more  attention  to  asset  specificity  as  a  
point of reference for choosing the efficient governance structure. Asset specifici-
ty  refers  to  “durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular 
transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best al-
ternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be prema-
turely terminated” (Williamson 1985: 55). Asset specificity is thus a particular 
case of small-number conditions. High asset specificity increases switching costs 
and makes it possible for the more flexible party to exploit the less flexible one 
(i.e. opportunism). Therefore, the transactions with medium asset specificity are 
pushed towards hybrids, because hybrids provide added contractual safeguards 
and dispute resolution mechanisms, and those with high asset specificity towards 
firm governance because firms, although they are subject to added bureaucratic 
costs, are also more adaptive as they can make use of fiat. Williamson (1985: 78) 
thus predicts that, ceteris paribus, transactions with low asset specificity will be 
handled by markets, those with intermediate asset specificity by hybrids, and 
those with high asset specificity in firms. 
The second dimension of transaction is uncertainty. The effect of uncertainty on 
the choice of governance form, however, is conditional (Williamson 1985: 59). 
When asset specificity is low, market governance should be preferred whatever 
the degree of uncertainty, since continuity matters little and new transaction ar-
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rangements can easily be arranged by both parties (i.e. accommodating uncertain-
ty by switching partners is easy) if necessary (Williamson 1985: 59). 
In situations of mixed asset specificity, although, there are benefits to continuing 
the transaction by hybrids governance as it facilitates adaptation. However, at 
high levels of uncertainty, the hybrid tend to shrink, and may even disappear 
(Williamson 1985: 80). This is because hybrid adaptations cannot be made unilat-
erally (as with market governance), or by fiat (as with hierarchy), but require mu-
tual consent (Williamson 1985: 80). Mutual consent is viewed as being more time 
consuming, which may lead to failure in the face of high rates of uncertainty. The 
result is that high uncertainty renders both market governance and hierarchies 
preferable to hybrids. Hence firm governance is preferred whenever asset speci-
ficity and uncertainty are both high, hybrids when asset specificity and uncertain-
ty are both medium, and market governance when asset specificity is low and 
uncertainty is high and\or low.  
Finally, the frequency of the transaction operates in a similar way. Williamson 
(1985: 75) argues that “specialized governance structures (i.e. hybrids and hierar-
chy) are commonly devised for recurring transactions supported by investments 
of mixed and highly specific kinds”. Hence, in the presence of mixed to high asset 
specificity, frequency pushes transactions away from the market and towards hy-
brids and hierarchy (Williamson 1985: 79). 
 
 
Figure 7. Principal attributes of transaction and choice of governance struc-
tures 
 Acta Wasaensia     29 
  
In conclusion, TCT argues that the transactions, which differ in their attributes, 
are aligned with governance structures, i.e. market, hybrid, or hierarchy, in a dis-
criminating (i.e. transaction-cost-economizing) way. The principal attributes of 
transactions, according to TCT, are asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. 
Williamson (1985) argues that firms are preferred to markets and hybrids in situa-
tions of very high asset specificity and uncertainty for recurrent transactions; and 
markets to hybrids in situation of low asset specificity, low\medium\high uncer-
tainty for all kind of occasional and recurrent transactions; and hybrids optimal 
when both asset specificity and uncertainty are at intermediate levels for recurrent 
transactions. Figure 7 explains the Williamson’s (1985) logic of the choice of 
market, hybrids, or hierarchy based on underlying attributes of the transaction. 
2.1.3 Extending transaction cost theory to IJV formation 
Williamson (1985, 1991) offered a precise analysis of the choice of hybrids (i.e. 
long term supply contracts, licensing, franchising, and JVs) over markets and hi-
erarchy in discriminating (i.e. transaction-cost-economizing) way based on three 
characteristics of the transactions (i.e. medium uncertainty and complexity, mixed 
specificity of investment, and recurrent frequency) coupling with two behavioral 
assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality. For Williamson (1985, 
1991), JVs are hybrids that are considered to occupy the positions between the 
two ends of the market-hierarchy continuum. However, Williamson (1985: 76) 
admits that “hybrids have only recently received the attention they deserve, and 
their operation is least well understood”. To further explain the logic of hybrids 
(including IJVS) formation, scholars have used TCT extensively to develop theo-
retical explanations of hybrids (Hennart 1988, 1993, 2008, 2010). These further 
developments, although extended TCT, are substantial different from Williamson 
in the way they describe, categorize, and explain the JVs in comparison to market, 
hybrids, and firm. The following section is based on Hennart (1988, 1993, 2008, 
2010), and Brouthers and Hennart (2007). 
For Hennart (1993), there are two distinct organizing methods, i.e. price and hier-
archy, and two institutional forms, i.e. market and firm. Although markets pre-
dominately use prices and firms rely principally on hierarchy, but markets and 
firms can be seen as using combination of two organizing methods of price and 
hierarchy, i.e. hybrids (Hennart 1993: 529). 
In market, price system rewards agents for maximizing their output at market 
prices. Here, it is assumed that value of output produced is perfectly measured by 
the interacting parties. However, this organizing method (i.e. price) becomes inef-
ficient when output of parties is difficult (costly) to measure. In that case, it is 
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likely that some agents will take advantage of the fact that measurement is diffi-
cult (costly) to undersupply those positive dimensions of output which are diffi-
cult to measure and to over supply the negative ones (Hennart 2008: 346). In oth-
er words, when output becomes difficult to measure, price system results in costs 
(i.e. cheating costs), which includes the cost of measuring output plus the residual 
amount of cheating that will remain due to imperfect measurement. Hence buyers 
will invest in measurement up to the point where additional measurement efforts 
are equal to their costs. For example, farmers may surreptitiously add water to 
milk they sell to dairies, or may sell milk contaminated with pesticides, and yet 
charge dairies the price of unadulterated milk. The dairy could perform extensive 
tests on each batch of milk, but the cost is likely to be prohibitive. This inability 
of price systems in markets, resulting in high cheating costs, pushes the transac-
tions towards hierarchy in firm and JVs. 
In firms and JVs, hierarchy reduces the cheating by reducing the incentives agents 
have to cheat. It does this by breaking the connection between outputs and re-
wards (i.e. market prices). Here, agents are no longer being rewarded through 
their output but instead through their obedience to managerial directives. Thus 
agents have fewer incentives to maximize their output and cheat buyers. Howev-
er, such a system of rewards independent of output has one unavoidable conse-
quence: while it reduces cheating, it also reduces incentives to work. Now agents 
have less incentive to generate output, because their reward is no longer directly 
proportional to that output measured at market prices. In other words, when moni-
toring behavior of agents in firms and JVs becomes difficult, hierarchy results in 
costs (i.e. shirking costs), which include the costs incurred to monitor the behav-
ior of employees (i.e. costs to prevent shirking) plus the losses from shirking due 
to imperfect monitoring (Hennart 2008: 346)  
In conclusion, markets are institutions that predominately use price method of 
organizing, and firms predominately rely on hierarchy. However, because of di-
minishing return to measuring output in market due to high cheating costs (i.e. 
inefficient market) pushes the transaction towards firm and JVs. However, be-
cause of diminishing return to constraining behavior due to high shirking costs 
makes firms and JVs inefficient. To solve this dilemma, Hennart (1993: 531) ar-
gues that “however, because of diminishing return to measuring output and con-
straining behavior, both firms and markets will often use a mix of price and be-
havior constraints.” Hence most of transactions exhibit features of both markets 
and hierarchy and are called hybrids. In conclusion, hybrids (see figure 8) like 
long-term supply contracts, licensing contracts, franchising contracts, buy-back 
contracts, distribution contracts, and production sharing are a mix of price and 
hierarchy organizing methods.  
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Figure 8. Organizing methods (i.e. price and hierarchy), and institutions (mar-
ket, hybrids, and firm) 
Now it can be seen from above discussion and Figure 8, that JVs are not part of 
hybrids as they are not mix of price and hierarchy, but are joint hierarchy. In 
comparison of Williamson (1985); which sees JVs as hybrids and explains the 
choice of JVs over other modes (i.e. market and hierarchy) based on transaction 
characteristics of mixed assets and medium uncertainty; Hennart (1988) does not 
see JVs as hybrids and explains the choice of JVs based on the intermediate in-
puts (some raw material and components, some types of knowledge, loan capital, 
and distribution services) that lowers the efficiency of markets. 
Hennart (1988: 364) argues that explaining the existence of JVs requires answer-
ing the following two questions: (1) why an equity link is sometimes preferred to 
other means of acquiring intermediate inputs; and (2) why the firm chooses to 
share the ownership of JV with other parents. 
Answering these questions requires distinguishing between two types of JVs, i.e. 
scale JVs, and link JVs. “Scale” JVs are created when two partners join forces to 
internalize a failing market to overcome the problems created by economies of 
scale or scope. Drilling consortia routinely used by integrated oil companies are a 
familiar example of scale JVs. “Link” JVs are usually used to combine comple-
mentary assets by different firms. A typical IJV, in which the foreign partner pro-
vides technology and the local partner provides local knowledge, is an example of 
link JVs (Hennart 1988: 362). 
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Minimum efficient scale (MES) sometimes differs across successive stages of 
production. If a large MES exists at an intermediate stage, the supply of these 
goods and services tends to be monopolized by a small number of companies who 
have successfully increased their output to the MES level and thus enjoy signifi-
cant cost advantages. This small-number condition significantly increases the 
transactions costs for buyers seeking to obtain such goods and services on the 
open market due to the high costs of bargaining and the potential of holdup by the 
suppliers. Therefore, it is often efficient for these buyers to internalize this inter-
mediate stage and thus reduce the transaction costs of bargaining these goods. 
However, given the large differences in MES across stages, it is often not eco-
nomical for a single firm to obtain full ownership of the relevant assets. There-
fore, firms with similar needs often form JVs to internalize the failing market to-
gether. In summary, scale JVs arise when parties seek to internalize a failing mar-
ket, but indivisibility due to scale or scope economies make full ownership of the 
relevant assets inefficient (Hennart 1988: 372). 
On the other hand, “link” JVs are formed to reduce the transaction costs of com-
bining hard-to-measure complementary assets held by different parties that are 
necessary to achieve a common task (Hennart 1988). Instead of paying a price 
determined by the market (i.e. contract), equity ownership within a JV arrange-
ments rewards partners’ hard-to-measure contributions with a share in the residual 
of the JV. However, if complementary assets can be purchased on the market, the 
party with hard-to-measure assets will integrate into a WOS. Otherwise, simulta-
neously failure of the markets for the service of two or more assets held by differ-
ent firms will therefore lead to the formation of link JVs.  
To explain the existence of the JVs, it is also necessary to explain when such an 
organization mode is preferred to greenfield investment (developing needed re-
sources internally) and acquisition (acquiring the target firm), two other means of 
pooling complementary assets. JVs are more effective when required assets are 
(1) firm-specific and (2) public goods.  
If required assets are public goods (i.e. assets that can be shared at low marginal 
cost), then greenfield is less desirable due to high fixed costs. In that case, it is 
much cheaper to obtain the use of existing assets through acquisition or JV. A JV 
will be chosen over acquisition when needed assets make up a small and insepa-
rable part of the total assets held by target firm. It is all because full acquisition of 
target firm will entail significant management costs because the acquiring firm 
will end up with a collection of unwanted businesses (Hennart 1988: 371).  
In conclusion, JVs are formed to bypass the inefficiencies of intermediate markets 
with respect to providing raw materials and components, tacit knowledge, loan 
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capital, and distribution systems, and when there are high fixed and low marginal 
costs with greenfield investment, and when assets sought are inseparable part of 
total assets held by target firm. One good empirical example is Oxley (1999: 285) 
that bases his analysis on TCT and suggests that, in choosing among different 
types of alliances (equity vs. non-equity JVs) and in the absence of “significant 
contracting hazards, the “default” low-cost governance mechanism is a simple 
contract”. He tested these predictions on a sample of 727 ISAs by US based firms. 
His results are consistent with TCT logic,  as he found that the US firms opt for 
equity IJVs rather than relying on contractual arrangements when intellectual 
property rights are weak in host countries, specification of property rights is diffi-
cult, and monitoring is difficult. In the same vein, Globerman and Nielsen (2007) 
tested the TCT’s prediction of opportunism on a sample of 119 ISAs by Denmark 
based firms. Their results are consistent with TCT logic, as they found that Dan-
ish firms opt for equity IJVs rather than relying on non-equity arrangements when 
threat of opportunism (that basically results from transaction characteristics) is 
high.  Further  findings  of  empirical  studies  driven  by  TCT on  the  choice  of  IJV 
can be found in Brouthers and Hennart (2007). Further to the formation reasons of 
JVs, TCT has also been extended to explain the management of IJVs based on the 
structural characteristics of IJV (Hennart 2010: 352).  
2.1.4 Transaction cost theory and management of IJVs 
The structural approach to managing IJV rests on the idea of curbing opportunism 
in IJVs. So, to proceed on to explain the structural factors for managing the IJVs, 
it is important to discuss here the concept of opportunism in IJVs.  
Opportunism  is  one  of  the  central  behavioral  assumptions  of  TCT,  where  it  is  
believed that human beings will behave opportunistically whenever such behavior 
is feasible and profitable. In Williamson (1985: 47), opportunism is defined as 
“self-interest seeking with guile”. In further specifying this type of behavior, he 
pointed at  “the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially cal-
culated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse”. 
However, Williamson’s assumption of opportunism does not require that every-
one be opportunistic or that opportunism be a constant. In his work, Williamson 
admits that managers want to act on the basis of trust. However, the difficulty on 
identifying trustworthy agents is so great that organizations have to structure 
themselves as if all agents cannot be trusted. Williamson (1985: 64) describes it in 
following  words,  “I do not insist that every individual is continuously or even 
largely given to opportunism. To the contrary, I merely assume that some individ-
uals are opportunistic some of the time and that differential trustworthiness is 
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rarely transparent ex ante. As a consequence, ex ante screening efforts are made 
and ex post safeguards are created”. 
This assumption of opportunism behavior has been associated with participation 
in JVs. Although, the formation of JV helps firms to avoid the costs of opportun-
ism and monitoring (i.e. cheating costs) that are inherent in market transactions. 
But at the same time, partners in JVs are exposed to different types of opportunis-
tic behavior of each other. Luo (2007b: 41) adds that in JVs, opportunism com-
prises “an act or behavior performed by a party to seek its own unilateral gains at 
the substantial expense of another party and/or the JV entity by breaching the 
contract or agreement, exercising private control, withholding or distorting infor-
mation, withdrawing commitment, shirking obligation, or grafting joint earnings”. 
Hennart and Zeng (2005: 109) put free-riding, spillovers, and holdup as three ex-
amples of opportunistic behavior in JVs. Firstly, free riding occurs when partners 
contribute less than promised in JVs. The partners’ contributions to JV are always 
difficult to describe precisely ex ante. This leaves the partners’ contributions 
vague in JV and there is possibility for parents to come short on their obligations 
i.e. free ride. Secondly, a spillover arises when one partner diverts the contribu-
tion of the other to benefit its own separate wholly owned operations without 
payment. JVs typically pool inputs with weak property rights; it becomes possible 
for JV parents to transfer them to their wholly owned operations without payment 
so  as  to  compete  with  each  other  and\or  with  JV i.e.  spill  over.  Lastly,  hold  up  
occurs  when  a  less  dependent  partner  exploits  the  dependency  of  the  other  JV  
partner.  
From TCT perspective, these concerns of opportunism are the fundamental prob-
lem in JVs, which needs to be curtailed. Hennart and Zeng (2005) argue that if 
these types of private gains are not handled effectively, many JVs that would be 
of beneficial to both parties will not materialize. According to Luo (2007a: 856), 
“opportunism impairs collaborative effects and synergy creation, hampers in-
terparty confidence, commitment and reciprocity, impedes IJV evolution and 
growth by increasing uncertainty, and eventually increases the probability of JV 
failure, dissolution or termination”. Collectively, proponents of TCT (Williamson 
1985, Hennart 1988, Hennart & Zeng 2005; Luo 2007a) suggest that opportunism 
is real, is prevalent, is of concern to IJV partners, and is related negatively to per-
formance of JVs. 
Structural factors to the management of IJVs  
TCT has also been extended to explain the management of JVs based on the 
structural characteristics of IJV as the structure chosen for JV goes a long way in 
 Acta Wasaensia     35 
  
explaining the management of IJVs (Hennart 2008: 352). This extended TCT con-
tends that the JVs should be structured in a way to curb opportunism. But, there 
are substantial differences between TCT scholars the way they identify and cate-
gorize the structural characteristics of IJV used to curb opportunism. The four 
basic structural tools that reduce opportunism in JVs are: (1) contract, (2) interde-
pendence (also called co-specialized assets investments and\or mutual hostages), 
(3) ownership structure, and (4) nature of partner resources.  
Firstly, contract has been argued to play an important role in alleviating or miti-
gating the potential problem of opportunism. Luo (2005: 209) argues that “IJV 
contract,  if  structured multi-dimensionally including (1) term specificity (i.e.  the 
extent to which contractual terms are clearly specified), (2) contingency adapta-
bility (possible contingencies are accounted for), and (3) contractual obligatori-
ness (i.e. JV parties are legally bound to the contract) can curtail opportunism and 
guide venture evolution at the same time”.  Using a sample of 192 equity-based 
IJVs in the People’s Republic of China, Luo (2007a) found that contract com-
pleteness reduces the opportunism. Although, parties to a JV may mitigate oppor-
tunism by using more complete contracts, but there are, however, good theoretical 
reasons why contractual restraints are likely to be ineffective in case of IJVs. As 
JVs are formed to pool intermediate inputs (some raw material and components, 
some types of knowledge, loan capital, and distribution services) that because of 
information and measurement costs lowers the efficiency of contracts (Hennart & 
Zeng 2005: 111). Further, unpredictable future contingencies make the contract 
incomplete, and this implies that contractual means to prevent opportunism in 
IJVs is likely to be ineffective. If the complete contracts can be developed, then 
the transaction should be conducted in market than forming IJVs. Williamson 
(1985: 73) also argued that contract completeness decreases when contracts 
change from classical (e.g. sales) to neoclassical (e.g. licensing) to relational (e.g. 
JV). It is probably for that reason that contract as a mechanism to curb opportun-
ism in JVs has limited role. 
Secondly, interdependence has been argued to be an important structural con-
struct in TCT to understand the IJV relationship, as both IJV partners are natural-
ly dependent on each other by investing transaction specific assets (i.e. assets tai-
lored to IJV) that have little value outside the IJV (Hennart & Zeng 2005). Wil-
liamson (1985: 191) differentiated between unilateral dependence and bilateral 
dependence with his discussion about the simple hostage model and the extended 
reciprocal hostage exchange. In a unilateral dependence (i.e. simple hostage mod-
el), only one party becomes dependent on other by investing transaction specific 
assets, but in bilateral dependence (i.e. the extended reciprocal hostage exchange) 
there is interdependence between the both parties, in which both parties invest 
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transaction specific assets. From TCT logic, by investing transaction specific as-
sets in interdependent relationships, both partners interlock each other in alliance 
and have no other option for pursuing their goals. Therefore in the TCT based 
discussion, interdependence is mainly understood as the difficulty of each partner 
to replace the other due to transaction specific assets. According to Williamson 
(1985: 191) “The argument here is that reciprocity (i.e. interdependence) can 
serve to equalize the exposure of the parties, thereby reducing the incentive of the 
buyer to defect from the exchange-leaving the supplier to redeploy specialized 
assets at greatly reduced alternative value. Absent a hostage (or other assurance 
that the buyer will not defect), the sale by A of specialized product to B may never 
materialize. The buyer’s commitment to the exchange is more assuredly signaled 
by his willingness to accept reciprocal exposure of specialized assets. Defection 
hazards are thereby mitigated”. 
In JVs, interdependence is considered to have significant impact on the mitigating 
of opportunism. Hennart and Zeng (2005) argue that bilateral credible commit-
ments (i.e. co-specialized assets) in IJVs mitigate the concerns of either partner’s 
opportunism. This is consistent with Das and Rahman’s (2002) argumentation 
that interdependence between alliance partners diminishes the potential threat of 
opportunism from either alliance partner. Parkhe (1998b) also argues that interde-
pendence between alliance partners in the form of specific investments lessens the 
fears of opportunism. Therefore, interdependence can create a self-enforcing 
structural mechanism in IJVs that reduces opportunism.  
Thirdly, the division of equity between the JV partners is argued to be an im-
portant structural variable from TCT. Level of ownership share concerns the ex-
tent to which “strategic decision making”, “risk” and “JV profits” are substantial-
ly shared between the parties of an IJV (Hennart & Zeng 2005; Hsieh, Rodrigues 
& Child 2010). There has been considerable debate about the relative merits of 
equal versus unequal ownership shares between the parents in IJVs. It is suggest-
ed that in the cases where both partners put an equal investment into a JV, their 
participation in JV decision making is maximized, risk is equally shared between 
JV partners, and profit is equally distributed between JV partners. Therefore, in 
JVs with equal ownership split between partners, both partners become equally 
vulnerable to potential losses from each other and thus show forbearance from 
opportunism (Bleeke & Ernst 1991; Luo 2007a; Hsieh, Rodrigues & Child 2010). 
In contrast, when ownership between JV partners is unequal, there is a strong in-
centive for the minority party to behave opportunistically because of its low 
switching costs on one hand (Hennart & Zeng 2005; Luo 2007a), and majority 
partner takes the decisions in such a way that are not in minority partner’s interest 
on the other hand leading to opportunism from either partner (Bleeke & Ernst 
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1991; Madhok 1995b). Therefore, proper distribution of ownership between IJV 
partners can reduce opportunism from either partner in JVs. 
Finally, an important view in TCE is that IJVs are designed to allow partners to 
combine complementary inputs (Hennart 1988; Hennart & Zeng 2005). In such 
IJVs, which Hennart (1988) refers to as link IJVs, the type of knowledge that each 
partner contributes to the IJV is different. Indeed, Hennart (1988) argues that IJVs 
are formed when access to the complementary resources cannot be obtained 
through market transactions, and acquisition of firms owing them would entail 
significant management costs because required resources are inseparable part of 
total assets held by target firm. Hence, from TCE, the combination of comple-
mentary resources owned by different firms is considered a primary motivation 
driving  IJV formation,  and  also  has  a  central  influence  on  IJV partner  selection  
(Geringer 1991; Hitt et al. 2000). This complementary of resources between IJV 
partners is also considered to have important implications for opportunism. 
Proponents of TCT suggest that resource complementary results in mutual neces-
sity of each other resources that reduces risk of opportunism by equilibrating it 
between IJV partners, and aligns IJV partner’s incentives for joint value creation 
(Hennart & Zeng 2005; Puck, Hodl & Wisgickl 2011). Therefore, resource com-
plementary provides a mutual self-interest and a common interest to forbear from 
opportunism because of necessity of each other resources. Hence, resource com-
plementary can create a self-enforcing structural mechanism in JVs that reduces 
opportunism. 
2.1.5 Conclusions and criticism on transaction cost theory 
TCT explains how and why IJVs are preferred to conduct economic exchange 
over markets (i.e. spot markets and contracts) and firm (i.e. greenfield and full 
acquisition). Theory assumes the presence of opportunism between IJV partners, 
and typically suggests for the importance of structural factors for curbing oppor-
tunism (i.e. managing IJV relationships). Therefore, what is being modeled in 
most of the studies driven by TCT is the presence of opportunism and some set of 
structural characteristics of IJV to curb opportunism (e.g. Hennart & Zeng 2005). 
The most important structural factors suggested are: division of equity between 
IJV partners (e.g. Killing 1982; Geringer & Hebert 1989; Bleeke & Ernst 1991; 
Ramaswamy, Gomes & Veliyath 1998; Child 2002; Lu & Hebert 2005; Luo 
2007a), resource complementary in IJV (e.g. Hennart & Zeng 2005), and interde-
pendence between IJV partners (e.g. Zeng 1998; Das & Rahman 2002; Hennart & 
Zeng 2005). Out of these three structural factors, ownership has received the most 
attention with many of the studies focusing on the reduction of opportunism. In-
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terestingly, limited empirical attention has been paid to interdependence, which 
according to Williamson (1985), and Hennart and Zeng (2005) is the most im-
portant dimension that reduces opportunism in IJVs. Similar to the interdepend-
ence, resource complementary has also received no empirical attention largely 
because TCT has been used selectively to model the management of IJVs (i.e. 
reducing opportunism). A detailed summary of TCT is presented in below Table 
3. 
Table 3. Summary of transaction cost theory 
 Transaction cost theory (TCT) 
Origins Law, economics, and organization 
Key authors Coase (1937); Williamson (1975, 1985, 1991); 
Hennart (1988, 1993);   Hennart and Zeng 
(2005); Brouthers and Hennart (2007); Luo 
(2007a); Oxley (1999) 
Level of analysis Organization 
Managerial philosophy Minimizing transaction costs 
Basic assumptions about 
humans 
Individuals are bounded rational. Some (not all) 
are opportunists 
What are JVs? Williamson logic: Hybrids containing elements 
of both market (i.e. contract) and firm (hierarchy) 
Hennart logic: Joint hierarchy 
JV formation logic Williamson logic: JVs preferred when both asset 
specificity and uncertainty are at intermediate 
levels for recurrent transactions 
Hennart logic: JVs are formed to bypass the 
inefficiencies of intermediate markets with re-
spect to providing raw materials and compo-
nents, tacit knowledge, loan capital, and distribu-
tion systems, and when there are high fixed and 
low marginal costs with greenfield investment, 
and when assets sought are inseparable part of 
total assets held by target firm 
JV management logic The use of various structural mechanisms (e.g. 
ownerships, contract, interdependence, nature of 
resources) to deal with opportunism in JVs 
Relations to trust Theory does not appreciate trust between JV 
partners 
Although, TCT assumes the presence of opportunism between JV partners, and 
typically suggests for the importance of structural factors for curbing opportunism 
(i.e. managing JV relationships). However, there is another research stream to the 
study of JVs, which focuses on the soft relationship between JV partners with the 
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idea that JV management and JV performance can be better explained by the rela-
tionship factor of trust (e.g. Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Nielsen 2007; 
Kwon 2008; Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Silva, 
Bradley & Sousa 2012). Specially, Madhok (1995b) is one of the first authors, 
which criticized TCT logic of JV management for putting too much emphasize on 
“hard issues of ownership and control”, and ignoring the relational element of 
trust that better explains the performance of IJVs. He posited that “trust has effi-
ciency implications, and its potential cost reduction and value enhancing proper-
ties need to be recognized” (Madhok 1995b: 126). In the following, some points 
about the importance of trust in JVs are discussed. 
Firstly, as argued above that it is difficult to develop complete contracts (because 
of unpredictable future contingencies and information asymmetry) in JVs, and 
increased efforts to develop complete contracts can increase transaction costs. 
However, if trust is present between JV partners, the subjective risk of entering 
into incomplete contract is reduced. According to Nooteboom (1996: 989), trust 
reduces transaction costs because it ‘‘economizes on the specification and moni-
toring of contracts and provides material incentives for co-operation’’. 
Secondly, another distinctive structural characteristic of a JV is shared ownership 
(Beamish & Banks 1987; Hennart 1988). Shared ownership implies that two or 
more companies are deciding the strategic direction and operational issues of the 
JV. It brings decreased flexibility in decision making for each party for the strate-
gic direction and operational issues of JV. Partners can disagree on every deci-
sion, and forcing the decision in JVs by the proportion of their ownership can 
increase transaction costs. Ultimately, this would be a pyrrhic victory that ulti-
mately will lead to JV dissolution (Madhook 1995; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 
2003). The role of trust can now be seen in clear focus. Presence of trust will re-
duce the subjective probability of disagreements between JV partners over strate-
gic decision making and hence will reduce the chances of IJV dissolution. 
Beamish and Banks (1987: 4) approach the importance of trust with argument that 
“with a foundation of trust, the partner, and particularly the MNE, would be more 
willing to exercise the tolerance and perseverance necessary to see the JV through 
its difficult time. Problems could be effectively dealt with by MNE without dam-
aging the long-run viability and efficiency of JV management”. By approaching 
the importance of trust from slightly different angle, Parkhe (1998a: 222) argues 
that “there exists a control gap” in managing alliances (JVs), as compared to 
managing hierarchical organizations. Full control is possible in the latter, but only 
partial control is possible in the former. Trust helps to fill the control gap”. 
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Thirdly,  despite  the  under-appreciation  of  trust  in  TCT,  trust  is  emerging  as  the  
new “missing factor” in the management of JVs that explains why some JVs suc-
ceed and other fail. In fact, it is widely noticed in current studies on JVs that the 
trust relationship not only exists between JV partners, but also has positive effects 
on the performance of JVs (e.g. Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007; 
Nielsen 2007; Kwon 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Bener & Glaister 2010).  
Fourthly, although TCT suggests that the chosen structural characteristics of IJV 
limit the perceived opportunistic behavior of JV partner (Hennart & Zeng 2005: 
113). However, the structural characteristics of JV are also subject to another in-
terpretation. Some studies suggest that chosen structural characteristics of JV can 
be interpreted as a symbol or sign of commitment that leads to trust (e.g. Parkhe 
1998a, 1998b; Lui, Wong & Liu 2009). Therefore, it is important to investigate 
these contradictory claims.  
Therefore, recent research on JVs acknowledges that it is trust than the structure 
characteristics of IJV that carries JV’s economic performance. Therefore, TCT, 
where human behavior is viewed as opportunistic, should also answer why trust 
exists in some JVs and why its presence carries economic value in those JVs. In 
the following section, the application of SET to the JV formation and manage-
ment, and the concept of trust are discussed in detail.   
2.2 Social exchange theory of IJVs 
SET was developed by Blau (1964) and further progressed by Gulati (1995), 
Parkhe (1998a, 1998b), Das and Teng (2002) and Globerman and Nielsen (2007). 
Although, theory has straightforward appeal regarding the formation reasons, 
characteristics and management of IJVs, however, it has been very limitedly used 
with regard to explaining the choice of IJV relative to other modes of cooperation 
(i.e. non-equity alliances). In the following, earlier development of SET, applica-
tion  of  SET to  the  formation  of  IJVs,  and  SET approach  to  the  management  of  
IJVs is discussed in detail. 
2.2.1 Earlier development of social exchange theory 
SET is a sociological theory which was initially developed to analyze the people’s 
social behavior in terms of exchange of resources. Theory argues that people get 
involve in social exchange because of a scarcity of resources, thus needing input 
from other parties (Levine & White 1961 referred in Das & Teng 2002: 441). 
Blau defines social exchange as "voluntary actions of individuals that are moti-
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vated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring from 
others" (1964: 91). This means that “an individual who needs resources from oth-
er (i.e. self-interest behavior), voluntary supplies rewarding services to another 
and obligates the other to furnish benefits to the first in turn” (Ibid: 89). These 
expected benefits from the other are not contracted explicitly (i.e. unspecified 
obligation) and it is left to the other to decide the return (Ibid: 93). This initial 
supply of rewarding services to another, although is voluntary and self-interested 
(i.e. motivated by return), carries the risk of rejection of the offer itself and failure 
to reciprocate and enter into friendly relationship from other (Ibid: 98). Because 
of this risk, social exchange requires trusting other to reciprocate. Bachmann 
(2001: 342) describes the importance of risk in trust as: 
“Although trust is such a fundamental mechanism in all social reality, it also in-
volves a problem which would be naive to ignore: Trust is a risky engagement 
(Luhmann 1979). It may be true that trust absorbs uncertainty and diffuses com-
plexity, but, at the same time, it produces risk, as it is inevitable that a social ac-
tor who decides to trust another actor extrapolates on limited available infor-
mation about the future behavior of this actor (Luhmann 1979: 26). In other 
words, trust can be disappointed and, then, appears to be misplaced, for in busi-
ness (as well as in other fields of life), one can be betrayed, and overly romantic 
assumptions can result in considerable losses”. 
However, if other actors discharge these obligations, they prove themselves 
trustworthy and a friendly relation starts (Blau 1964: 98). In order to continue the 
exchange, both supply more of their own services to provide incentives for the 
other to increase his supply and avoid becoming indebted to him. Thus, social 
exchange becomes an ongoing reciprocal process in which “one’s actions are con-
tingent on rewarding reactions from others" (Ibid: 6). According to Blau (1964: 
94), “this gradual expansion of mutual exchange is accompanied by parallel 
growth of mutual trust”. In other words, self-interested actors need trust to get 
involve in reciprocal exchange of needed resources, and this trust is further pro-
moted when reciprocal exchange becomes ongoing.  
Although,  the  SET  is  helpful  in  analyzing  people’s  social  behavior  in  terms  of  
exchange of resources in an incremental way (i.e. process), but the theory itself is 
very broad. The breadth of the theory is considered as an umbrella for various 
concepts such as need of resources, reciprocity, rational actors (self-interested 
actors), trust, interdependence, power, restricted social exchange, generalized 
social exchange, long-term relations, and cultural similarity. It is a big challenge 
for researchers who want to use SET to divide these various concepts in meaning-
ful groups. However, a useful starting point may be to divide these concepts into 
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three groups: (1) factors leading to the formation of social exchange, (2) charac-
teristics of social exchange, and (3) management of social exchange.  
Firstly, SET argues that no actor is self-sufficient, actors will have to interface 
with each other (i.e. to enter in social exchange) to obtain needed resources (Lev-
ine & White 1961 referred in Das & Teng 2002: 441). So, the need of resources is 
the main motive for actors to engage in social exchange. Secondly, the concepts 
of rationality (i.e. self-interested actors), reciprocity, incomplete contracts (i.e. 
unspecified obligation), long-term relations, interdependence, restricted social 
exchange and generalized social exchange, and cultural similarity are the charac-
teristics of social exchange. SET assumes that actors: (1) are self-interested moti-
vated by returns from others, (2) enter into ongoing reciprocal exchange of need-
ed resources, (3) entail incomplete contracts (i.e. unspecified obligation), (4) con-
tinue social exchange for long time, (5) become interdependent on each other for 
needed resources, (6) can constitute social exchange between two actors (i.e. re-
stricted social exchange), and between more than two actors (i.e. generalized so-
cial exchange), and (7) belong to same culture.  
Finally, the concepts of trust and power are used for the management of social 
exchange. The concept of power has been widely studied by resource dependence 
theory (which is grounded in SET) on inter-organizational level.  The theory sug-
gests that when A needs resources from B, A develops a dependence on B, and 
consequently B acquires power over A. It follows that B’s having power over A 
means that B can influence the behavior of A to a certain degree. The relative 
dependence between A and B determines the relative power between them. More 
power means an ability to influence the other party and to determine the outcome 
in social exchange (Emerson 1962, referred in Das & Teng 2002: 441). As re-
gards the difference between trust and power in terms of mode of selection of 
expectations, Bachmann (2001: 350) argues that: “While in case of trust, the actor 
who considers to invest trust in his assumptions selects the possibility that the 
potential trustee will behave the way he prefers, the powerful actor selects a pos-
sibility of behavior which he suggests to the subordinate actor as undesirable 
behavior that should be avoided”. 
Therefore, the very existence of power is considered as a source of interpersonal 
tension (i.e. because of exploitative use) and conflict becomes a natural outcome 
when  one  exercises  power  over  other  (Das  &  Teng  2002,  448).  In  compare  to  
power and exercise of power which is considered as a source of conflict in SET, 
the presence of trust is considered essential for the stable social relations (Blau 
1964: 99). Within the possible management factors of social exchange, this dis-
sertation will focus on the importance of trust.  
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2.2.2 Social exchange theory and formation of IJVs 
Although the origins of SET are at the individual level, the theory has been ex-
tended to inter-firm alliances including the IJVs (e.g. Mohr & Spekman 1994; 
Gulati 1995; Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay 1996; Luo 2002b; Muthusamy, White & 
Carr 2007; Lin & Wang 2008). The logic of theory, as described here “that no 
actor is self-sufficient, actors will have to interface with each other to obtain 
needed resources”, has been extended to inter-firm alliances. According to SET, 
firms resort to various alliances (including IJVs) to gain needed resources from 
each other (Das & Teng 2002: 444). Further to reasoning of alliance formation, 
the characteristics of social exchange (as discussed in above section) have been 
extended to describe the characteristics of strategic alliances including IJVs. SET 
assumes that IJV partners: (1) are self-interested (but not opportunist) motivated 
by returns from others, (2) enter into IJVs for ongoing reciprocal exchange of 
needed resources, (3) form IJV that entail incomplete contracts, (4) continue IJVs 
for long time, (5) become interdependent on each other for needed resources, (6) 
can form IJV between two actors (i.e. restricted IJVs), and between more than 
two actors (i.e. generalized IJVs), and (7) belong to same culture.  
While SET has straightforward appeal regarding the formation and characteristics 
of IJVs, it has been very limitedly used with regard to explaining the choice of 
IJV relative to other modes of cooperation (i.e. structural choice). Specially, Gu-
lati (1995) studied the choice between equity JVs and non-equity JVs and found 
that the likelihood of equity JV formation decreases with the increase in trust be-
tween partners indicated by repeated alliances between partners. The theoretical 
argumentation put forward by Gulati (1995) is that repeated alliances between 
partners breed trust, and trust replaces the equity JVs (and explicit contracts) as a 
chosen governance mechanism. By using the same theoretical logic, Hoffmann, 
Neumann and Speckbacher (2010) studied the choice between full acquisitions 
and non-equity JVs and found that the likelihood of non-equity JV formation in-
creases with the increase in trust between partners. Similarly, Globerman and 
Nielsen (2007) analyzed the choice between equity IJVs and non-equity IJVs of 
Danish firms and found that prior alliance experience between IJV partners is 
associated with a significant lower likelihood of equity IJV. The findings of these 
above studies depict that non-equity JVs are by default mode that reflects the 
presence of trust and it is substitute of equity and control (and explicit contracts).  
However, Das and Teng (2002: 451) study based on social exchange theory sug-
gest that the importance of trust and relationship is more in equity JVs as compare 
to non-equity JVs because of intensifying vulnerabilities resulting from invest-
ments of highly specific assets. This suggestion contradicts with theoretical logic 
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and findings of Gulati (1995) that considers trust and equity/control/contract as 
substitutes. There are some interesting studies that based their theoretical logic 
based on Gulati (1995) study, but found different findings. For example, Oxly 
(1999) studied the choice between equity JVs and non-equity JVs between US 
and non-US firms and found that trust as depicted by repeated alliances between 
partners does not have a significant impact on the choice of alliance structure. In 
the same vein, findings of the Poppo and Zenger’s (2002) study contradict to the 
theoretical logic of Gulati (1995) study that trust is substitute for complex con-
tracts and equity JVs. Their study found that rather than hindering or substituting 
for relational governance of trust, well specified contracts (and JVs as theoretical 
logic used) promote trusting exchange and they complement each other in en-
hancing the exchange performance.  
In conclusion, SET has been very limitedly used with regard to explaining the 
choice of IJV relative to other modes of cooperation (i.e. structural choice). Alt-
hough, studies (e.g. Gulati 1995; Globerman & Nielsen 2007; Hoffmann, Neu-
mann & Speckbacher 2010) evidence in support of a conclusion that low levels of 
trust encourage a preference for equity JVs. However, findings of some studies 
(e.g. Oxly 1999; Poppo & Zenger 2002) are contradictory. Therefore, there is 
need of more empirical research on the role of trust as an important determinant 
of choice between equity JVs and non-equity JVs. In the following, the role of 
trust as an important IJV management factor is discussed in detail. 
2.2.3 Social exchange theory and management of IJVs 
SET has become a popular theory that not only characterizes the IJV relationships 
and explains trust as an important determinant of governance structure, but it has 
also been extended to explain the management of JVs (i.e.  trust  as an important 
governance mechanism). The logic of theory, as described here “self-interested 
actors need trust to get involve in reciprocal exchange of needed resources, and 
this trust is further promoted when reciprocal exchange becomes ongoing (Blau 
1964: 94)”, has been extended to the management of IJVs. SET puts trust at the 
center of social exchange (i.e. IJVs here) as it considers trust essential for the sta-
ble social relations between exchange actors (i.e. between IJV partners) (Blau 
1964: 99). For example, it has been argued that trust can increase cooperation and 
quality of relationship (Arino, de la Torre & Ring 2001), improves alliance flexi-
bility (Young-Ybarra & Wiersema 1999), lowers transaction costs (Zaheer, 
McEvily & Perrone 1998; Dyer & Chu 2003), reduces conflicts (Zaheer, McEvily 
& Perrone 1998), facilitates learning, innovation (Nielsen & Nielsen 2009) and 
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competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen 1994), and improves IJV performance 
(Nielsen 2007; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012).  
According to SET, IJVs are reciprocal exchanges among partner firms that are 
characterized by incomplete contracts with long term duration and are governed 
by trust relationships (Das & Teng 2002: 444). Hence, SET considers that the 
bond  of  trust  between  IJV  partners  is  an  important  management  factor  of  IJVs.  
However, conceptualizing trust as an important management factor of IJVs intro-
duces the possibility that trust may complement rather than substitute for owner-
ship sharing in IJVs. Madhok (1995a: 69) suggests that “trust through the social 
exchange process in and of itself does not replace other forms of governance, 
such as makers or hierarchies, but complements them and can be combined with 
them to govern economic exchange”. The same logic has been put forward by 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) that trust does not replace contracts and hierarchies but 
makes a complementary relation with them in explaining exchange performance. 
Empirical studies that consider trust an important governance mechanism that 
improves IJV performance (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 1997; Nielsen 2007; Kwon 
2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012) implicitly verify 
this logic. However, there are substantial differences between SET scholars the 
way they conceptualize trust to explain the management of IJVs.  
2.2.4 Conclusions and criticism on social exchange theory                                                                                                                                
The SET explains that IJVs are formed to gain needed resources. In IJV studies, it 
is common to treat trust either as a determinant of governance structure (e.g. Gu-
lati 1995; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009) or a governance structure in itself (e.g. Inkpen 
& Currall 1997; Nielsen 2007; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Kwon 2008; Silva, Brad-
ley & Sousa 2012). Social exchange theory (Blau 1964) and empirical studies 
driven by SET (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 1997; Nielsen 2007; Kwon 2008; Nielsen & 
Nielsen 2009; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012) suggest that the partners in IJVs 
should develop trust with each other to manage IJV relationships. However, there 
are some shortcomings of SET. Firstly, the theory is not so explicit in the choice 
of IJV over other type of alliances, and empirical findings present contradictory 
results. Secondly, the theory simply focuses on the importance of trust between 
IJV partners to manage IJV relationships and ignores the importance of structural 
characteristics of IJV. Further, a variety of conceptualizations of trust exists in 
IJV literature. Table 4 presents the summary of SET. 
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Table 4. Summary of social exchange theory 
 Social exchange theory (SET) 
Origins Sociology 
 
Key authors Blau (1964); Gulati (1995); Parkhe (1998a, 1988b);  
Das and Teng (2002); Globerman and Nielsen (2007) 
 
Level of analysis Individual, group, organization 
 
Managerial philosophy Building social exchange 
 
Basic assumptions 
about humans 
Individuals are motivated by return from others (i.e. 
self-interested), but are fair and reciprocal in their 
actions 
What are JVs? JVs are reciprocal exchanges among partner firms 
that are characterized by incomplete contracts with 
long term duration (Das & Teng 2002: 444) 
JV formation logic Firms resort to various alliances (including JVs) to 
gain needed resources from each other. However, 
theory is in support of conclusion that lower levels of 
trust encourage a preference of equity IJVs (Glober-
man & Nielsen 2007: 453) 
JV management logic The bond of trust between IJV partners is an im-
portant management factor of JVs 
2.3 The conceptualization of trust in IJVs 
There is a widespread agreement among scholars over the importance of trust in 
exchange relationships like IJVs (Nielsen 2007; Kwon 2008; Robson, Katsikeas 
& Bello 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). However, 
no widely accepted conceptualization of trust has been proposed so far (Li 2007). 
Despite the existence of vast number of studies on the concept, trust has been 
called as: “slippery” (Hosmer 1995: 393) and “poorly understood” (Child 2001: 
274) phenomenon “with many meanings” (Williamson 1993b: 453) and “with 
lack of a common definition” (Noorderhaven 1996: 109). More recently, Li 
(2007: 422) reviewed the definitions of trust by many authors and argued that 
“despite its increasing importance, trust has no universally definition, and there is 
no consensus regarding its essential nature and features. At best, researchers only 
agree to disagree”. Given the fact that trust is a complex concept, a variety of 
conceptualizations of trust exists. Table 5 presents the conceptualization of trust 
in previous studies on IJVs (this list is by no means exhaustive). The discussion 
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does  not  aim  at  reaching  consensus  on  a  single  conceptualization  of  trust,  but  
helps to frame an understanding of the conceptualization of trust suitable for pre-
sent dissertation. 
The table depicts that a common thread that runs through most of these defini-
tions is that trust entails two fundamental aspects. First, trust is conceptualized as 
“reliance\willingness to rely\willingness to be vulnerable” to another JV party 
(e.g. Mayer, Davis & Schoorman 1995; Inkpen & Currall 1997; Inkpen & Currall 
1998; Ramaseshan & Loo 1998; Sako & Helper 1998; Rousseau et al. 1998; Gu-
lati & Sytch 1998; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone 1998; Child 2001; Fryxell, Dooley 
& Vryza 2002; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Gill & Butler 2003; Muthu-
samy, White & Carr 2007; Luo 2002b, 2008; Lin & Wang 2008; Robson, 
Katsikeas & Bello 2008). This component of trust, i.e. “reliance\willingness to 
rely\willingness to be vulnerable” is used as to express the trusting behav-
ior\intentions  of  trusting  party  in  IJVs.  It  implies  that  under  a  condition  of  risk,  
the trustor willingly accepts to “rely\being vulnerable” to the potential losses 
caused by counterpart IJV party and these potential losses exceed eventual gains 
(Parkhe 1998a: 222). Researchers like Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) and 
Inkpen and Currall (1998) suggest that the risk of negative outcomes must be pre-
sent  for  trust  to  operate,  and  the  trustor  must  be  willing  to  be  vulnerable.  The  
greater the risk, the higher the confidence threshold required to engage in trusting 
action. Further, Robson, Katsikeas and Bello (2008: 648) explicitly state that “in 
the absence of vulnerability perceptions and associated uncertainty, a venturing 
firm’s trust is unnecessary because outcomes are inconsequential for the trustor”.   
Second, trust is conceptualized as “belief\confidence\expectations” about an ex-
change partner attributes (e.g. Mayer, Davis & Schoorman 1995; Ramaseshan & 
Loo 1998; Sako & Helper 1998; Gulati & Sytch 1998; Zaheer, McEvily & Perro-
ne 1998; Rousseau et al. 1998; Jennings et al. 2000; Child 2001; Lane, Salk & 
Lyles 2001; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Dyer & Chu 2003; Krishnan, 
Martin & Noorderhaven 2006; Lin & Wang 2008; Luo 2002b, 2008; Robson, 
Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Deitz et al. 2010; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). This 
aspect of trust is linked with “reliance\willingness to rely\willingness to be vul-
nerable” to another JV party. The logic behind this linkage is that the trustor will-
ingly accepts to “rely\being vulnerable” to the potential losses caused by counter-
part IJV party, but “beliefs\has confidence\expects” about the counterpart’s at-
tributes of trustworthiness. These positive attributes of trustee are called different 
dimensions of trust. The most important dimensions are: (1) integrity\reliability\ 
contractual, (2) competence, (3) goodwill\benevolence\affective \resilient\       
relational\strong-form-trust, and (4) calculativeness. Table 6 depicts the dimen-
sions of trust in prior studies. 
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Table 5.  Conceptualization of trust in previous studies 
Studies Definitions of trust 
Mayer, Davis and 
Schoorman (1995: 
712) 
Willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of an-
other party based on the expectations that the other will per-
form a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective 
of the ability to monitor or control that other party 
Inkpen and Currall 
(1997: 312) 
An individual’s behavioral reliance on another person under 
a condition of risk 
Inkpen and Currall 
(1998: 3) 
Reliance on another JV party (i.e. person, group, or firm) 
under a condition of risk 
Sako and Helper 
(1998: 388) 
Expectation held by an agent that its trading partner will 
behave in a mutually acceptable manner, including an ex-
pectation that neither party will exploit the other's vulnera-
bility 
Gulati and Sytch 
(1998: 167) 
Expectation that another organization can be relied on to 
ful?ll its obligations, to behave in a predictable manner, and 
to act and negotiate fairly even when the possibility of op-
portunism is present 
Ramaseshan and 
Loo (1998: 447) 
Willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has 
confidence 
Rousseau, Sitkin, 
Burt and Camerer 
(1998: 395) 
A psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based on positive expectations of the inten-
tions or behavior of another 
Zaheer, McEvily 
and Perrone (1998: 
143) 
Expectation that an actor can be relied on to fulfill obliga-
tions, will behave in a predictable manner, and will act and 
negotiate fairly when the opportunity for opportunism is 
present 
Jennings et al. 
(2000: 26) 
Mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will behave 
opportunistically and exploit another’s vulnerabilities 
Lane, Salk and 
Lyles (2001: 1140) 
Confidence that the other firm will refrain from exploiting 
your vulnerabilities 
Child (2001: 275) Willingness of one person or group to relate to another in 
the belief that the other’s actions will be beneficial rather 
than detrimental, even though this cannot be guaranteed 
Luo (2002b: 671) Psychological state comprising the intention to accept vul-
nerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or 
behavior of another 
Fryxell, Dooley 
and Vryza (2002: 
871) 
Willingness to make vulnerable to the actions of others un-
der conditions of risk, based on the characteristics/qualities 
of specific others, groups, or systems 
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Studies Definitions of trust 
Boersma, Buckley 
and Ghauri (2003: 
1032) 
Expectation that a party can be relied on to keep to agree-
ments (promissory), will perform its role competently 
(competence) and that the party will behave honorably even 
where no explicit promises or performance guarantees have 
been made (goodwill) 
Gill and Butler 
(2003: 545) 
Trust is placed in organizations or individuals who can be 
relied upon to keep verbal or written promises, not to take 
advantage of the other party and/or be competent, respec-
tively. 
Dyer and Chu 
(2003: 58) 
One party's confidence that the other party in the exchange 
relationship will not exploit its vulnerabilities 
Mohr and Puck 
(2005: 168) 
One IJV partner trusts the other if the latter is perceived to: 
(a) stick to agreements (integrity); (b) be interested in 
achieving both partners’ objectives (benevolence); (c) and 
have the competences resources that are needed to do so 
(competence) 
Krishnan, Martin 
and Noorderhaven 
(2006: 895) 
Expectation held by one firm that another will not exploit its 
vulnerabilities when faced with the opportunity to do so 
Nielsen and  
Nielsen (2009: 
1039) 
Con?dence that another party, not under your control, will 
refrain from exploiting your vulnerabilities 
Muthusamy, White 
and Carr (2007: 
56) 
Reliance on another party under conditions of risk 
Luo (2008: 32) Intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expecta-
tions of the intentions or behavior of another 
Robson, Katsikeas 
and Bello (2008: 
648) 
Willingness of venturing firm's management to accept vul-
nerability based on positive expectations about counterpart's 
intentions or behavior 
Lin and Wang 
(2008: 343) 
Willingness to rely on a partner in whom one has confi-
dence 
Deitz et al. (2010: 
4) 
A generalized expectation regarding an exchange partner's 
reliability and integrity 
Silva, Bradley and 
Sousa (2012: 294) 
Belief, confidence or expectation about an exchange part-
ner’s trustworthiness that results from the partner’s exper-
tise, reliability, or intentionality 
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Table 6. Dimensions of trust in prior studies 
Studies Different dimensions used 
Barney and Hansen (1994) Weak form trust, semi-strong form trust, 
strong form trust 
Ganesan (1994); Johnson et al. 
(1996) 
Credibility, benevolence 
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994); Ra-
maseshan and Loo (1998); Deitz 
et al. (2010); Silva, Bradley and 
Sousa (2012) 
Reliability, integrity 
McAllister (1995) Cognition based, affect based 
 
Leewicki and Bunker (1996) Calculus-based, knowledge-base, affective 
base 
Ring (1996) 
 
Fragile trust, resilient trust 
Nooteboom, Berger and 
Noorderhaven (1997) 
Habitualization, Institutionalization 
Sako (1998); Sako and Helper 
(1998) 
Contractual, competence, goodwill 
 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and 
Camerer (1998) 
Calculative, institutional, relational 
Gulati and Sytch (1998); Za-
heer, McEvily and Perone 
(1998) 
Reliability, predictability, goodwill 
Child (2001) Calculative, knowledge, goodwill 
 
Fryxell, Dooley and Vryza 
(2002) 
Goodwill trust 
 
Mollering (2003) Cognitive, affective, behavioral 
 
Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri 
(2003); Gill and Butler (2003); 
Mohr and Puck (2005); Muthu-
samy, White and Carr (2007) 
Integrity (promissory trust), goodwill trust, 
competence trust 
Dyer and Chu (2003); Krishnan, 
Martin and Noorderhaven 
(2006) 
Reliability, Fairness, Goodwill 
Robson, Katsikeas and Bello 
(2008) 
Calculative, goodwill 
 
First, the concept of integrity is used in many studies on IJV trust to explain the 
trustworthy behavior of trustee (e.g. Morgan & Hunt 1994; Ramaseshan & Loo 
1998; Gulati & Sytch 1998; Zaheer, McEvily & Perone 1998; Sako 1998; Sako & 
Helper 1998; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Dyer & Chu 2003; Gill & Butler 
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2003; Mohr & Puck 2005; Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven 2006; Muthusamy, 
White & Carr 2007; Deitz et al. 2010; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). Underlying 
idea here is that trustee possesses the quality of adhering to a set of principles that 
makes the trustor to rely upon (Mayer et al. 1995: 719). More specifically, integri-
ty is conceptualized as that trusting IJV partner expects\believes\has confidence 
that the other IJV partner will keep to IJV agreements (Boersma, Buckley & 
Ghauri 2003; Mohr & Puck 2005). 
Second, the concept of competence is used in few studies on IJV trust to explain 
the trustworthy behavior of trustee (e.g. Sako 1998; Sako & Helper 1998; Bo-
ersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Gill & Butler 2003; Mohr & Puck 2005; Muthu-
samy, White & Carr 2007). Proponents of this dimension suggest that trust in 
social exchange situations not only means that the other party is expected to sup-
port or at least not obstruct goal achievement, it also includes the belief that the 
partner is actually capable of doing so. Underlying idea here is that trustee pos-
sesses certain competences and resources that increase the likelihood of achieving 
the goals for the IJV (Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Mohr & Puck 2005).  
Third, the concept of goodwill is used in many studies on IJV trust to explain the 
trustworthy behavior of trustee (e.g. Barney & Hansen 1994; Ganesan 1994; 
McAllister 1995; Johnson et al. 1996; Leewicki & Bunker 1996; Ring 1996; Sako 
1998; Sako & Helper 1998; Rousseau et al. 1998; Gulati & Sytch 1998; Zaheer, 
McEvily & Perone 1998; Child 2001; Fryxell, Dooley & Vryza 2002; Boersma, 
Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Gill & Butler 2003; Dyer & Chu 2003; Mohr & Puck 
2005; Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven 2006; Muthusamy, White & Carr 2007; 
Nielsen 2007; Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008). Here, the trusting IJV partner 
expects\believes\have confidence that the other IJV partner will not act opportun-
istically, and will behave in a fashion beneficial to both partners in IJV relation-
ships over and above what was explicitly or implicitly promised. This is expressly 
explained by Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003), and Krishnan, Martin and 
Noorderhaven (2006). Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003: 1032) state that “the 
key  to  understanding  goodwill-based  trust  is  that  there  are  no  explicit  promises  
which are expected to be fulfilled, as in the case of integrity trust, nor fixed pro-
fessional standards to be reached, as in the case of competence trust. This (i.e. 
goodwill trust), then, is a less self-interested, non-egotistic form of trust”. Further, 
Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven (2006: 895) maintain that in goodwill trust, 
“partners commit themselves and make contributions to their relationship that go 
beyond what was explicitly guaranteed”. 
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Fourthly, the concept of calculativeness is used in some studies on IJV trust (e.g. 
Leewicki & Bunker 1996; Rousseau et al. 1998; Child 2001; Robson, Katsikeas 
& Bello 2008). McEvily and Zaheer (2006) consider this dimension of trust as 
most controversial. It presents a highly rational view of trust that is based on con-
sideration of the costs and benefits associated with making oneself vulnerable to a 
counterpart (Nielsen 2011). McEvily and Zaheer (2006: 289) argue that “never-
theless, those who advocate considerations of calculativeness as trust maintain 
that there are conditions under which the evidence of failure to perform can be 
readily determined, but that there may still be limited or short-term exposure to 
vulnerability”. Figure 9 depicts the definitions of the different dimensions of trust. 
 
 
Figure 9. Dimensions of trust in IJVs 
The above analysis depicts that there is no consensus to the dimensions of trust. 
In  a  critical  review of  empirical  research  on  trust,  Seppanen  et  al.  (2007)  found 
twenty-one different dimensions of trust. The table 6 validates this abundance. 
However, the variety of approaches to trust will help us to find a suitable defini-
tion of trust that serves the purpose of current dissertation. It is not our intention 
to evaluate which of these categories is the best. Rather, the available definitions 
and dimensions of trust can help us to determine the concept that can serve the 
current research interest. Preferences will be given to some authors while concep-
tualizing trust for present dissertation in order to pursue the objectives of the dis-
sertation. 
2.4 Conceptualizing trust for present dissertation 
While the above discussion makes it clear that there is a lack of unity among the 
IJV scholars in conceptualizing trust. In order to progress in studying the im-
portance of trust in IJVs, and despite the bewilderment that the massive literature 
has provoked, it is essential at this point to spell out the parameters that frame our 
understanding of the conceptualization of trust for present study.  
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Firstly, the phenomenon of trust is mostly addressed as “reliance\willingness to 
rely\willingness to be vulnerable” to another JV party (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 
1997; Inkpen & Currall 1998; Ramaseshan & Loo 1998; Fryxell, Dooley & Vryza 
2002; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Gill & Butler 2003; Muthusamy, White 
& Carr 2007; Lin & Wang 2008; Luo 2002b, 2008; Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 
2008).  We believe  that,  when trusting,  an  IJV partner  is  willing\accepting  to  be  
vulnerable to the actions of other IJV partner, whose behavior cannot be con-
trolled, based on the expectations that the IJV partner will not exploit these vul-
nerabilities. 
Second, an important aspect of trust is “belief\confidence\expectations” about an 
exchange partner attributes (e.g. Ramaseshan & Loo 1998; Jennings et al. 2000; 
Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Krishnan, Martin & 
Noorderhaven 2006; Lin & Wang 2008; Luo 2002b, 2008; Robson, Katsikeas & 
Bello 2008; Deitz et al. 2010; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). As regards the trus-
tee attributes (i.e. dimensions), Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven (2006) and 
Dyer and Chu (2003) propose an interesting conceptualization of the other IJV 
party’s attributes. Thus the other party is believed\expected: 
(1) to demonstrate reliability by carrying out their promises (e.g. Morgan & 
Hunt 1994; Ramaseshan & Loo 1998; Zaheer, McEvily & Perone 1998; 
Dyer & Chu 2003; Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven 2006; Deitz et al. 
2010; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012) ===> RELIABILITY (it also 
includes the elements of integrity proposed by Boersma, Buckley & 
Ghauri 2003; Gill & Butler 2003; Mohr & Puck 2005; Muthusamy, White 
& Carr 2007) 
 
(2) to  act  fairly  when  dealing  with  each  other  ===>  FAIRNESS  (has  to  do  
with refraining from opportunism (e.g. Dyer & Chu 2003; Krishnan, 
Martin & Noorderhaven 2006) 
 
(3) to exhibit goodwill over and above what was explicitly or implicitly 
promised ===> GOODWILL (e.g. Zaheer, McEvily & Perone 1998; Sako 
1998; Dyer & Chu 2003; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Gill & Butler 
2003; Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven 2006; Muthusamy, White & 
Carr 2007; Nielsen 2007; Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008). 
Based on the preceding discussion, we may outline our definition of trust as: 
Trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability to another party (i.e. to rely) in an 
IJV relationship based on the positive expectations\believes of counterpart’s reli-
ability, fairness, and goodwill. 
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On  the  basis  of  this  definition,  we  present  our  conceptualization  of  trust  in  the  
next figure (see Figure 10), where we have trusting intentions on the left hand 
side, bases of trust on the middle, and dimensions of trust on the right hand side. 
 
Figure 10.  Trust conceptualization 
2.5 Importance of trust in IJVs 
The role of trust in inter-organizational and IJV setting has been highlighted by 
several authors (e.g. Beamish & Banks 1987; Madhok 1995a, 1995b; Zaheer, 
McEvily & Perrone 1998; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Silva,  Bradley  &  Sousa  
2012). The most influential work can be divided into two different groups: 
– Articles that claim the importance of trust based on transaction cost theo-
ry and treat trust as a governance mechanism 
– Articles that refer to trust as one of the most important factor in inter-
organizational and IJV success 
2.5.1 Importance of trust based on transaction cost theory 
There is a general consensus among academics about one characteristic of trust – 
it reduces the motivation for opportunistic behavior and therefore reduces transac-
tion costs, as we may see from the example of Table 7. These studies extensively 
view trust as a key factor for the management of inter-organizational and IJVs 
that lowers the motivation for opportunistic behavior and therefore reduces trans-
action costs. For example, it is suggested that where IJVs  are established in a 
spirit  of  mutual  trust  and  commitment  to  its  long-term commercial  success,  op-
portunistic behavior is unlikely to emerge (Beamish & Banks 1987: 4), are there-
fore resulting transaction costs will be reduced (Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 
2003: 1033). 
 Acta Wasaensia     55 
  
Table 7.  Trust highlighted through transaction cost theory – some im-
portant references 
References Statements 
Beamish and Banks 
(1987: 4) 
In situations where joint venture is established in spirit of mutual trust and com-
mitment to its long-term commercial success, opportunistic behavior is unlikely to 
emerge 
Buckley and Casson 
(1988: 32) 
The firm essence of voluntary inter-firm cooperation lies in coordination effected 
through mutual forbearance, which in turn becomes possible where there is recip-
rocal behavior and mutual trust 
Barney and Hansen 
(1994: 186) 
The level of vulnerability in some economic exchanges may be greater than the 
ability of any standard governance devices to protect against the threat of oppor-
tunism. The only way to pursue these exchanges is thought strong form trustwor-
thiness 
Gulati (1995: 93) Trust counteracts fear of opportunistic behavior and as a result, is likely to limit the 
transaction costs associated with an exchange. This process in turn should affect 
the governance structure of the alliance. In other words, trust can substitute for 
hierarchical contracts in many exchanges 
Madhok (1995a: 59) Where scope for conflict is high, a greater input of trust is required which, if creat-
ed, reduces the probability of opportunism and results in enhancing the value of the 
relationship 
Madhok (1995b: 120) Trust is especially important in situations of uncertainty since, in its presence, less 
stringent contracting can occur in the expectation that social dimensions of the 
relationship will occasion mutually desirable behavior 
Nooteboom (1996: 
989) 
Trust reduces transaction costs because it economizes on the specification and 
monitoring costs of the contracts, and provides material incentives for co-operation 
Aulakh, Kotabe and 
Sahay (1996: 1009) 
If trust is embedded in the partnership, opportunistic behavior is unlikely to occur 
because partner firms will pass short term individual gains in favor of the long-
term interests of the partnership 
Johnson et al. (1996: 
1000) 
A relationship without trust makes partners tentative in their involvement and 
reluctant to reveal their true motives or share knowledge. Without trust, partners 
hold back information or take unfair advantage if given the opportunity 
Inkpen and Currall 
(1997: 309) 
With a foundation of trust, JV partners will be more willing to exercise the toler-
ance and mutual forbearance that allow the JV to overcome problems that could 
lead to opportunistic behavior 
Parkhe 1998a: 220 Trust reduces complex and uncertain realities far more quickly and economically 
than prediction, authority, or bargaining, and thus improves performance 
Zaheer, McEvily and 
Perrone (1998: 144) 
Trust reduces the inclination to guard against opportunistic behavior (i.e. deliberate 
mis-presentation on the part of the exchange partner)  
Nielsen (2001: 3) If as noted by Williamson (1985: 19), “transaction costs are the economic equiva-
lent of friction in physical systems”, then we may conceptualize trust as the behav-
ioral lubricant that can improve a system’s (an alliance’s) operating efficiency 
Boersma, Buckley 
and Ghauri (2003: 
1033) 
Trust is a transaction-cost-reducing mechanism that lowers the subjective risk of 
entering into an agreement. Both ex ante and ex post elements are reduced by trust 
Dyer and Chu (2003: 
60) 
Under conditions of high trust, trading partners will spend less time and resources 
on monitoring to see if the other party is shirking or fulfilling the “spirit of the 
agreement” 
Kauser and Shaw 
(2004: 41)  
If managers are able to help develop mutual trust between partners, this should 
reduce the possibility of both partners attempting to take advantage of each other 
and the possibility of opportunism 
Muthusamy, White 
and Carr (2007: 57) 
As fear of opportunism fades because of mutual trust, the coordination and moni-
toring cost may be reduced  
Nielsen and Nielsen 
(2009: 1039) 
Trust is a particularly important aspect of relational quality in alliances because it 
facilitates social interaction, increases transparency, and reduces transaction costs 
and uncertainty 
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2.5.2 Importance of trust for performance 
Several scholars have suggested (e.g. Harrigan 1986; Madhok 1995b; Zaheer, 
McEvily & Perrone 1998; Cullen, Johnson & Sakano 2000) that the reason for 
this widespread interest in trust lies in the assumptions that trust between partners 
is an important cause of performance in international cooperative alliances and 
IJVs. In fact, these assumed positive roles of trust have been empirically validated 
by scholars in the context of both international cooperative alliances (e.g. Mohr & 
Spekman 1994; Sako 1998; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone 1998; Ybarra & Turk 
2009; Poppo, Zhou & Ryu 2008), and IJVs (e.g. Nielsen 2007; Robson, Katsikeas 
& Bello 2008; Kwon 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Bener & Glaister 2010; Sil-
va, Bradley & Sousa 2012). For detail review please see references in table 8.  
Cullen, Johnson and Sakano (2000: 226) suggested that trust (and commitment) is 
central for IJVs for at least, three reasons. First, no contract or other agreement 
can account for every issue or every contingency that might arise. Therefore, 
much of what happens between partners in IJVs develops informally in IJV rela-
tionship. Ultimately, in evolving or long-term IJVs in particular, managers must 
fall  back  on  trust  (and  commitment),  the  social  fabric  of  the  relationship,  to  fill  
the gaps in the formal agreement and to keep the relationship running smoothly. 
Second, companies often differ in strategic goals and objectives, previous experi-
ences with alliances, cultures and management philosophies, policies and proce-
dures, and national cultures. These differences cause misunderstandings and con-
flicts. Without a sense of mutual trust (and commitment), these differences re-
main unresolved and therefore result in less than optimal performance and even-
tual dissolution. Third, when partners do not trust each other, they hold back in-
formation or take unfair advantage of each other if given the opportunity. If this 
happens, the alliance seldom produces all the mutual benefits possible from coop-
eration. Nielsen and Nielsen (2009) support this view that trust not only directly 
facilitates learning but also strengthen the potential benefit of knowledge tacitness 
for innovative outcomes. In the same vein, Madhok (1995b: 126) suggests that 
trust affects IJV performance by increasing the quality of inter-partner relation-
ships, because trust fosters inter-partner cooperation and coordination, broadens 
the band of tolerance for temporary periods of inequity, reduces conflicts and per-
ceptions  of  relational  risk,  and  heightens  the  flexibility  within  the  IJV  relation-
ship.  
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Although,  the  previous  theoretical  research  on  trust  in  IJVs  (e.g.  Beamish  &  
Banks 1995; Madhok 1995b; Inkpen & Currall 1998; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b) pro-
vides general support for the idea that trust is important to achieve superior IJV 
performance. However, empirical work on trust-performance relationship in IJVs 
presents contradictory results. Some studies find that trust improves IJV perfor-
mance (e.g. Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007; Nielsen 2007; 
Kwon 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Bener & Glaister 2010), some others reveal 
the absence of a significant direct link between trust and IJV performance (e.g. 
Inkpen & Currall 1997; Muthusamy, White & Carr 2007), some studies reveal the 
conditions under which trust matters more to IJV performance (e.g. Luo 2002b; 
Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012), and one study 
points out that under some circumstances, trust may even negatively affect the 
IJV performance (e.g. Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven 2006). Such discordant 
findings suggest that trust’s relationship to performance is not only complex and 
poorly understood, but also that trust may not improve IJV performance under all 
circumstances.  
2.6 Antecedents of trust 
Trust is not a commodity to be bought or sold in the marketplace, but rather must 
be developed by partner firms (Kramer & Tyler 1996). Therefore, scholars have 
identified numerous antecedents of trust in the context of international coopera-
tive alliances and IJVs as can be seen in table 9. In general, the antecedents of 
trust in international cooperative alliances and IJVs can be grouped into two 
broad categories: 
– Social factors 
– Structural factors 
Researchers arguing in favor of social factors as antecedents of trust in interna-
tional cooperative alliances (e.g. Morgan & Hunt 1994; Gulati & Sytch 1998; 
Sako 1998; Poppo, Zhou & Ryu 2008) and in IJVs (e.g. Jennings et al. 2000; 
Brouthers & Bamossy 2006; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 
2008; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012) argue that trust formation\development is 
affected by soft factors at the pre-alliance formation stage and post-alliance for-
mation stage. Among such factors are: 
– Shared values (Morgan & Hunt 1994; Johnson et al. 1996; Gulati & Sytch 
1998; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema 1999; Robson, Katsikeas 
& Bello 2008; Kwon 2008; Ybarra & Turk 2009; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012)  
 Acta Wasaensia     59 
  
– Communication (Morgan & Hunt 1994; Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay 1996; Sako 
& Helper 1998); Sako 1998; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema 1999; Jennings et al. 
2000; Brouthers & Bamossy 2006; Kwon 2008; Ybarra & Turk 2009; Dyer & 
Chu 2011; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012) 
– Opportunistic behavior (Morgan & Hunt 1994; Inkpen & Currall 1997; Nielsen 
2001; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012) 
– Prior alliance experience with partner (Ganesan 1994; Inkpen & Currall 1997; 
Gulati & Sytch 1998; Sako 1998; Sako & Helper 1998; Inkpen & Currall 1998; 
Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema 1999; Jennings et al. 2000; 
Nielsen 2001; Poppo, Zhou & Ryu 2008; Dyer & Chu 2011)  
– Expectations of continuity (Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay 1996; Sako 1998; Parkhe 
1998a, 1998b; Sako & Helper 1998; Nielsen 2001; Poppo, Zhou & Ryu 2008) 
– Cultural sensitivity (Johnson et al. 1996; Jennings et al. 2000; Brouthers & 
Bamossy 2006) 
– Collaborative know-how (Nielsen & Nielsen 2009) 
– Reputation (Jennings et al. 2000; Ganesan 1994; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Nielsen 
2001) 
– Knowledge protectiveness (Nielsen 2001; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009) 
– Distributive fairness (Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Ybarra & Turk 2009) 
Researchers arguing in the favor of structural factors suggest that trust for-
mation\development has also origins in chosen structural characteristics of gov-
ernance form (e.g. Ganesan 1994; Johnson et al. 1996; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; 
Young-Ybarra & Wiersema 1999; Sarkar et al. 2001; Nielsen 2001; Boersma, 
Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Kwon 2008; Ybarra & Turk 2009; Dyer & Chu 2011). 
Among such factors are: 
– Contract (Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003) 
– Asset specificity (Ganesan 1994; Sako & Helper 1998; Dyer & Chu 2011) 
– Balanced asset specificity\interdependence (Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Young-
Ybarra & Wiersema 1999; Nielsen 2001; Ybarra & Turk 2009) 
– Resource complementary (Johnson et al. 1996; Sarkar et al. 2001; Kwon 2008) 
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It is important to note that a substantial number of studies refer to the social ante-
cedents of trust in cooperative alliances as compare to IJVs. In the context of 
IJVs, there are limited studies on antecedents of trust and they have identified 
different antecedents of trust.  For example, Nielsen (2001), Parkhe (1998a, 
1998b), and Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003) suggest that reputation is an 
important antecedent of trust. However, this antecedent has been not analyzed in 
other studies (e.g., Inkpen & Currall 1997; Kwon 2008). Further, most of studies 
on antecedents of trust in IJVs are either conceptual (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; 
Inkpen & Currall 1998; Nielsen 2001) or case based studies (e.g., Jennings et al. 
2000; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Brouthers & Bamossy 2006) that 
prompt the need of more large scale quantitative studies.  
Further, those studies that have analyzed the structural antecedents of trust are 
mostly in the context of cooperative alliances (e.g. Young-Ybarra & Wiersema 
1999; Johnson et al. 1996; Sarkar et al. 2001; Ybarra & Turk 2009). However, in 
the context of IJVs, only conceptual studies (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Inkpen & 
Currall 1998; Nielsen 2001) or case based studies (Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 
2003) suggest for structural antecedents of trust. This ignorance of structural an-
tecedents of trust by prior empirical studies prompts the need to study more the 
social and structural antecedents of trust in the context of IJVs. 
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2.7 Combining social exchange theory and transaction 
cost theory to study the antecedents of trust and 
trust-performance relationship in IJVs 
IJV researchers have devoted considerable effort to the study of managing IJV 
relationships (Madhok 1995a, 1995b; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Inkpen & Currall 
1998; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003). Madhok (1995b) is one of the first au-
thors, who borrowed the concept of trust from social exchange theory and trans-
ferred it to the IJV settings, and posited that “trust has efficiency implications, 
and its potential cost reduction and value enhancing properties need to be recog-
nized” (Madhok 1995b: 126). His study sparked an important research focus in 
IJVs with the idea that IJV management and IJV performance can better be ex-
plained by the relationship factor of trust. Following Madhok (1995b), researchers 
well appreciated the concept of trust in IJVs by identifying the antecedent factors 
of trust and the impact of trust on IJV performance. Studies on antecedent factors 
of trust have identified important antecedent factors such as prior relations, and 
reputation (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Jennings et al. 2000; Boersma, Buckley & 
Ghauri 2003; Nielsen 2003); cultural sensitivity (e.g. Johnson et al. 1996; Parkhe 
1998a, 1998b; Jennings et al. 2000; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003); commu-
nication (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Jennings et al. 2000; Kwon 2008; Silva, 
Bradley & Sousa 2012); expected longevity of IJV (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; 
Nielsen 2003), and opportunism (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 1997; Silva, Bradley & 
Sousa 2012).  
Further, though Madhok’s (1995b) study provides general support for the idea 
that trust is important to achieve superior IJV performance, empirical work on 
trust-performance relationship is limited and presents contradictory results. Some 
studies find that trust improves IJV performance (e.g. Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001; 
Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007; Nielsen 2007; Kwon 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; 
Bener & Glaister 2010), some others reveal the absence of a significant direct link 
between trust and IJV performance (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 1997; Muthusamy, 
White & Carr 2007), some studies reveal the conditions under which trust matters 
more to IJV performance (e.g. Luo 2002b; Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Sil-
va,  Bradley  &  Sousa  2012),  and  one  study  points  out  that  under  some  circum-
stances, trust may even negatively affect the IJV performance (e.g. Krishnan, 
Martin & Noorderhaven 2006). This suggests that trust’s relationship to perfor-
mance is not only complex and poorly understood but also that trust may not im-
prove outcomes under all circumstances. Many studies suggest that further evi-
dence is necessary on the impact of trust on IJV performance (Inkpen & Currall 
1997; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007). 
64      Acta Wasaensia 
This approach of SET, although identifies the antecedent factors of trust, and in-
vestigates the trust-performance relationship, is widely seen as incomplete for 
ignoring the structural characteristics of IJV. The research on antecedent factors 
of trust has merely identified the social antecedent factors of trust and ignored the 
structural characteristics of IJV that could also be important antecedent factors of 
trust. Further research investigating the trust-performance relationship has also 
ignored any role of structural characteristics of IJV which could be potential 
moderators of trust-performance relationship. Hennart and Zeng (2005) are the 
first authors which, although studied the structural characteristics of IJV to reduce 
opportunism, widely criticized the SET approach of ‘studying the social anteced-
ent factors of trust and investigating the trust-performance relationship’ for ignor-
ing the structural characteristics of IJV.  
Regarding the antecedent factors of trust, they argue that “this willingness to be 
vulnerable (i.e. trust) will obviously be greater if the partners have the same 
goals, or if the structure or the contractual stipulations of the joint venture limit 
the extent to which they can be opportunistic” Hennart and Zeng (2005: 113). 
Parkhe (1998a, 1998b) also suggest that in addition to social factors, structural 
factors of IJV are also important antecedent factors of trust. Regarding the trust-
performance relationship, they argue that “while there is no doubt that process 
variables are an important determinant of the performance of alliances, process-
based explanations of alliance dynamics often under-emphasize structural expla-
nation. Some (but not all) process variables seem also to be repackaged structur-
al variables. The prime example is trust, which has been extensively used as an 
independent variable to explain alliance performance” Hennart and Zeng (2005: 
113). Madhok (1995: 122) also share the view that trust is not sufficient in and of 
itself  to  hold  IJV  performance  for  long  time  until  structural  bases  of  IJV  are  
strong. Robson, Skarmeas and Spyropoulou (2006: 603) also suggest that “empir-
ical attempts combining the behavioral paradigm (e.g. trust from social exchange 
theory) with other, dissimilar theoretical perspectives (e.g. structural characteris-
tics from transaction costs economics) are to be encouraged in future research as 
they can expedite the development of richer, more complete explanations of IJV 
performance”. 
This suggests that research on ‘social antecedent factors of trust, and trust-
performance relationship driven by SET’ is incomplete and need to be integrated 
with TCT for possible ‘social and structural antecedent factors of trust, and the 
role of structural characteristics of IJV on trust-performance relationship’. This is 
understandable because different theories are designed to address different types 
of questions.  SET is developed to explain the people’s social  interaction and re-
sulting trust to manage exchange relationships without focusing on the costs from 
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an economic perspective. However, transferring the notion of trust to IJV setting 
requires taking into account the role of chosen structural characteristics of IJVs, 
which are typically discussed in TCT. The TCT is an economic theory which ex-
plains the governance structure of IJV with a focus on cost minimization. Given 
the fact that SET merely explains the social interaction and resulting trust to man-
age exchange relationships without focusing on the role of chosen structural char-
acteristics  of  IJV,  it  is  important  that  SET should  be  combined  with  TCT to  in-
clude the role of structural characteristics of IJV. As Hennart (1988: 373) points 
out, “JVs are often the product of multiple factors, and any (single) theory must 
necessarily  abstract  from  some  of  them”.  Therefore,  integrating  SET  and  TCT  
will help to better understand the ‘social and structural antecedent factors of trust, 
and the role of structural characteristics of IJV on trust-performance relationship’. 
The most important structural factors suggested from proponents of TCT are: di-
vision of equity between IJV partners (e.g. Killing 1982; Geringer & Hebert 
1989; Bleeke & Ernst 1991; Ramaswamy, Gomes & Veliyath 1998; Child 2002; 
Lu & Hebert 2005; Luo 2007a), resource complementary in IJV (e.g. Hennart & 
Zeng 2005), and interdependence between IJV partners (e.g. Zeng 1998; Das & 
Rahman 2002; Hennart & Zeng 2005). From TCT point of view, the structural 
characteristics of IJV limits the perceived opportunistic behavior of partner and 
engenders trust (Hennart & Zeng 2005: 113). Unlike to this reasoning, there is 
also another interpretation of structural antecedents of trust. Some studies suggest 
that chosen structural characteristics of IJV can be interpreted as a symbol or sign 
of commitment that leads to trust (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Lui, Wong & Liu 
2009). Although, the structural characteristics of IJV are subject to different in-
terpretation, it is important to investigate their relationship with trust. However, 
our understanding of structural antecedents of trust is very limited and remains at 
theoretical level (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Hennart & Zeng 2005). 
Concluding that the framework of ‘social antecedents-trust-performance’ driven 
by SET is incomplete because of ignoring the structural characteristics of IJV, 
researchers (Madhok 1995; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Luo 2007a; Hennart & Zeng 
2005) propose that SET should be integrated with TCT to investigate the role of 
IJV structure in ‘social antecedents-trust-performance’ framework . Therefore, the 
development of a framework that unifies SET and TCT to study the antecedents 
of trust, and trust-performance relationship would be an important and timely 
contribution to the literature on trust in IJVs. In the following chapter, a unified 
framework is developed to the study the antecedents of trust, and trust-
performance relationship in IJVs. 
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3 STUDY HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH MODEL 
This chapter provides the conceptual model and the associated hypotheses regard-
ing the antecedent factors of trust, and trust-performance relationship in IJVs. 
Firstly, the hypotheses are developed regarding the impact of social and structural 
antecedent factors on trust for two pathways: (1) direct path (i.e. social and struc-
tural antecedent factors ? trust) and (2) indirect path (i.e. social and structural 
antecedent factors ? opportunism ? trust). Next, the chapter includes the hy-
potheses about the trust-performance relationship in IJVs, and the potential mod-
erating influence of resource complementary on trust-performance relationship. 
Finally, the conceptual model of the study is presented. 
3.1 Social antecedents of trust and opportunism in IJVs 
SET (Blau 1964) and proponents of SET (e.g. Zucker 1986; Parkhe 1998a, 
1998b) suggest that trust is likely to be produced in inter-organizational setting 
like IJVs through the social processes of backward looking (i.e. prior alliance 
experience with the partner, reputation), current interactions (communication, 
cultural sensitivity), and forward looking (i.e. expected length of relationship). In 
the following, we explore each of these social factors and derive hypotheses.  
 
Prior alliance experience with the partner 
Prior research on IJVs suggests that IJVs are not always discrete and independent 
transactions (Inkpen & Currall 1998; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b). Indeed, on many 
occasions firms engage in multiple sequential alliances over time whereby a par-
ticular IJV may be preceded by a history of alliance cooperation between the IJV 
partners (e.g. Nielsen 2001; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003). Social exchange 
theory posits that  this formation of an IJV after having an alliance in past  is  ac-
companied by the development of mutual trust between the partners. This sug-
gests that prior alliance experience between IJV partners helps them to deepen 
their understandings of each other competencies and likely behaviour, and there-
fore develops trust between them (Parkhe 1998a, 1998b). Therefore, partners with 
prior alliance experience with each other are likely to trust each other more than 
other firms with whom they have had no alliances (Gulati 1995: 93).  
However, the empirical findings on the impact of prior alliance experience with 
partner are inconclusive. Dyer and Chu (2011) found that intimate knowledge 
gained by partners about each other through prior exchanges was an important 
factor in engendering trust in subsequent exchanges in Korea and the United 
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States. In Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003) study, it is also found that prior 
exchange between IJV partners facilitates the development of trust between IJV 
partners. Inkpen and Currall (1997) and Gulati and Sytch (1998) found that prior 
alliance experience with partner does not impact trust, a finding contrary to Dyer 
and Chu (2011), and Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003). Poppo, Zhou and Ryu 
(2008) also reported similar results that the positive effect of prior history on trust 
is achieved though expectation of continuity. However, Jennings et al. (2000) 
found support for Dyer and Chu (2011) and Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri’s 
(2003) findings that prior alliance experience with partner facilitates the devel-
opment of trust between IJV partners. Nielsen (2001, 2007) suggests that previous 
alliance experience between the partners facilitates trust and reduces uncertainty 
regarding partner’s behaviour,  and therefore justifies them to invest  in new IJVs 
with partner firm.   
These previous alliance relations impose constraints on IJV parent’s opportunistic 
behaviour and encourage them to act according to each other’s expectations, and 
to the commonly held values, beliefs and norms of reciprocity (Gulati 1995). 
Therefore, previous alliance relationship enhances trust between the IJV parents 
(Inkpen & Currall 1998). It increases the predictability of each other’s behaviour, 
and so constrains the threat of opportunistic behaviour inherent in IJVs. For ex-
ample, Parkhe (1993) found that perceptions of opportunistic behaviour were re-
duced for partners with prior relationships. Given the dominant logic that for-
mation of an IJV after having an alliance in past is accompanied by the develop-
ment of mutual trust (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 1998; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Jennings 
et al. 2000; Nielsen 2001; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Dyer & Chu 2011), 
we posit that: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between the prior alliance ex-
perience with a partner and trust one partner places on the other IJV partner. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between the prior alliance ex-
perience with a partner and threat of opportunism one partner perceives in the 
other IJV partner. 
 
Reputation 
Social exchange theory suggests that in lack of prior direct alliance relationship 
with a partner, trust still can be developed based on partner’s reputation for trust-
worthiness (Nielsen 2001). Reputation represents a cumulative record of a firm’s 
past behavior in alliances with other firms, and therefore its likely future behavior 
can be ascertained by relying on it. A firm with a reputation of being honest, fair, 
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and  trustworthy  gives  one  the  first  piece  of  evidence  to  take  some  initial  risk  
(Barney & Hnasen 1994). The stronger the reputation, the greater the tacit assur-
ance of continuing trustworthy behavior in the future, and the high trust is devel-
oped between IJV partners (Parkhe 1998a, 1998b). Inkpen and Currall (1997) 
posit that those parties which are found to forbear in previous relationships may 
gain a reputation of trustworthiness, which makes them potentially attractive 
partners for others. This is consistent with Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri’s (2003) 
empirical finding that overall reputation including the reputation of trustworthi-
ness makes the firms attractive for forming IJVs, and therefore develops trust be-
tween the IJV partners. Jennings et al. (2000) study also found that parties prefer 
to form IJV with reputable partners which help them to develop mutual trust. In 
the same vein, Ganesan (1994) also reported similar result. 
A firm’s reputation of trustworthiness develops trust between current IJV part-
ners, because partners know more about each other’s past behavior and therefore 
perceived likelihood of opportunism decreases. For example, Bierly and Gal-
lagher (2007) argue that a firm’s reputation is a socially constructed concept and 
reputable firms are viewed as more stable in their behavior and perceived transac-
tion costs will be lower in alliances. This is consistent with Saxton (1997) argu-
ment that “positive reputation can lessen fears of "moral hazard" and "adverse 
selection" by acting as a surrogate for direct experience with a partner”. It is 
therefore advantageous for firms to form IJVs with reputable partners, which 
lessens their concerns of opportunism and facilitates trust in IJVs. Therefore, we 
posit that: 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between the partner reputation 
and trust one partner places on the other IJV partner. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a negative relationship between the partner reputation 
and threat of opportunism one partner perceives in the other IJV partner. 
 
Communication 
Communication refers to the information exchanged between partners in an IJV 
relationship and is defined as “formal as well as informal sharing of meaningful 
and timely information between partners” (Anderson & Narus 1990: 44). Social 
exchange theory suggests that communication is an important determinant of trust 
between IJV partners (Blau 1964; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b) because it aligns the 
partner’s perceptions and expectations, reduces misunderstandings, facilitates 
close ties, and enables them to cope better with internal processes and external 
market conditions (Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay 1996; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). 
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Therefore, IJV partners having good communication with each other are more 
likely to have greater level of trust. This importance of communication as an im-
portant determinant of trust has been substantially confirmed in prior empirical 
research. In a study of 94 IJV in Korea, Kwon (2008) found that communication 
between IJV partners was an important factor in the development of trust. Jen-
nings et al. (2000) also found that communication between the IJV partners facili-
tates  not  only  the  coordination  of  the  IJV  activities,  but  also  develops  trust  be-
tween the IJV partners. Further based on 232 foreign IJVs in Portugal, Silva, 
Bradley and Sousa (2012) also found that communication between IJV partners 
had a positive effect  on trust  between IJV partners.  Dyer and Chu (2001) found 
that communication does not impact trust, a finding contrary to the logic of SET. 
However, substantial studies (e.g. Morgan & Hunt 1994; Aulakh, Kotabe & Sa-
hay 1996; Sako 1998; Sako & Helper 1998; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema 1999; 
Ybarra & Turk 2009) found support that communication facilitates trust between 
partners. 
In addition, communication is also argued to reduce opportunism in IJVs. For 
example, Morris and Cadogan (2001: 233) assert that communication between 
IJV partners enables them to have greater knowledge of each other, lowers infor-
mation asymmetries, and reduces consequent scope for opportunism and per-
ceived risk. From this discussion, we posit that communication between partners 
mitigates opportunistic concerns and develops trust between IJV partners. There-
fore, we posit that: 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a positive relationship between the communication 
between the IJV partners and trust one partner places on the other IJV partner. 
Hypothesis 3b: There is a negative relationship between the communication 
between the IJV partners and threat of opportunism one partner perceives in 
the other IJV partner. 
 
Cultural sensitivity 
Blau’s (1964) notion of “trust required for and promoted by exchange relation-
ships”  entails  the  social  or  cultural  similarity  between  exchange  partners.  This  
perspective suggests that exchanges between culturally similar partners facilitate 
familiarity with each other's modes of thinking and behaving which creates trust 
between partners (Zucker 1986). However, IJVs are formed between companies 
that are usually quite dissimilar in their background characteristics. Two of such 
characteristics are national and corporate cultures of partner firms (e.g. Pothuku-
chi  et  al.  2002).  Creating  trust  in  dissimilar  cultures,  whether  organizational  or  
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national, may be harder, since homogeneous expectations and shared assumptions 
about the alliance may not exist as readily (Nielsen 2001). Clearly, SET justifies 
the need for minimizing the cultural differences between the parents of IJVs; it 
however leaves open how this may be achieved. 
Parkhe (1998a, 1998b) extends the SET by arguing that the existence of cultural 
differences, whether organizational or national, does not in itself produce neces-
sarily conflicts. It may be possible for the partners in an alliance to reach some 
common understanding which can help overcome cultural differences. He sug-
gests for deliberate efforts like investment in intercultural awareness training pro-
grams, encouraging informal contact, and improving behavior transparency. The 
point  of  these  programs  is  to  move  from  culture  shock  to  culture  empathy,  so  
managers understand how their views are colored by their background, how their 
behavior can impact cross-cultural dealings, and how to recognize cultural influ-
ences in others' conduct. Such efforts can pay off nicely in overcoming cultural 
differences and generating trust between partners. For example, Voss et al. (2006) 
found that cultural sensitivity helps to neutralize the deleterious effects of conflict 
and misunderstandings, and facilitate trust between alliance partners. In the same 
vein, Johnson et al. (1996) found that cultural sensitivity promotes trust in US-
Japan alliances. This is consistent with Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri’s (2003) 
findings  that  cultural  sensitivity  (i.e.  putting  oneself  in  other  shoes)  helps  to  re-
duce behavioral uncertainty and creates trust between IJV partners. Thus, we ex-
pect that partner's cultural sensitivity in IJVs can help to create trust and mitigate 
the concerns of opportunism in IJV. Therefore, we posit that: 
Hypothesis 4a: There is a positive relationship between the partner cultural 
sensitivity and trust one partner places on the other IJV partner. 
Hypothesis 4b: There is a negative relationship between the partner cultural 
sensitivity  and  threat  of  opportunism  one  partner  perceives  in  the  other  IJV  
partner. 
 
Expected longevity of IJVs 
In the preceding sections, we have discussed the past and current interactions that 
help to create trust and mitigate opportunism in IJVs. Proponents of SET (e.g. 
Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Zucker 1986) also present the concept of “forward looking” 
in IJVs. The concept of time horizons (i.e. forward looking) has been largely ig-
nored in previous research on IJVs. 
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Prior research suggests that IJVs are residual sharing contracts, where IJV parties 
make provisions from the outset for value to be accrued in the future (Hennart & 
Zeng 2005). Accordingly, IJVs are considered to endure for long period of time, 
and  partners  are  bound for  the  stability  and  success  of  IJVs  (Deitz  et  al.  2010).  
The proponents of SET (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b) suggest that future longer time 
horizons of interaction in IJVs facilitate trust in IJVs. For example, (Parkhe 
1998a) argues that “longer time horizons of alliance, and the expected future 
gains from the alliance promote cooperative, trustworthy behavior. Through such 
expectations of cooperation (and the resulting gains from the alliance), the future 
casts a shadow back upon the present, affecting current behavior patterns”. This is 
consistent with Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay’s (1996) findings that organizational 
perceptions of inter-firm relationship continuation into future encourage ongoing 
trust between alliance partners. Heide and Miner (1992) also found that a percep-
tion of inter-firm relationship continuation into future creates trust and coopera-
tion between alliance partners. In the same vein, Poppo, Zhou and Ryu (2008) 
analyzed the U.S alliances and found that expectation of inter-firm relationship 
continuation into future facilitates trust. Other studies (e.g. Sako 1998; Sako & 
Helper 1998) have found similar results. 
Further, Das and Rahman (2002) and Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay (1996) posit that 
the shadow of the future is the consciousness about the duration of the potential 
relationship between the existing IJV partners, which affects their tendency to 
either cooperate or to be opportunistic in the present. Therefore, if partners per-
ceive that the time horizons of IJV relationship are long, they will be less inclined 
towards opportunism in the interest of the long term viability of the IJV relation-
ship. Therefore, the future longer time horizon of IJV facilitates trust and can help 
to attenuate the concerns of opportunism in IJVs. Hence, we posit that: 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a positive relationship between the perceived longevi-
ty of the IJV and trust one partner places on the other IJV partner. 
Hypothesis 5b: There is a negative relationship between the perceived longev-
ity of the IJV and threat of opportunism one partner perceives in the other IJV 
partner. 
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3.2 Structural antecedents of trust and opportunism in 
IJVs 
In addition to social factors of trust, the requirements of structural characteristics 
of IJV should be satisfied in order to strengthen trust between IJV partners (e.g. 
Madhok 1995b; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Hennart & Zeng 2005). On the basis of the 
TCT, two types of structural factors are assessed in their relation to opportunism 
and trust. These include interdependence and ownership share between the IJV 
partners. In the following, we explore each of these structural factors and derive 
hypotheses. 
Symmetric Interdependence 
Interdependence is arguably the most important structural construct in TCT to 
understand the IJV relationship, as both IJV partners are naturally dependent on 
each other by investing transaction specific assets (i.e. assets tailored to IJV) that 
have little value outside the IJV (Hennart & Zeng 2005). Williamson (1985) dif-
ferentiated between unilateral dependence and bilateral dependence with his dis-
cussion about the simple hostage model and the extended reciprocal hostage ex-
change. In a unilateral dependence (i.e. simple hostage model), only one party 
becomes dependent on other by investing transaction specific assets, but in bilat-
eral dependence (i.e. the extended reciprocal hostage exchange) there is interde-
pendence between the both parties, in which both parties invest transaction specif-
ic assets. From TCT logic, by investing transaction specific assets in an alliance, 
both partners interlock each other in alliance and have no other option for pursu-
ing their goals. Therefore in the TCA based discussion, interdependence is mainly 
understood as the difficulty of each partner to replace the other due to transaction 
specific assets. 
In IJVs, interdependence between IJV partners is seen as one of the key structural 
elements determining the level of trust and opportunism. Hennart and Zeng 
(2005) argue that bilateral credible commitments (i.e. co-specialized assets) in 
IJVs facilitate symmetric interdependence between IJV parties and mitigate the 
concerns of either partner’s opportunism. Both, spillover and holdup problems of 
opportunism are less likely in presence of symmetric interdependence. This is 
consistent with Das and Rahman’s (2002) argumentation that when both partners 
are symmetrically interdependent on each other by investing transaction specific 
assets, with both having much to lose, partners are less likely to engage in oppor-
tunistic behavior. Thus, symmetric interdependence between alliance partners in 
the form specific investments lessens fears of opportunism and induces trust 
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(Parkhe 1998b). Conversely, the existence of asymmetric interdependence be-
tween IJV is considered to enhance opportunism and decrease trust between IJV 
partners (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b). Empirically, Zeng (1998) conducted the sur-
vey of 49 IJVs in United States and found that symmetric interdependence (i.e. 
co-specialized assets) between IJV partners promotes cooperation between IJV 
partners (i.e. reducing opportunism) and enhances IJV performance. In the same 
vein, Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999) analyzed 132 information technologi-
cal alliances of U.S firms and found that balanced asset specificity promotes trust 
between partners. In a sample of 121 information technology alliances, Ybarra 
and Turk (2009) found that balanced asset specificity does not impact trust, a 
finding contrary to Zeng (1998) and Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999). How-
ever, contrary to Ybarra and Turk (2009), Xie, Suh and Kwon’s (2010) study de-
picts that asymmetric interdependence between alliance partners decrease the lev-
el of trust, and increases conflict and opportunism between alliance partners. Fur-
ther, Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom (2005) also found that presence of 
symmetric interdependence between ISA partners leads to higher trust and alli-
ance performance, and low conflict. Based on above discussion, we posit that:  
 
Hypothesis 6a: There is a positive relationship between greater level of sym-
metric interdependence between IJV partners and trust one partner places on 
the other IJV partner. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: There is a negative relationship between greater level of sym-
metric interdependence between IJV partners and threat of opportunism one 
partner perceives in the other IJV partner. 
Equivalent ownership equity 
In IJVs, another important structural factor is the distribution of equity ownership 
between the IJV partners. Level of ownership share concerns the extent to which 
“strategic decision making”, “risk” and “IJV profits” are substantially shared be-
tween  the  parties  of  an  IJV (Ramaswamy,  Gomes  & Veliyath  1998;  Hennart  & 
Zeng 2005). There has been considerable debate about the relative merits of dom-
inant versus equal ownership share in IJVs (e.g. Killing 1982; Beamish 1985; 
Ramaswamy, Gomes & Veliyath 1998; Bener & Glaister 2010). Hsieh, Rodrigues 
and Child (2010) suggest that in the cases where both partners put an equal in-
vestment into an IJV, their commitment to the IJV is maximized, which in turn 
may bring benefits of higher levels of trust and also provide mutual forbearance 
from opportunism and bring stability. Ramanathan, Seth and Thomas (1997) also 
suggest that trust is a function of the structure of the equity arrangement between 
74      Acta Wasaensia 
IJV partners and equivalent ownership IJVs will exhibit higher level of trust than 
where ownership is relatively unequal. Empirically, Bleeke and Ernst (1991) 
found that IJVs with even split ownership had a highest success rate (60 percent) 
than ventures dominated by one company (31 percent). The reason they put for-
ward is that even split IJVs builds trust by ensuring that each partner has equal 
stake in mutual success.  
In contrast, it is said that in IJVs with uneven split ownership, the minority part-
ner having low potential loss and low switching cost, and with less decision mak-
ing  authority  to  IJV  has  greater  incentive  to  be  opportunistic  (Hennart  &  Zeng  
2005). Contrary to that argumentation, Madhok (1995) and Bleeke and Ernst 
(1991) argue that dominant partner having greater decision making authority has 
greater incentive to be opportunistic by putting its own interest ahead of those of 
IJV and partner firm. Altogether, these researchers believe that uneven split own-
ership between IJV partners is nettlesome because it leads to conflicts and oppor-
tunism that can arise from either partner having majority and minority ownership. 
However, given the equal sharing of equity by both firms in an IJV, there is likely 
to be high trust and little incentive for opportunism since partners have equal 
rights in decision making and profit sharing, and have equal stakes in mutual suc-
cess (Bleeke & Ernst 1991; Madhok 1995). Thus, even split ownership between 
IJV partners is considered not only a source of trust, but is also considered to mit-
igate opportunism. We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7a: There is a positive relationship between the greater level of 
equivalent ownership share between IJV partners and trust one partner places 
on the other IJV partner. 
Hypothesis 7b: There is a negative relationship between the greater level of 
equivalent ownership share between IJV partners and threat of opportunism 
one partner perceives in the other IJV partner. 
3.3 Opportunism and trust in IJVs 
An important limitation within SET is the negligence of opportunistic behavior 
between  the  partners  of  an  IJV.  Theory  assumes  that  IJV  partners  pursue  self-
interest, but only in an honest way, which rules out the threat of opportunism. The 
concept of opportunism emanates from TCT and theory assumes that partners will 
use guile to pursue self-interest whenever such behavior is feasible and profitable 
(Williamson 1985). Within the context of IJVs, opportunism is manifested in 
many forms. For example, Luo (2007b: 41) adds that in IJVs, opportunism com-
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prises of “an act or behavior performed by a party to seek its own unilateral gains 
at the substantial expense of another party and/or the IJV entity by breaching the 
contract or agreement, exercising private control, withholding or distorting infor-
mation, withdrawing commitment, shirking obligation, or grafting joint earnings”. 
In the same vein, Hennart and Zeng (2005: 109) put holdup (i.e. exploiting the 
unilaterally dependence of IJV partner), free riding (i.e. contributing less than 
promised in IJVs), and spillovers (i.e. appropriating specific assets without pay-
ment), as three examples of opportunistic behavior in IJVs.  
The opportunistic behavior, no matter in what form, has been pointed out as det-
rimental  for  the  development  of  trust  between  IJV  partners  (Nielsen  2001).  For  
example, Hsieh, Rodrigues and Child (2010: 3) suggest that if an IJV partner per-
ceives that another is behaving in an opportunistic fashion, such perceptions will 
badly impact the collaborative interactions between  IJV partners and will lead to 
decreased trust in that IJV partner. Empirically, Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012) 
conducted the survey of 232 ISAs (also includes IJVs) between Portuguese and 
international firms and found that opportunistic behavior has a negative impact on 
trust. In the same vein, Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that opportunistic behav-
ior reduces trust between alliance partners. Further, Inkpen & Currall (1997) sur-
veyed the 35 Japanese IJVs operating in North American and found that forbear-
ance from opportunism develops trust between IJV partners suggesting that IJV 
partners who observe in the counterpart partners a willingness to refrain from 
opportunistic behavior are more likely to engage in trusting relationship with 
them. Therefore, when an IJV partner believes that its counterpart IJV partner is 
behaving opportunistically, such perception will generate ill will towards that 
partner, and will hinder the development of trust towards that partner. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 8: There is a negative relationship between the opportunistic be-
havior one partner perceives in the other and the trust placed in that partner 
3.4 Trust-performance relationship 
A prevalent notion in the SET is that trust between exchange partners is an im-
portant governance device that results in exchange success (e.g. Blau, 1964). 
Madhok (1995b)  is  one  of  the  first  authors,  which  borrowed this  stance  of  SET 
and transferred it to IJV settings. He posited that “trust has efficiency implica-
tions, and its potential cost reduction and value enhancing properties need to be 
recognized” (Madhok 1995b: 126). The focal logic in his argumentation is that 
trust affects IJV performance by increasing the quality of inter-partner relation-
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ships, because trust fosters inter-partner cooperation and coordination, broadens 
the band of tolerance for temporary periods of inequity, reduces conflicts and per-
ceptions of relational risk, and heightens the flexibility within the IJV relationship 
(Madhok 1995b; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven 1997). Though previous 
theoretical research (e.g. Beamish & Banks 1995; Madhok 1995b; Parkhe 1998a, 
1998b; Inkpen & Currall 1998) provides general support for the idea that trust is 
important to achieve superior IJV performance, limited empirical evidence exists 
to substantiate a positive relationship of the trust-performance relationship in IJVs 
(Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). 
Prior empirical research found that trust has a positive effect on the satisfaction 
with achievement of financial objectives and overall IJV performance in IJVs 
formed between foreign firms and Hungarian firms (Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001) 
and satisfaction with overall performance in IJVs formed between foreign firms 
and Korean firms (Kwon 2008). Further, it is found that trust between IJV part-
ners is an important determinant of the satisfaction with financial and non-
financial IJV performance in IJVs formed between Danish firms and partners 
across the world (Nielsen 2007), between foreign firms and Chinese firms (Ng, 
Lau  &  Nyaw  2007),  and  between  firms  from  UK,  Europe,  North  America  and  
Australia (Bener & Glaister 2010). Therefore, it is believed that trust between IJV 
partners is an important determinant of IJV performance, because it provides a 
sound and cooperative working relationship characterized by low partner’s behav-
ioral uncertainty, low transaction costs, greater flexibility and forbearance, greater 
assets investment, open information flow, and low dysfunctional conflicts 
(Beamish & Banks 1995; Madhok 1995b; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven 
1997; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Inkpen & Currall 1998). Therefore, we posit that: 
Hypothesis 9: In an IJV relationship, there is a positive relationship between 
the amount of trust one partner places in the other and the performance of the 
IJV. 
3.5 Moderation effects-resource complementary 
An important research suggestion emerging from prior reviews of empirical re-
search on trust–performance link (e.g. McEvily & Zaheer 2006; Robson, 
Skarmeas and Spyropoulou 2006) is identifying and empirically testing the mod-
erators for the effects of trust on IJV performance. The underlying logic for this 
view is that the trust–performance link may not hold in the same strength in all 
occasions. Consistent with suggestion, some empirical attempts have been made. 
For example, it is found that trust-performance link is strong with low market 
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uncertainty and high behavioral uncertainty (Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven 
2006), high market uncertainty, strong resource interdependency, commensurate 
risk sharing, greater reciprocal commitment, and younger IJVs (Luo 2002b), 
small  alliance  size  (Robson,  Katsikeas  &  Bello  2008),  and  high  similarities  be-
tween IJV partners (Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012).  
These empirical attempts shed some light on the moderators for the effects of 
trust on IJV performance. However, current research is virtually silent in identify-
ing the role of resource complementary (i.e. an important structural characteristic 
of  IJV)  for  the  effects  of  trust  on  IJV  performance.  The  empirical  research  on  
trust-performance link, which is widely driven by SET, is criticized by Hennart 
and Zeng (2005). They argue that, “some (but not all) process variables seem also 
to be repackaged structural variables. The prime example is trust, which has been 
extensively used as an independent variable to explain alliance performance” 
(Hennart & Zeng 2005, 113). Madhok (1995b: 122) also share the view that trust 
is not sufficient in and of itself to hold IJV performance for long time until struc-
tural bases of IJV are strong. Robson, Skarmeas and Spyropoulou (2006: 603) 
also suggest that “empirical attempts combining the behavioral paradigm (e.g. 
trust from social exchange theory) with other, dissimilar theoretical perspectives 
(e.g. structural characteristics from transaction costs economics) are to be en-
couraged in future research as they can expedite the development of richer, more 
complete explanations of ISA performance”. Therefore, to explore further the 
trust-performance relationship in IJVs, the structural characteristic of IJV, namely 
resource  complementary  from  TCT  that  may  interact  with  trust  in  IJVs  is  dis-
cussed. Knowledge of such moderator for the effects of trust on IJV performance 
is important, as it will allow the managers to understand the structural characteris-
tics of IJVs under which trust  pays off.  In the following, moderating variable of 
resource complementary is discussed and hypothesis is formulated. 
 
Resource complementary as moderator 
An important view in TCE is that IJVs are designed to allow partners to combine 
complementary inputs (Hennart 1988; Hennart & Zeng 2005). In such IJVs, 
which Hennart (1988) refers to as link IJVs, the type of knowledge that each part-
ner contributes to the IJV is different. Indeed, Hennart (1988) argues that IJVs are 
formed when access to the complementary resources cannot be obtained through 
market transactions, and acquisition of firms owing them would entail significant 
management costs because required resources are inseparable part of total assets 
held by target firm. Hence, from TCE, the combination of complementary re-
sources owned by different firms is considered a primary motivation driving IJV 
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formation, and also has a central influence on IJV partner selection (Geringer 
1991; Hitt et al. 2000). This complementary of resources between IJV partners 
has been identified as an important determinant of IJV performance (Nielsen 
2007). The moderating effect of resource complementary on the impact of trust 
on IJV performance has so far, however, not been examined. We suggest that 
resource complementary between IJV partners is crucial in amplifying the posi-
tive effects of trust on IJV performance. 
Prior research suggests that resource complementary is subject to two interpreta-
tions. First, resource complementary provides the basis for value creation in IJVs, 
thus enhancing competitive viability of the IJV (Madhok 1995b; Nielsen 2007; 
Kwon 2008). Second, resource complementary implies mutual necessity of each 
other resources, and therefore results in mutual forbearance from opportunism 
and hence reduced transaction costs (e.g. Inkpen & Currall 1998; Aulakh & 
Madhok 2002; Hennart & Zeng 2005). Therefore, we posit that when resource 
complementary is high, the same amount of established trust will contribute more 
to IJV performance because of reduced transaction costs and increased transaction 
value resulting from resource complementary. Based on these arguments, we 
formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 10: Resource complementary among IJV partners enhances the 
positive relationship between trust and IJV performance. 
3.6 Research model of the study 
The following Figure 11 provides an overview of the study model of the anteced-
ents of trust and trust-performance relationship in IJVs.  
In the case of social antecedent factors taken from social exchange theory, it is 
suggested that prior alliance experience with the partner, reputation, communica-
tion, cultural sensitivity, and expected longevity of IJVs have positive influence 
on trust. Further it is suggested that social antecedent factors comprising of prior 
alliance experience with the partner, reputation, communication, cultural sensitiv-
ity, and expected longevity of IJVs have negative influence on opportunism.  
In the case of structural antecedent factors taken from transaction cost theory, it is 
suggested that level of symmetric interdependence and level of equivalent owner-
ship have positive influence on trust. Further it is suggested that these structural 
antecedent factors comprising of level of symmetric interdependence and level of 
equivalent ownership have negative influence on opportunism. Thereafter, oppor-
tunism is suggested to have negative influence on trust.  
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The model also depicts that the factor of trust taken from SET has positive impact 
on the performance of IJVs. Further, we borrowed the concept of resource com-
plementary from TCT and suggested that positive trust-performance relationship 
will be stronger in case of high resource complementary. 
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4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter offers the discussion about empirical research design of the study. 
The chapter starts with the discussion of chosen philosophical stance that guides 
the methodology of this study. In next section, the data collection procedure in-
cluding the population, questionnaire development, and survey procedure and 
response pattern for the survey research are discussed. Thereafter, the variance 
based structural equation modeling using the PLS approach is discussed by giving 
emphasis to the description of the PLS path modeling and assessment of the struc-
tural model. The chapter concludes with the operationalization of key constructs 
in the dissertation. 
4.1 Philosophical stance followed 
The choice of methodology is of fundamental importance in international busi-
ness studies (Hurmerinta-Peltomäki & Nummela 2004), because it establishes a 
relationship between theory and data (Honderich 1995). These methodological 
decisions are not made in isolation, but are always based on some criteria (Hur-
merinta-Peltomäki & Nummela 2004). Two important criteria that assist in the 
choice of the methodology are the researcher’s philosophical stance (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 1991: 21; Hurmerinta-Peltomäki & Nummela 2004), and 
the research objectives (Collis & Hussey 2009). Therefore, it is necessary to know 
both researcher’s philosophical stance and the research objectives. The first crite-
rion warrants an ontological and epistemological justification and the second a 
technical one (Byrman 1988, cited in Symon & Cassell 1998: 3). Only after align-
ing the choice of research methodology with these criteria, the research should 
begin.  
The philosophical stance followed by a researcher can be described by trying to 
know his/her opinion or assumptions about the; “nature of reality” (i.e. ontology) 
and “what constitutes a valid knowledge” (i.e. epistemology). These assumptions 
of ontology and epistemology assist the researcher to place themselves into two 
opposing paradigms of positivism and phenomenology that guide the choice of 
methodology (Hurmerinta-Peltomäki & Nummela 2004; Collis & Hussey 2009). 
However, it is believed that in the long-standing debate between the two common 
cited extreme positions – phenomenology and positivism – no researcher entirely 
defends one of these views (Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998). Nevertheless, making 
an effort to understand philosophical issues help clarify the overall configuration 
of a piece of research, and identify the most appropriate research methodology in 
relation to the objectives of the research (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 1991). 
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Hence, I will try to clarify my position in this debate, along with the direction to 
which the current research leads me.  
I believe that social reality is objective, external to the researchers, and therefore 
there is one reality (i.e. ontology stance), and it is relevant because it can be 
measured by means of objective methods (i.e. epistemology stance), rather than 
being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 1991; Collis & Hussey 2009). Indeed, I intend to observe 
the level of trust between IJV partners, and how social and structural factors relate 
to this level of trust, and how this trust influences IJV performance. It is not my 
intention to interpret managers’ perceptions, but rather ascertain them by means 
of measures developed from previous empirical studies. Therefore, constructs will 
be operationalized in a way that reality can be measured quantitatively. This is 
what  present  study  intends  to  do  with  the  constructs  of  trust,  IJV  performance,  
and social and structural antecedents of trust. Furthermore, the key objective for 
researchers following this philosophical stance is to search for regularities and 
casual relationships between the constituent elements of social world (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 1991). This is exactly what present study is looking for: to 
know what is the influence of trust on IJV performance, and the possible impact 
of social and structural characteristics of IJV partners on the trust (i.e. antecedents 
of trust). Taking these philosophical assumptions into consideration and research 
objective, present study falls on the left side of the below continuum identified by 
Collis and Hussey (2009: 57) in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  A continuum of paradigms (Collis & Hussey 2009: 57) 
According to Collis and Hussey (2009) and Ghauri and Gronhaug (2010), a de-
ductive approach is followed in positivism paradigm. In this approach, the re-
searcher; builds\deduces hypotheses from the existing knowledge (literature), 
operationalize the key constructs, collects empirical data, and then empirically 
test the hypotheses which demonstrates the truth or false of those developed hy-
potheses.  
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4.2 Choice of quantitative research methodology and 
method 
Collis and Hussey (2009) suggest that the researcher must choose the methodolo-
gy and method that meet his\her philosophical assumptions of the chosen para-
digm. In above section, based on my ontological and epistemological assump-
tions, I argued that my research paradigm is positivism where deductive approach 
is used. A deductive approach is often, according to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2010) 
as well as Hurmerinta-Peltomäki and Nummela (2004) and Collis and Hussey 
(2009), associated with quantitative methodology, and method of data collection. 
According to these authors, survey is a very appropriate methodology for deduc-
tive type of research. Typically the instrument used in survey research is a ques-
tionnaire, which is an “effective tool to get opinions, attitudes and descriptions as 
well as getting cause-and-effect relationships (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2010). In this 
study, a lot of crucial information, such as level of trust between IJV partners, is 
simply not available from secondary sources. Therefore, a structured question-
naire is designed for survey research to collect primary data from a sample, with a 
view to analyse primary data statistically and generalizing the results to a popula-
tion. But for generalizing the results to a population, a sample of sufficient size is 
required. Therefore, in the followings, I discuss the population and sampling. 
4.3 Study population 
The target population of the study consists of Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, 
and Norway) firms having manufacturing IJVs operations in Asia, Europe, and 
America. The following selection criterion was defined to identify the target pop-
ulation: firstly, the IJVs have to be equity IJVs; secondly, one of the parents has 
to be from Nordic countries; and thirdly, IJVs should be formed during the time 
period from 2000 to 2011. The first selection criteria (i.e. limiting the population 
of this study to equity IJVs) was used because all equity IJVs have standardized 
structures, and similar management in comparison to non-equity cooperative alli-
ances (Guidice 2001). Therefore, the findings will be comparable with previous 
studies focusing on equity IJVs (Contractor & Lorange 1988; Park & Russo 
1996). The second criterion of only inquiring the Nordic firm’s IJVs was taken 
because of easy access to developed databank of Nordic IJVs at the University of 
Vaasa (Finland). Furthermore, by looking at foreign partners from only Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway), the influences caused by 
cultural differences occurring when foreign partners come from diverse countries 
is also reduced. Besides, this was a prerequisite due to financial restrictions pre-
venting the author from collecting data from other different countries. In collect-
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ing data for the present study, the author has excluded the viewpoint of local part-
ners. Although, some researchers suggest that it is necessity to consult local part-
ners (e.g. Fryxell, Dooley & Vryza 2002). However, Geringer and Hebert (1991) 
maintain that collecting feedback from both foreign and local partners can be lo-
gistically infeasible and quite costly. Moreover, they find a positive correlation 
between IJV manager’s evaluations of performance and that of foreign and local 
parent companies. The third selection criteria (i.e. IJVs should be formed during 
the time period from 2000 to 2011), was used to capture as many of the firms en-
gaged in IJVs as possible, and also avoiding the biasness of only including the 
relatively newly formed IJVs (Hebert & Beamish 1997; Sarkar, Cavusgil & 
Evirgen 1997). 
Information about the Nordic firms and their operating IJVs in Asia, Europe, and 
America was obtained from “Nordic International Joint Ventures” database com-
piled by Professor Jorma Larimo at the “University of Vaasa”, Finland. The data-
base provides a comprehensive source of manufacturing Nordic IJVs since 2000 
to 2010. This database includes 590 IJVs (196 Danish IJVs, 189 Finnish IJVs, 94 
Swedish IJVs, 111 Norwegian IJVs) formed by 214 Nordic Firms (84 Danish 
Firms, 77 Finnish Firms, 41 Swedish Firms, and 12 Norwegian Firms). The in-
formation contained the names of the Nordic firms, names of IJVs, target coun-
tries of IJV operation, and names of local IJV partners. However, in case of Nor-
wegian and Danish IJVs, database was available up till 2008. Furthermore, in 
some of the cases, nature of investment (i.e. either IJV or WOS) was not identi-
fied. Therefore, a decision was taken to; upgrade database up till 2011, find the 
missing data, and find suitable respondents who have been involved in the for-
mation  and  management  of  IJVs,  their  e-mails  and  telephone  numbers.  To  up-
grade the database, company websites, annual reports, and press releases of all 
214 Nordic firms were reviewed from 2000-2011. From the review, it was found 
that; some firms were not in existence anymore, some IJVs were announced but 
never formed, and some entries in database were in fact WOS from start. After 
removing these entries and upgrading database up till 2011, a population of 464 
IJVs was identified. From the 464 IJVs, 110 IJVs were from Denmark, 180 IJVs 
were from Finland, 97 IJVs were from Sweden, and 77 IJVs were from Norway.  
4.4 Questionnaire development 
The ability to collect necessary data is a very important element of the empirical 
study. Questionnaire is considered an important tool to collect necessary data 
when the researcher knows exactly what is required and how to measure the vari-
ables of interest (Sekaran 1992; Collis & Hussey 2009). The whole success of the 
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work  depends  on  the  quality  of  the  questionnaire  (Easterby-Smith,  Thorpe  &  
Lowe 1991). Therefore, a particular attention was paid for designing the ques-
tionnaire. 
Firstly, it was important to identify what information should be collected and 
how it should be formulated (Collis & Hussey 2009). Therefore, based on theoret-
ical model of the present study, it was clear that the required information is about 
the antecedents of trust, manager’s perceptions of trust, and the impacts of trust 
on IJV performance. Therefore, the questionnaire was organized into three sec-
tions covering each of these topics separately in order to facilitate both reading 
and answering for managers. The three sections of the questionnaire are: back-
ground information and structural characteristics of the IJVs, relationship charac-
teristics between the IJV partners, and IJV survival and performance.  
Secondly, it was important to pay special attention to the measurement and scal-
ing of the constructs (Collis & Hussey 2009). Therefore, all the items/questions in 
the questionnaire are derived or adopted from prior studies conducted by Geringer 
and Hebert (1991), Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay (1996), Johnson et al. (1996), Zeng 
(1998), Glaister and Buckley (1999), Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999), 
Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven (2006), Voss et al. (2006), Nielsen (2007), 
Hsieh, Rodrigues and Child (2010), and Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012). Further, 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991) suggest that closed questions with Lik-
ert scales should be used because they are quick to complete and analyse. There-
fore, all the questions/items of the questionnaire are in a closed or structured form 
mostly with five point Likert scale. 
Thirdly, it is important to pre-test the questionnaire to make sure that questions 
are clear and the respondents of the questionnaire will understand the questions as 
presented (Collis & Hussey 2009). Therefore, pre-testing was carried-out with 
two academicians. These academicians comprise of one professor and one post-
doctorate researcher. Both of the academicians are expert with IJV research, and 
previously had conducted the IJV survey research. They reviewed the initial ques-
tionnaire and made some suggestions regarding wording, sequence, and length of 
questionnaire. Their suggestions were accommodated.  
4.5 Survey procedure and response rate 
Data for present study was collected by web-survey. It is considered an appropri-
ate distribution method as compare to mail survey because it allows the research-
ers to access large sample size easily, faster, cheaply (i.e. reducing costs associat-
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ed with paper, postage, mail out), and it displays the data in numerical form in 
real time (Dillman 2001 referred in Silva 2007). Following these advantages, sev-
eral researchers of IJVs (e.g. Nielsen 2007; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Silva, Brad-
ley & Sousa 2012) have successfully used the web-survey. Therefore, a web-
survey was carried out as suggested by Silva (2007). Following three steps were 
taken sequentially to conduct the web-survey. These steps are: identifying the 
respondents, preparing web survey, sending web-survey and response rate.  
 
Identifying the respondents:  
After deciding to conduct a web-survey, it was necessary to create a database with 
the data on respondent’s names, their contact emails, and phone numbers. There-
fore, a decision was taken to review the websites of all 214 Nordic firms and their 
IJVs,  and  the  annual  reports  and  press  releases  of  all  214  Nordic  firms  from  
2000–2011. I tried to find suitable respondents who have been involved in the 
formation and management of IJVs. The persons responsible for IJV formation 
and management from Nordic firms are usually the directors (i.e. regional direc-
tors, country specific directors, and product specific directors), Voice presidents, 
and managing directors of IJVs.  
Identifying these respondents from press-releases and matching this information 
with their profile on company website, and then collecting their emails turned out 
to be the most difficult and time consuming task in whole survey process. There-
fore, to maximize the benefits of this effort, two respondents for each IJV were 
identified. In this process, the emails were also sent to communication and HRM 
presidents of Nordic firms to determine the identity of the respondents responsi-
ble for their IJVs. In the end, I could identify about 928 appropriate respondents 
and their emails for 464 IJVs.    
 
Preparing web survey: 
After identifying the respondents, next step was the development of web-survey. 
A research software called “LOMAKE” at the “University of Vaasa (Finland)” 
was used to convert the original paper-based questionnaire to web-survey. This 
programme contains important functions of text field, drop down menu, check 
box group, radio buttons, and background appearance option that help to develop 
a web-survey. By using these functions, and Java Scripts, a web-survey was pre-
pared and later verified its quality from supervisor of this software programme.   
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After having respondent’s emails and the web-survey, next step was to develop an 
email message (also called cover letter in mail surveys) to send the web-survey. 
Collis and Hussey (2009) suggest that a well-developed email message is needed 
to elevate the response rate. Therefore, a special attention was paid in the email 
message (i.e. cover letter) to familiarize the respondents with the subject matter, 
and convince them to respond the web-survey. 
Usually, soft-wares, like “LOMAKE”, send one standard email message to all 
respondents at once. However, in my case, instead of sending standard email 
message to all respondents, I decided to send personalized email messages (i.e. 
separate email message to each respondent on his name). This decision was taken 
because I had the details of the respondents (i.e. names and emails of respondents 
responsible for specific IJVs), and the details of IJVs (i.e. IJV names, IJV for-
mation year, target countries of the IJV, and name of local partner). Further, this 
could increase the response rate because respondents will know that the research-
er has good background information about the IJVs and knows the importance of 
respondent for this research. Therefore, personalised email messages were sent to 
each respondent separately that explains the study and contains the link to web-
survey. Following are the contents of the personalised email message in Table 10. 
Sending web-survey and response rate: 
After having the details of respondents (i.e. their names and emails) and web-
survey along with email message, the next step was to send the web-surveys to 
respondents. I had a list of 928 appropriate respondents and their emails to ask for 
464 IJVs that made up the population. From the 464 IJVs, 110 IJVs were from 
Denmark, 180 IJVs were from Finland, 97 IJVs were from Sweden, and 77 IJVs 
were from Norway.  
Finland  
The questionnaires were sent in March 2012 to the 360 identified respondents to 
ask for 180 IJVs. Further, the researcher contacted to the communication direc-
tors,  investment  directors,  and  HRM  directors  of  Finnish  firms  via  phone  calls,  
emails, and personal visits to explain the nature of study and get their help in ar-
ranging interviews and/or filling the web-survey from the respondents. Some re-
spondents were also directly contacted via phone calls to fill the web-survey. Af-
ter all this effort, the first round resulted in 29 filled questionnaires.  
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Table 10. Information given in e-mail 
Parts of e-mail 
message 
Information given 
Title/subject box Title of questionnaire 
 
Salutation line Name of the respondent 
 
Paragraph 1  Purpose of the study 
 
Institute responsible for this study 
Paragraph 2 Details of the IJV (name of IJV, formation year, local 
partner name, target country) about whom information is 
requested 
 
Importance of respondent’s contribution  
 
Request to pass survey-email to another executive if 
he/she feels that the other executive is more appropriate 
respondent 
 
Paragraph 3 Benefits of the study, and offering a summary of the  
results of the research to the respondent 
 
Assurance of the confidentiality 
 
Information about the time duration to complete  
the questionnaire 
 
Paragraph 4 Hyperlink to the survey 
 
The complimentary 
Close 
Appreciating respondent’s replies and their invaluable 
time 
Signature Information about the researcher/researchers 
 
 
The questionnaires were re-sent in April 2012 to those who had not yet respond-
ed. The second round resulted in 13 filled questionnaires. Thus there were 42 an-
swered questionnaires. An attempt was made to directly contact the remaining 
respondents via phone calls to remind them of the questionnaires. Because of this, 
only two more filled questionnaires were received. Thus, a total of 44 surveys 
representing 44 IJVs were returned, for an effective response rate of 24.44 %.  
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Sweden 
The questionnaires were sent in April 2012 to the 194 identified respondents to 
ask for 97 Swedish IJVs. Further, the researcher contacted to the communication 
directors, investment directors, and HRM directors of Swedish firms via emails to 
explain the nature of study and get their help in filling the web-survey from the 
respondents. Despite this all effort, only one filled questionnaire was received. 
Given the very low response and respondent’s un-comfortableness about disclos-
ing such sensitive information to a survey delivered from a university outside of 
Sweden, a decision was taken to collaborate with the “Uppsala University (Swe-
den)”. Therefore, by using email facility from Uppsala University in May 2012, 
the web-survey was recent to 192 respondents to ask for remaining 96 IJVs. Fur-
ther, the researcher re-contacted to the communication directors, investment di-
rectors, and HRM directors of Swedish firms via emails, and personal visits to 
explain the nature of study and get their help in arranging interviews and/or filling 
the web-survey from the respondents. Due to this effort, the second round resulted 
in 22 filled questionnaires. Thus, a total of 23 surveys representing 23 IJVs were 
returned, for an effective response rate of 23.71 %. 
Denmark 
In case of Denmark, it was decided to collaborate with “Copenhagen Business 
School (Denmark)”. This decision was taken to increase the response rate. In June 
2012, a web-survey by using email facility of “Copenhagen Business School” was 
sent to 220 identified respondents to ask for 110 IJVs. Further, the researcher con-
tacted to the communication directors, investment directors, and HRM directors 
of Danish firms via phone calls, emails, and personal visits to explain the nature 
of study and get their help in arranging interviews and/or filling the web-survey 
from the respondents. This effort resulted in 13 filled questionnaires. Due to some 
technical reasons, the researcher could not have the second round of data collec-
tion from Denmark. Therefore, a total of 13 surveys representing 13 IJVs were 
returned, for an effective response rate of 11.82 %. 
Norway 
In case of Norway, I could not have the collaboration with some local Norwegian 
university. Therefore, by using the own email facility at the university of Vaasa 
(Finland), the web-surveys were sent in July 2012 to the 154 identified respond-
ents to ask for 77 IJVs. Further, the researcher contacted to the communication 
directors, investment directors, and HRM directors of Norwegian firms via emails 
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to explain the nature of study and get their help in filling the web-survey from the 
respondents. Despite this all effort, only five filled questionnaire was received. 
The web-survey was recent to remaining respondents in August 2012. This yield-
ed another four filled questionnaires. Therefore, a total of 9 surveys representing 
9 IJVs were returned, for an effective response rate of 11.69 %. 
Reasons of low response rate: 
The target population consisted of 464 IJVs (110 Danish IJVs, 180 Finnish, 97 
Swedish IJVs, and 77 Norwegian IJVs). Through a web-survey, a total of 89 re-
sponses representing 89 IJVs (13 Danish IJVs, 44 Finnish, 23 Swedish IJVs, and 
9 Norwegian IJVs) were received. This makes a total response rate of 19.18 % 
(11.82 % from Denmark, 24.44 % from Finland, 23.71 % from Sweden, and 
11.69 % from Norway). In data collection, although an attempt was made to col-
lect data from two key respondents for each IJV, but finally received single re-
sponse for each IJV. 
The following are the major factors to the low response rate. The most important 
one is the “questionnaire and interview fatigue”. For example, a director at a fiber 
and speciality paper manufacturing company told me that every day he receives 
an average of 30 emails from outside of the company and one or two emails are 
definitely requests for filling questionnaire or interviews. As a result, many re-
spondents refuse to participate in the study. The second reason was the busy 
schedule of the directors. Many managers declined to participate because they 
said they are too busy due to meetings, travelling, and etc. The third reason was 
the restructuring of some companies and respondents declined to disclose sensi-
tive information during restructuring. Fourth reason which was especially visible 
in case of Sweden and Norway that many respondents were not interested in the 
study. This was understandable because they did not feel comfortable to disclose 
sensitive information to a research institute outside their home countries. Fifthly, 
another reason was that some companies replied that they have company policy 
not to participate in surveys. 
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4.6 Structural equation modelling approach with PLS 
method 
4.6.1 Choice of structural equation modelling approach 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) is a second-generation multivariate tech-
nique that couples two traditions: an “econometric perspective” focusing on pre-
diction, and a “psychometric emphasis” that models concepts as latent variables 
that are indirectly inferred from multiple observed measures. This coupling in 
SEM allows the researchers to assess the latent variables at the observation level 
(i.e. measurement model) and test relationship between latent variables on the 
theoretical level (i.e. structural model). In general, it has been stated that the ad-
vantage of SEM-based techniques over first-generation techniques is the greater 
flexibility for the interplay between theory and data. This means that the re-
searcher has the flexibility to model relationships among multiple predictor and 
criterion variables, to construct unobservable latent variables, to model errors in 
measurements for observed variables and to statistically test a priori substan-
tive/theoretical and measurement assumptions against empirical data (Chin 1998: 
296). 
In  this  study,  SEM  is  chosen  over  first  generation  techniques.  The  reasons  for  
choosing the SEM are followings: Firstly, the model of current study consists of 
17 structural relations between the variables that have to be examined at once. 
Therefore, to analyse such a complex model, SEM is deemed proper according to 
Chin (1998). Secondly, the study consists of several latent variables. According to 
Chin  (1998),  for  a  model  that  contains  latent  variables,  the  choice  of  SEM  is  
deemed important. Furthermore, the choice is according to the references from 
authors such as Silva (2007) and Robson, Skarmeas and Spyropoulou (2006), 
who suggest using the SEM in studies on trust since it is soft concept in terms of 
its measurement. Thirdly, it is suggested to use SEM for models wherein con-
structs are simultaneously independent and dependent (Robson, Skarmeas & Spy-
ropoulou 2006). Like in this study, trust is simultaneously dependent and inde-
pendent variable. Therefore, to analyse such a model, choice of SEM is appropri-
ate. 
4.6.2 Choice of PLS method for structural equation modelling 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) can be applied by using different methods. 
The most often used method is covariance-based structural equation modelling 
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(CB-SEM), on which also well-known software such as LISREL, EQS, AMOS, 
SEPATH, and RAMONA are based. The other used method is variance-based 
partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM), on which known 
software PLS is based (Chin 1998). The CB-SEM minimizes the difference be-
tween the sample covariances and those predicted by the theoretical model, 
whereas the PLS-SEM minimizes the variance of the dependent variables ex-
plained by the independent variables. Researchers such as Chin (1998) and Gotz, 
Liehr-Gobbers and Krafft (2010) suggest that the choice of an appropriate method 
should depend on the assumptions about data, theory, and the ties between unob-
servable variables and indicators. This study utilizes PLS-SEM as a primary data 
analysis technique because of the following reasons: 
Firstly, rather than aiming for producing the covariance matrix as close as possi-
ble to the theoretical model (i.e. parameter estimation for testing theory) in CB-
SEM, the aim has been both to theory testing and prediction. This is so because 
part of the structural model, which is under investigation, is based on a strong 
theory (i.e. impact of social factors on trust; and impact of structural factors on 
opportunism) but part of it on a weak theory (i.e. impact of structural factors on 
trust; impact of social factors on opportunism). According to Chin (1998: 295), 
PLS-SEM is appropriate analysis tool when the research objective is theory test-
ing and also theory development.  
Secondly, the small sample size (n=89) restricts the use of CB-SEM. Small sam-
ples in CB-SEM can lead to poor parameter estimates and model fit, and the poor  
statistical power of SEM (Peng & Lai 2012). The minimum recommended sample 
size for CB-SEM is 200-800 (Chin & Newsted 1999). Therefore, the small sam-
ple size of this study (i.e. n=89) prevents the use of CB-SEM. In PLS-SEM, the 
minimal sample size requirement is ten times the greater of the following: 1) the 
latent variable with the largest number of formative indicators or 2) the dependent 
latent variable with the largest number of independent latent variables influencing 
it (Chin 1998: 311). In the study, the largest number of independent latent varia-
bles on one dependent latent variable is 8. Thus, the sample size requirement for 
the structural model under investigation is 80 (10 x 8), which is slightly less than 
the sample size of current study (i.e. n=89). 
Thirdly, another data-related reason to choose PLS-SEM is the danger that the 
data may not follow multivariate normal distribution assumption, which is re-
quired in CB-SEM (Chin 1998; Peng & Lai 2012). 
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Fourthly, regarding the ties between unobservable variables and indicators, an 
advantage of PLS-SEM is that it explicitly determines the values of latent varia-
bles for the predictive purpose. In contrast, the CB-SEM never determines the 
values for the latent variables, and therefore there is no possibility to predict the 
observed variables (Chin 1998: 301). Therefore, PLS-SEM is preferred over CB-
SEM in this study. 
Thus, the objective of the study, the properties of data, and the ties between unob-
servable variables and indicators support the application of PLS-SEM over CB-
SEM in the study. 
4.6.3 Formal specification of the PLS-SEM 
A PLS-SEM with latent constructs has two components: 1) structural or inner 
model, which shows the relationships (i.e. paths) between the latent constructs; 
and 2) the measurement or outer model, which specifies the relationship between 
the observed variables, often also called manifest variables, and the latent varia-
bles (Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 2011).  
The structural model consists of both exogenous and endogenous variables. Ex-
ogenous variable is a latent variable, which does not have any structural path rela-
tionship pointing at it (i.e. independent variable). On the other hand, endogenous 
variable is a latent variable, which is explained by other constructs via structural 
model relationships (i.e. dependent variable). Further, PLS-SEM only permits 
recursive relationships between latent variables (i.e. no causal loops). Therefore, 
the structural paths between the latent constructs can only head in a single direc-
tion (Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 2011). Below Figure 13 presents the structural mod-
el of this study. The model has eight exogenous variables (i.e. prior alliance expe-
rience, reputation, communication, cultural sensitivity, expected longevity of 
IJVs, interdependence, ownership share, and resource complementary), and three 
endogenous (i.e. opportunism, trust, and IJV performance), which all are indicat-
ed as ovals. The casual relationships between these exogenous variables and en-
dogenous variables make up the structural model of the study.  
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Figure 13. The structural model of the study 
The measurement model defines the predictive relationship between each latent 
construct and its associated observed indicators. PLS.SEM can handle both form-
ative and reflective indicators. Reflective indicators are seen as functions of the 
latent construct, and changes in the latent construct are reflected in changes in the 
indicator (manifest) variables. Reflective indicators are represented as single-
headed arrows pointing from the latent construct outward to the indicator varia-
bles. Further, the associated coefficients for these relationships are called outer 
loadings. In contrast, formative indicators are assumed to cause a latent construct, 
and changes in the indicators determine changes in the value of the latent con-
struct. Formative indicators are represented by single-headed arrows pointing 
toward the latent construct inward from the indicator variables. Further, the asso-
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ciated coefficients for these formative relationships are called outer weights (Hair, 
Ringle & Sarstedt 2011). Figure 14 shows the measurement model of the study. 
All latent variables are measured with reflective indicators. These reflective indi-
cators are represented with boxes having arrows pointing toward them. The rela-
tionships between these indicators and their respective latent constructs comprise 
the measurement model of the study.  
 
Figure 14. The measurement model of the study 
4.6.4 Evaluation of the model quality 
Although PLS estimates the measurement model and structural model simultane-
ously, the models are usually analyzed and interpreted in two stages (Sarkar et al. 
2001). The measurement model is assessed first, followed by the assessment of 
the structural model. This is done in order to ensure that the construct measures 
are reliable and valid before assessing the relationship between latent constructs 
(Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 2011). In the following, the criteria for assessing both 
the measurement model and structural model are presented. 
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4.6.4.1   Evaluation of measurement model  
The measurement model or outer model specifies the relationship between ob-
served variables and the underlying latent construct. The literature on PLS-SEM 
(Chin 1998; Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 2010; Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 2011) 
recommends that the assessment of the measurement model should be conducted 
by looking at 1) indicator loadings, 2) composite reliability, 3) AVE (average 
variance extracted), and 4) indicator cross-loadings. In the followings, these eval-
uation types are discussed in detail. 
Indicator loading: The indicator loading on its respective construct is used for 
assessing the individual item reliability. The loading for reflective indicators with 
their respective latent variables has been suggested as 0.4 at the early stages of 
scale development and as 0.7 or greater for developed theory (Hulland 1999; 
Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 2010). 
Composite reliability: The composite reliability describes the internal consisten-
cy of a given block of indicators. It is very important that all the construct’s indi-
cators jointly measure the construct adequately. The values of composite reliabil-
ity have been suggested as larger than 0.60 (e.g. Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 
2010). In comparison to Cronbach’s alpha, which uses equal weighting, the com-
posite reliability includes the actual factor loadings. 
Average variance extracted (AVE): It is used to assess the convergent validity 
of reflective blocks of the items. The AVE includes the variance of its indicators 
captured by the construct relative to the total amount of variance, including the 
variance due to measurement error. An AVE of less than .5 is considered insuffi-
cient, as more variance is due to error variance than to indicator variance (Gotz, 
Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 2010). AVE analysis is also used to evaluate the discrim-
inate validity of the measurement model. Discriminant validity is proven if a la-
tent variable’s AVE is larger than the common variance (squared correlations) of 
this latent variable with any other of the model’s constructs (Fornell & Larcker 
1981 referred in Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 2010). 
Indicator cross-loadings are also used for estimating the discriminant reliability, 
which  presents  the  extent  to  which  measures  of  a  given  construct  differ  from  
measures of other constructs in the same model. Therefore, an indicator’s loading 
with its associated latent construct should be higher than its loading with the 
measures of other latent constructs in the same model (Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 
2011). 
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4.6.4.2   Evaluation of structural model: 
The structural model covers the causal relationships among the hypothetical latent 
constructs. These causal relationships between the latent constructs in PLS-SEM 
are always recursive (i.e. there is no loop in the path model). In contrast to CB-
SEM, the PLS-SEM does not allow statistical tests to measure the calibrated 
model’s overall goodness, which is mainly due to the assumption of distribution-
free variance. Alternatively, non-parametrical tests are applied to evaluate the 
structural model’s quality. It is recommended that the assessment of the structural 
model should be conducted by 1) looking at R² (coefficient of determination) for 
dependent latent variables, 2) path loadings, 3) significance levels, and 4) predic-
tive relevance (Q²) (Chin 1998; Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 2010; Hair, Ringle 
& Sarstedt 2011). In the following, these evaluation types are discussed in detail. 
Coefficient of determination (R²): It explains the variance of endogenous latent 
variables. It is very important evaluation criteria of structural model because the 
goal of PLS-SEM is to explain the variance of endogenous latent variables. Alt-
hough, R² can assume values between 0 and 1, but no established threshold value 
has been suggested. However, the larger R² is, the larger the percentage of vari-
ance explained in endogenous latent variable (Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 
2010). Chin (1998) suggests that besides inspecting the R², the effect size f² (i.e. 
change in the R²) also shows whether an independent latent variable has a sub-
stantial influence on the dependent latent variable. The formula for calculating the 
effect size is presented below.  
 
                                          f² = ?²????????? ?²????????
???²????????  
The effect size of .02, 0.15 and 0.35 can be viewed to represent the small, medi-
um and large effect at the structural level (Chin 1998; Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & 
Krafft 2010). 
Path loadings: The path loadings in PLS-SEM are the standardized beta coeffi-
cients of ordinary least squares regressions. Chin (1998) recommends that stand-
ardized path coefficients should be around 0.2 and ideally above 0.3 in order to be 
considered meaningful.  
Significance levels: The significant levels of standardized path coefficients in 
PLS-SEM are tested by means of t-statistics, which are obtained by resampling 
methods of either bootstrapping or jack-knifing. Bootstrapping is considered a 
more efficient approach and recommended by Chin (1998) to generate t-values. 
As discussed earlier, PLS-SEM does not assume that the data is normally distrib-
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uted, so the bootstrapping takes random sample repeatedly from original sample 
to estimate the population distribution from sample, and hence generates t-values. 
To assess the acceptance or rejection of an individual hypothesis, the t values for 
each structural relationship are checked. Critical t-values for a two-tailed test are 
1.65 (significance level = 10 percent), 1.96 (significance level = 5 percent), and 
2.58 (significance level = 1 percent) (Chin 1998; Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 2011). 
Predictive relevance (Q²): The predictive relevance of the model is tested by 
means of Stone-Geisser test, which postulates that the model must be able to ade-
quately predict each endogenous latent construct’s indicators. The Q ²  value  is  
obtained by using a blindfolding procedure, which is a sample reuse technique 
that omits some data and uses the resulting estimates to predict the omitted part. 
Q²  comes in two forms – the cross-validated redundancy and communality.  It  is  
recommended to use cross-validated redundancy, which unlike the cross-
validated communality, uses the PLS-SEM estimates of both the structural model 
and the measurement models for data prediction. If an endogenous construct’s 
cross-validated redundancy measure value (i.e. Q²) for a certain endogenous latent 
variable is larger than zero, its explanatory latent constructs exhibit predictive 
relevance. 
4.7 Operationalization of variables 
In order to determine the measurement of the study’s constructs, a comprehensive 
review of the prior literature on inter-organizational trust and IJVs has been con-
ducted. This comprehensive review indicated that most of the constructs can be 
assessed by measures already established in previous research, therefore minimiz-
ing the problems with reliability and validity.  Most of the study constructs were 
measured on a five-point Likert type of scale. The operationalized constructs are 
related to prior alliance experience with the partner, reputation, communication, 
cultural sensitivity, expected longevity of IJV, opportunism, ownership share, 
resource complementary, interdependence, trust, and IJV performance. 
Prior alliance experience with the partner 
Prior alliance experience with the partner refers to whether or not two firms had a 
prior alliance with each other before the establishment of current IJV. Consistent 
with Glaister and Buckley (1999), Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999), and Niel-
sen (2007), the respondents were asked whether or not their firm had a prior alli-
ance with the current IJV partner before the establishment of current IJV. Table 
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11 provides the measurement item for prior alliance experience with the partner, 
and the sources of the item. 
Table 11. Item measuring prior alliance experience with the partner 
Item Option Source 
PAE: Has your firm been 
engaged with your partner 
firm in alliance/alliances 
before the establishment of 
current IJV?  
0 = no, 1= yes Glaister & Buckley (1999); 
Young-Ybarra & Wierse-
ma (1999); Nielsen (2007) 
Partner reputation 
Partner reputation was gauged by a single item, related to the degree to which the 
reputation of the partner was favourable at the time the IJV was formed. Con-
sistent with Nielsen (2007), and Janowicz (2004), the respondents were asked to 
rate the extent to which the reputation of the partner was favourable at the time 
the IJV was formed. Table 12 provides the measurement item for partner reputa-
tion, and the sources of the item.  
Table 12. Item measuring partner reputation 
Item Scale Source 
REP: Please rate the ex-
tent to which partner’s 
reputation was favourable 
at the time of IJV for-
mation? 
Very low 1-5 very high Janowicz (2004); Nielsen 
(2007) 
Communication 
Communication between IJV partners was measured by a five-item Likert scale 
capturing the quality and frequency of the communication between the IJV part-
ners. The choice of these items was based on a review of existing empirical re-
search (e.g. Young-Ybarra & Wiersema 1999; Mohr & Puck 2005; Krishnan, 
Martin & Noorderhaven 2006; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). Table 13 provides 
the measurement items for communication, and the sources of the items. 
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Table 13. Items measuring communication 
Stem Question: Regarding communication between you and your IJV partner, 
please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:: 
Items Scale Source 
COM1: IJV partners al-
ways keep each other in-
formed about 
events\changes that may 
affect other party or IJV 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Mohr & Puck (2005); 
Young-Ybarra & 
Wiersema (1999); Silva, 
Bradley & Sousa (2012) 
COM2: IJV partners 
promptly notify each other 
about relevant information 
that may affect other party 
or IJV 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Mohr & Puck (2005); 
Krishnan, Martin & 
Noorderhaven (2006) 
COM3: Exchange of in-
formation between IJV 
partners  takes place fre-
quently 
Strongly disagree 1-5 
strongly agree 
Young-Ybarra & 
Wiersema (1999); Silva, 
Bradley & Sousa (2012) 
COM4: IJV partners get 
clear information from 
each other that may affect 
the other party or IJV 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Mohr & Puck 2005; 
Krishnan, Martin & 
Noorderhaven (2006) 
COM5: Over all, the 
quality of communication 
between the IJV partners 
is extremely good 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
New item 
Cultural sensitivity 
Cultural sensitivity refers to a firm’s awareness of cultural differences between it 
and its IJV partners, and dealing and managing these differences (Johnson et al. 
1996). Five reflective items were used to measure the cultural sensitivity. All the 
five  items  are  adopted  from  Johnson  (1996)  and  Voss  et  al.  (2006).  The  scale  
ranged  from 1  =  strongly  disagree  to  5  =  strongly  agree.  Table  14  provides  the  
measurement items for cultural sensitivity, and the sources of the items. 
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Table 14. Items measuring cultural sensitivity 
Item Scale Sources 
CS1: Our firm makes 
deliberate efforts to un-
derstand the ways our 
partner do things 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Johnson et al. (1996); 
Voss et al. (2006) 
CS2: Our firm makes 
necessary adjustments to 
the partner’s way of doing 
things 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Johnson et al. (1996); 
Voss et al. (2006) 
CS3: Our firm makes 
special efforts to imple-
ment those customs and 
strategies in IJV with 
which partner firm agrees 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Johnson et al. (1996); 
Voss et al. (2006) 
CS4: A number of our 
firm’s managers spend 
much time learning local 
language of partner firm 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Johnson et al. (1996) 
CS5: A number of our 
firm’s managers spend 
many non-business hours 
learning local partner 
business culture 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Johnson et al. (1996) 
Expected longevity of IJV 
Expected longevity of IJV refers to the degree to which a firm expects that the 
IJV  relationship  with  partner  firm  will  continue  on  a  long-term  basis  (Muthu-
samy, White & Carr 2007). Consistent with Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay (1996) 
and Muthusamy, White and Carr (2007), the respondents were asked to provide 
their opinion regarding the continuity of their IJV relationship with partner firm 
on long term basis. Table 15 provides the measurement item for expected lon-
gevity of IJV, and the sources of the item. 
Table 15. Item measuring expected longevity of IJV 
Item Scale Source 
EL: Our firm plans to 
continue the IJV for a 
long time 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay 
(1996); Muthusamy, 
White & Carr (2007) 
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Opportunism 
Eight items were employed to measure the opportunism perceived by foreign 
partner on a five-point Likert scale. The choice of these items was based on a re-
view of existing empirical research (e.g. Morgan & Hunt 1994, Liu et al. 2008; 
Katsikeas, Skarmeas & Bello 2009; Hsieh, Rodrigues & Child 2010; Silva, Brad-
ley & Sousa 2012). These items asked if the IJV partner firm (1) alters facts, (2) 
makes false promises, (3) presents incomplete information, (4) fails to provide 
support (5) breaches contract, (6) engages in opportunistic behavior, (7) appropri-
ates technology, and (8) supplies substandard/overpriced material. Table 16 pro-
vides the measurement items for opportunism, and the sources of the items. 
Table 16. Items measuring opportunism 
Stem Question: With respect to your partner firm’s behaviour in the present IJV, please indicate 
your level of agreement with the following statements: 
Items Scale Sources 
OPP1: Sometimes partner firm 
alters the facts slightly in order to 
get what they need from IJV 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree                          
Morgan & Hunt (1994); 
Katsikeas, Skarmeas & Bello 
(2009); Hsieh, Rodrigues & 
Child (2010); Silva, Bradley 
& Sousa (2012) 
OPP2: Partner firm has some-
times promised to do things 
without actually  doing  them 
later 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Morgan & Hunt (1994); 
Hsieh, Rodrigues & Child 
(2010); Silva, Bradley & 
Sousa (2012) 
OPP3: Partner firm sometimes 
presents incomplete or distorted 
information to get their benefit 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Hsieh, Rodrigues & Child 
(2010) 
OPP4: Sometimes partner firm 
fails to provide your firm\IJV 
with the support and resources 
that it is obliged to 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Morgan & Hunt (1994); Liu 
et al. (2008); Hsieh, Ro-
drigues & Child (2010); 
Silva, Bradley & Sousa 
(2012)  
OPP5: Partner firm breaches 
formal or informal IJV agreement  
to get their benefit 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Katsikeas, Skarmeas & Bello 
(2009); Hsieh, Rodrigues & 
Child (2010) 
OPP6: Partner firm engages in 
opportunistic behaviour 
 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Hsieh, Rodrigues & Child 
(2010) 
OPP7: Partner firm appropriates 
technological know-how which 
your firm  provides to IJV 
 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Liu et al. (2008); Hsieh, Ro-
drigues & Child (2010) 
OPP8: Partner firm supplies 
substandard/overpriced material 
or products to IJV 
Strongly disagree 1–5 
strongly agree 
Hsieh, Rodrigues & Child 
(2010) 
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Ownership share 
Ownership share refers to the ratio of equity distribution between the IJV part-
ners. Respondents were asked to indicate their firm’s ownership share in the IJV, 
and their partner firm’s ownership share in the IJV. In order to measure the ratio 
of  equity  distribution  between  IJV  partners,  both  firm’s  ownership  shares  were  
transformed to 5-point scale with 5 if the equity difference between two partners 
was equal to or less than 6 %, 4 if 7–21%, 3 if 22–36%, 2 if 37–51%, and 1 if 
equal or larger than 52%. Table 17 provides the measurement scale for IJV own-
ership share distribution between IJV partners.  
Table 17. Item measuring ownership share 
Item Scale 
OS: Ratio of equity dif-
ferences between the IJV 
partners 
5= equal to or less than 6 %, 4 = 7–21%, 3 = 22–
36%, 2 = 37–51%, and 1 = equal or larger than 52%. 
Resource complementary 
Resource complementary of IJV partners was measured by two-items, 5 point 
Likert scale adapted from Donnell (2005), Nielsen (2007), and Deitz et al. (2010) 
that evaluated the degree to which the resources and competencies brought by 
partners to IJV are complementary for accomplishing the IJV goals. The scale 
anchored by 1= “very low” to 5 = “very high”. Table 18 provides the measure-
ment items for resource complementary, and the sources of the items. 
Table 18. Items measuring resource complementary 
Item Scale Source 
RC1: Extent to which 
resources and competen-
cies brought by each part-
ner to IJV are different? 
 
Very low 1–5 very high Donnell (2005) 
RC2: Extent to which 
resources and competen-
cies brought by each part-
ner to IJV are complemen-
tary for accomplishing the 
IJV goals? 
 
Very low 1–5 very high Donnell (2005);  Nielsen 
(2007); Deitz et al. 
(2010) 
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Interdependence 
Interdependence represents the degree to which the partners in the IJV (i.e. the 
foreign partner and local partner) depend on each other by investing transaction 
specific assets. For measuring purpose, the variable of interdependence was di-
vided into two dependence types: the dependence of foreign firm and the depend-
ence of local firm. Each dependence type is the product of two questions: one is 
how large is the investment in the IJV; and other is the degree to which a part-
ner’s investment in the IJV is sunk. To measure the first question, the ownership 
share of each IJV partner was taken as a proxy for the size of investment in the 
IJV. The second question is measured by a single question; “if the IJV ends in 
conflict, the difficulty your firm would have in redeploying your resources (i.e. 
people and facilities) presently serving the IJV to other uses would be”. The scale 
anchored with this question is 1= “very low” to 5 = “very high”. These two ques-
tions were collapsed into one to determine the dependence of foreign partner (see 
Table 19).  
Table 19. Items measuring dependence of foreign firm 
Item Scale Source 
Foreign firm’s size of 
investment in IJV (owner-
ship share taken as proxy 
for the size of investment) 
5–19 % (very low), 20–38 
(low), 39-57 (average ), 
58–76 (high), 77–95 (very 
high)  
New item 
If the IJV ends in conflict, 
the difficulty your firm 
would have in redeploy-
ing your resources (i.e. 
people and facilities) 
presently serving the IJV 
to other uses would be 
Very low 1–5 very high Zeng (1998); Reuer & 
Arino (2002) 
Similarly, these two questions were collapsed into one for determining the de-
pendence of local partner (see Table 20). 
In order to determine the interdependence, a comparison between dependence of 
foreign firm and dependence of local firm was made by taking the absolute dif-
ference between them. Here, a “zero” indicated a perfectly balanced set of inter-
dependence. A numerical example might be helpful here. Suppose a foreign firm 
(1) has size of investment in IJV (3 out of 5); and (2) the difficulty in redeploying 
its  resources  outside  the  IJV  (4  out  of  5).  Then  the  foreign  firm’s  dependence  
would be: 3×4=12. Following the same steps, the dependence of local firm can be 
determined. Suppose the value is also 12 for the local partner, then the difference 
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between these values: 12–12=0 presents the perfect balanced interdependence. 
The scale for measuring the level of interdependence is given below in Table 21. 
Table 20. Items measuring dependence of local firm 
Item Scale Source 
Local firm’s size of in-
vestment in IJV (owner-
ship share taken as proxy 
for the size of investment) 
5–19 % (1= very low), 
20-38 (2= low), 39–57 
(3= average ), 58-76 (4= 
high), 77–95 (5= very 
high)  
New item 
If the IJV ends in conflict, 
the difficulty your partner 
firm would have in rede-
ploying his resources (i.e. 
people and facilities) 
presently serving the IJV 
to other uses would be 
Very low 1–5 very high Zeng (1998); Reuer & 
Arino (2002) 
Table 21. Item measuring the interdependence 
Item 
 
Scale Source 
INTE: Level of interde-
pendence between IJV 
partners (i.e. difference 
between dependence of 
local and foreign partner) 
 
? 3= 5, 4-8=4, 9-13=3, 
14-18=2, 19-24=1 
New item 
Trust 
In order to measure trust  we included seven items reflecting a level of trust  (i.e.  
reliability, fairness, goodwill, and overall level of trust). The choice of the 
measures was based on a review of existing empirical research on trust (e.g. Mor-
gan & Hunt 1994; Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay 1996; Johnson et al. 1996; Dyer & 
Chu 2003; Mohr & Puck 2005; Muthusamy & White 2005; Krishnan, Martin & 
Noorderhaven 2006; Muthusamy, White & Carr 2007; Nielsen 2007; Liu et al. 
2008; Hoffmann, Neumann & Speckbacher 2010; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012). 
Item 1 reflects reliability, items 2–3 reflect fairness, items 4-5 reflect goodwill, 
and items 6-7 reflect overall level of trust. The scale anchored with these items is 
1= “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”. Table 22 provides the measure-
ment items for trust, and the sources of the items. 
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Table 22. Items measuring trust 
Stem Question: Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements: 
Items Scale Source 
TRU1: In our IJV, the 
partner firm is reliable to 
move our joint project 
forward 
 
Strongly disagree 
1–5 strongly agree                         
Morgan & Hunt (1994); Mohr 
& Puck (2005); Nielsen 
(2007); Silva, Bradley & Sousa 
(2012) 
 
TRU2: In our IJV, we 
feel secure with partner 
firm because of its sincer-
ity 
Strongly disagree 
1–5 strongly agree                         
Muthusamy, White & Carr 
(2007)
TRU3: In our IJV, we are 
confident that our partner 
firm will not take ad-
vantage of us 
Strongly disagree 
1–5 strongly agree                         
Johnson et al. (1996); Muthu-
samy & White (2005); Krish-
nan, Martin & Noorderhaven 
(2006); Muthusamy, White & 
Carr (2007); Nielsen (2007); 
Hoffmann et al. (2010) 
 
TRU4: In our IJV, part-
ner firm is always ready 
and willing to offer us 
support beyond the IJV 
agreement 
 
Strongly disagree 
1–5 strongly agree                         
Krishnan, Martin & Noorder-
haven (2006); Muthusamy, 
White & Carr (2007); Liu et al. 
(2008) 
TRU5: In our IJV, part-
ner considers our firm’s 
welfare alongside its own 
while making important 
decisions 
 
Strongly disagree 
1–5 strongly agree                         
Johnson et al. (1996); Mohr & 
Puck (2005); Muthusamy & 
White (2005); Liu et al. (2008) 
TRU6: In our IJV, the 
relationship with partner 
firm is characterized by 
high levels of trust 
 
Strongly disagree 
1–5 strongly agree                         
Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay 
(1996); Dyer & Chu (2003); 
Nielsen (2007) 
TRU7: Based on experi-
ence in our IJV, we know 
that our partner can be 
completely trusted 
 
Strongly disagree 
1–5 strongly agree                         
Morgan & Hunt (1994); Silva, 
Bradley & Sousa (2012) 
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IJV performance 
In order to measure IJV performance, respondents were asked to evaluate their 
side’s satisfaction with the IJV using four performance indicators: (1) overall per-
formance, (2) profitability, (3) market share, and (4) achieving the goals set for 
IJV. These items were taken from existing empirical research on IJV perfor-
mance. For all items 5-point Likert-type scales were used. These items have been 
widely used in the literature as subjective measures of IJV performance. Table 23 
presents the performance measurement employed in this study. 
Table 23. Items measuring IJV performance 
Stem Question: How satisfied is your firm with the performance of the IJV in 
term of: 
Item Scale Source 
Overall performance Very unsatisfied  1–5 
very satisfied 
Geringer & Hebert 
(1991); Fey (1996); 
Lane, Salk & Lyles 
(2001); Krishnan, Martin 
& Noorderhaven (2006) 
Profitability Very unsatisfied  1–5 
very satisfied 
Geringer & Hebert 
(1991); Lane, Salk & 
Lyles (2001); Krishnan, 
Martin & Noorderhaven 
(2006); Ng et al. (2007); 
Nielsen (2007); Robson, 
Katsikeas & Bello (2008)  
Market share Very unsatisfied  1–5 
very satisfied 
Geringer & Hebert 
(1991); Aulakh, Kotabe 
& Sahay (1996); Inkpen 
& Currall (1997); Lane, 
Salk & Lyles (2001); Ng, 
Lau & Nyaw (2007); 
Nielsen (2007)  
Achieving the goals set 
for IJV  
Very unsatisfied  1–5 
very satisfied 
Krishnan, Martin & 
Noorderhaven (2006); 
Kwon (2008) 
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5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This  chapter  starts  with  a  description  of  the  sample,  which  is  followed  by  the  
presentation of the results. The analysis of the results consists of two steps. First-
ly, the full structural model consisting of 17 hypotheses about the antecedent of 
trust and trust-performance relationship is tested. Secondly, the structural model 
is divided into five sub-models to better explain the results. 
5.1 Description of the sample 
In this section the sample (n=89) of the study, from which the results are derived, 
is described. The description focuses on the following characteristics: 1) Nordic 
parents  of  the  IJVs,  2)  location  regions  of  the  IJVs,  3)  host  countries  of  Nordic  
IJVs, 4) year of investment, 5) Nordic parent’s ownership in IJVs, 6) establish-
ment mode of Nordic IJVs, 7) and Nordic firm’s size. 
The foreign parents of IJV in the study sample are from Nordic region comprising 
of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The study sample (n= 89 IJVs) com-
prises of 44 IJVs (49.43%) made by Finnish firms, 23 IJVs (25.84%) made by 
Swedish firms, 13 IJVs (14.69%) made by Danish firms, and 9 IJVs (10.11%) 
made by Norwegian firms (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15. Nordic parents of IJVs 
The location regions of the IJVs (i.e. target regions of IJVs) are presented in fig-
ure 16. A detailed analysis reveals that Asia was the most often entered region 
with 49 IJVs (55.05%), followed by Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with 16 
Nordic parents of the IJVs
Finland (49.43%)
Sweden (25.84%)
Denmark (14.69%)
Norway (10.11%)
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IJVs (17.97%), and Western Europe with 11 IJVs (12.36%). Further, 7 IJVs 
(7.86%) were operating in Latin America, 5 IJVs (5.62%) were operating in 
North America, and one IJV (1.12%) was operating in Africa.  
 
Figure 16.  Location regions of the Nordic IJVs 
Further, the distribution of host countries of Nordic IJVs is presented in Table 24. 
There were 32 countries in our sample, indicating substantial variation in the lo-
cations of target countries of the IJVs. The table depicts that China was the most 
often  entered  country  with  25  IJVs,  followed  by  Russia  with  7  IJVs,  India  and  
Poland  both  with  5  IJVs,  and  USA with  4  IJVs.  Further,  the  target  countries  of  
Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and South Korea were all with three IJVs. The 
remaining 22 target countries had either one or two IJVs. 
 
  
Location regions of the Nordic IJVs
Asia (55.05%)
Central and Eastern Europe
(17.97%)
Western Europe (12.36%)
Latin America (7.86%)
North America (5.62%)
Other (1.12%)
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Table 24. Host countries of Nordic IJVs 
Target country Total Percentage 
China 25 28,1% 
Russia 7 7,9% 
India 5 5,6% 
Poland 5 5,6% 
USA 4 4,5% 
Germany 3 3,4% 
Japan 3 3,4% 
Norway 3 3,4% 
Qatar 3 3,4% 
South Korea 3 3,4% 
Australia 2 2,2% 
Brazil 2 2,2% 
France 2 2,2% 
Italy 2 2,2% 
Saudi Arabia 2 2,2% 
Vietnam 2 2,2% 
Argentina 1 1,1% 
Bulgaria 1 1,1% 
Canada 1 1,1% 
Chile 1 1,1% 
Finland 1 1,1% 
Hungary 1 1,1% 
Laos 1 1,1% 
Libya 1 1,1% 
Slovakia 1 1,1% 
South Africa 1 1,1% 
Thailand 1 1,1% 
Trinidad & Tobago 1 1,1% 
Turkey 1 1,1% 
UAE 1 1,1% 
Ukraine 1 1,1% 
Uruguay 1 1,1% 
 
Total  
89 100,0% 
The years of Nordic IJV formation varied from 1984 to 2011 as can be seen in 
table 25. Most of the IJVs (68, 53%) were formed during the 2005-2011, of which 
the peak year was 2007 in which 17 IJV were formed. Although, in this study one 
selection criteria of IJVs was that IJV should be formed from year 2000 to year 
2011. This criterion was chosen due to the possible erosion of respondent memo-
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ries if the IJVs were formed before 2000. However, we received 7 IJVs which 
were formed before 2000. A decision was made to retain them because respond-
ents themselves were interested to describe those IJVs, and further three of these 
IJVs were still surviving.  
Table 25. Formation year of Nordic IJVs 
Year of IJV formation Total Percentage 
1984 1 1,1% 
1989 1 1,1% 
1994 1 1,1% 
1995 2 2,2% 
1998 1 1,1% 
1999 1 1,1% 
2000 5 5,6% 
2001 1 1,1% 
2002 8 9,0% 
2003 3 3,4% 
2004 4 4,5% 
2005 6 6,7% 
2006 13 14,6% 
2007 17 19,1% 
2008 9 10,1% 
2009 5 5,6% 
2010 5 5,6% 
2011 6 6,7% 
Total 89 100,0% 
The ownership level of IJVs varied from 12,5% to 94,9%, as can be seen in Table 
26. The share of minority 1JVs (i.e. 12,5%–49,9%) was 26,96% and share of ma-
jority JVs (i.e. 50,1%–94,9%) was about 51,68 %. Further 21,36% of the IJVs 
were classified as equal 1JVs (i.e. 50%–50%). 
 
Table 26. Nordic parents ownership share in IJVs 
Level of ownership Frequency Percent 
Minority ownership  
(12,5%–49,9%) 
24 26,96% 
Equal ownership (50%) 19 21,36% 
Majority ownership  
(50,1%–94,9%) 
46 51,68% 
Total 89 100% 
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The study sample further reveals that almost half of the Nordic IJVs were green-
field IJVs (50,56%) and about half were acquisition IJVs (49,44%). The distribu-
tion of establishment mode of Nordic IJVs is shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Establishment mode of Nordic IJVs 
The size of the Nordic firms was measured by the number of employees. Figure 
18 presents the distribution of the number of employees of the Nordic firms. Fig-
ure depicts that 53 Nordic firms (59,55%) had more than 5000 employees. Fur-
ther, 7 firms (7,86%) had employees between 3000–4999, 10 firms (11,23%) had 
employees between 1000–2999, 8 firms (9%) had employees between 500–999, 
and 5 firms (5,61%) had employees between 10–99.  
The profile of the key respondents was assessed by their official position held in 
Nordic firms. Table 27 depicts that mostly respondents were high level executives 
of Nordic firms. Of the 89 respondents, 67 respondents (72.28%) were CEO, Vice 
president, business directors, general managers and managing directors; and 6 
respondents (6.74%) were the chief financial officers, directors of sales and mar-
keting, and chief operating director. This participation at the highest level of Nor-
dic firms in our sample ensures that the responses come from key boundary span-
ning officials, who interact with the partner firms. 
 
  
Establishment mode of Nordic IJVs
Greenfield IJVs (50.56%)
Acquisition IJVs (49,44%)
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Figure 18. Distribution of Nordic firm’s size 
 
Table 27. Profile of key respondents 
Finally, the important characteristics of the study sample are presented and sum-
marized in following Table 28. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
5,61 9 6,74 11,23 7,86
59,55
Size of Nordic firms
Number of employees of
Nordic firms
Tile Frequency Percent 
 CEO 7 7,9 
CFO 3 3,4 
Chairman 1 1,1 
Chief operating director 1 1,1 
Deputy CEO 1 1,1 
Director of Business 11 12,4 
Director of sales and marketing 1 1,1 
EVP 8 9,0 
General manager 9 10,1 
Group EVP 3 3,4 
Group executive director 1 1,1 
Managing Director 3 3,4 
President 2 2,2 
Senior Vice President 10 11,2 
Vice President 11 12,4 
Other 17 19,1 
Total 89 100,0 
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Table 28. Summary of sample characteristics 
Sample characteristics Description 
 
Nordic parents of the IJVs Finland (44 IJVs), Sweden (23 IJVs), Norway (9 
IJVs), Denmark (13 IJVs) 
 
location regions of the IJVs Asia (49 IJVs), Latin America (7 IJVs), North 
America (5 IJVs), CEE (16 IJVs), Western Europe 
(11 IJVs), Other (1 IJV) 
Host countries with highest 
number of Nordic IJVs 
China (25 IJVs), Russia (7 IJVs), India (5 IJVs), 
Poland (5 IJVs),  
Year of investment 1984, 1989, 1994, 1998, 1999 (One IJV in each 
year), 1995 (2 IJVs), 2000 (5 IJVs), 2001 (One 
IJV), 2002 (8 IJVs), 2003 (3 IJVs), 2004 (4 IJVs), 
2005 (6 IJVs), 2006 (13 IJVs), 2007 (17 IJVs), 
2008 (9 IJVs), 2009 (5 IJVs), 2010 (5 IJVs), 2011 
(6 IJVs) 
 
Nordic parent’s ownership 
in IJVs 
< 49 % (17 IJVs), 49 % (7 IJVs), 50% (19 IJVs), 
51% (16 IJVs),  > 51% (30 IJVs) 
 
Establishment mode of 
Nordic IJVs 
Greenfield (45 IJVs), Acquisition (44 IJVs) 
Nordic firm’s size ? 100 (5 IJVs), 100-499 (8 IJVs), 500-999 (6 IJVs), 
1000-2999 (10 IJVs), 3000-4999 (7 IJVs), ? 5000 
(53 IJVs ) 
5.2 Two common problems with mail survey 
According to Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay (1996: 1016), in a (single respondent, 
self-report) mail survey research; there are two types of errors that can result in 
both sample selection and data collection process. These errors are: 
– Non-response biasness  
– Common method biasness 
Both errors are a type of statistical bias and can occur and affect the results of a 
survey if: 
– Non-respondent of the mailed questionnaire cause any systematic exclu-
sion of the opinions of the participants in certain groups (non-response 
bias), or 
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– Respondents provide systematic answers to the questions (i.e. respondents 
answer the questions in a socially desirable manner) (common method 
variance). 
5.2.1 Assessment of non-response biasness 
The non-response biasness raises the issue whether data obtained from respond-
ents are representative of non-respondents. Following the procedure suggested by 
Mohr and Spekman (1994), Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay (1996), Sarkar et al. 
(2001), Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven (2006), and Silva, Bradley and Sousa 
(2012), independent samples t tests was performed for comparing the early re-
spondents (N=48) to the late respondents (N=41) in terms of firm size and indus-
try of Nordic parents.  
The results of these t tests are shown in Table 29. There were no significant dif-
ferences at the 5% significant level between the early and late respondents in 
terms of firm size (p = .708) and industry (p = .548). [Levene’s test for equality of 
variances  was  non-significant  for  the  firm size  (p  =  .883)  and  for  industry  (p  =  
.230). This indicates that non-response bias is not an issue.  
Table 29.  Independent samples t-test by firm size and industry for early and 
late respondents 
5.2.2 Assessment of common method variance 
According to Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay (1996: 1016), Harman’s one factor test is 
used to address the common method variance issue. Therefore, Harman’s one 
factor test was performed. Table 30 shows the results of Harman’s one factor test. 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Diffe-
rence 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Size 
of 
firm 
Equal variances assumed ,022 ,883 -,376 87 ,708 -,112 ,297 
Equal variances not assumed     -,375 84,096 ,708 -,112 ,298 
In-
dust
ry 
Equal variances assumed 1,459 ,230 -,603 87 ,548 -,046 ,076 
Equal variances not assumed     -,597 80,334 ,552 -,046 ,077 
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Using the eigenvalue greater than 1 criterion, 11 factors emerged with eigenval-
ues ranging from 1.11 to 8.83. The first factor explained 43 % of variance. This 
factor structure does not point to a single or general factor that accounts for most 
of the variability in the data, suggesting that common method variance is not a 
significant feature of the data of the study. 
Table 30. The results of Harman’s single factor test 
 
5.3 Validating the measurement model 
The quality of the measurement model is assessed by looking at the individual 
item reliability (i.e. assessing the indicator loadings), the internal consistency of a 
given block of indicators (i.e. assessing the composite reliability, and AVE), and 
discriminant validity (i.e. assessing the AVE, and indicator cross-loadings) (Chin 
1998; Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 2010; Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 2011). In the 
followings, the results of these evaluation types are discussed in detail. 
Firstly, the individual-item reliability was assessed by examining loadings of the 
measures on their respective constructs. A rule of thumb is that loadings should 
be greater than .7 to demonstrate individual item reliability. However, according 
to Hulland (1999) and Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers and Krafft (2010), loadings greater 
than 0.4 may also be acceptable at the early stages of scale development. An ex-
amination of the initial measurement model revealed that of the 36 items, 33 had 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8,839 43,994 43,994 
2 4,659 15,081 59,075 
3 4,537 13,974 73,049 
4 3,643 5,844 78,892 
5 3,582 5,295 84,188 
6 2,512 4,654 88,842 
7 2,365 3,318 92,160 
8 2,299 2,721 94,881 
9 1,484 2,586 97,468 
10 1,155 1,405 98,872 
11 1,114 1,128 100,000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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loadings greater than .7, and 3 items had loadings of less than .7. Cultural sensi-
tivity construct has 2 indicators out of 5 with poor loadings of .6695, and .4672, 
and opportunism has one indicator out of 8 with poor loading of .6417. These 3 
items with poor loadings were removed from subsequent analysis. Table 31 pro-
vides the list of individual items and their loadings. Except the 3 indicators with 
poor loadings, the remaining loadings are above the cut-off of .7 as suggested by 
Hulland (1999) and Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers and Krafft (2010). This indicates that all 
of the items demonstrate good individual-item reliabilities. 
Table 31. The measurement model:  Individual items loadings  
Constructs Items Loadings 
Communication COM1 0,9712 
 COM2 0,9624 
 COM3 0,8662 
 COM4 0,9513 
 COM5 0,9298 
Cultural sensitivity CS1 0,8424 
 CS2 0,8271 
 CS3 0,8205 
 CS4 0,6695 
 CS5 0,4672 
Opportunism OPP1 0,9226 
 OPP2 0,8969 
 OPP3 0,9318 
 OPP4 0,878 
 OPP5 0,8909 
 OPP6 0,6417 
 OPP7 0,8212 
 OPP8 0,7735 
Trust TRU1 0,9187 
 TRU2 0,9586 
 TRU3 0,9137 
 TRU4 0,9416 
 TRU5 0,9288 
 TRU6 0,9619 
 TRU7 0,9461 
Resource complementary RC1 0,9395 
 RC2 0,9628 
Performance PER1 0,9261 
 PER2 0,8526 
 PER3 0,7957 
 PER4 0,8779 
Ownership share OS 1 
Prior alliance experience with 
partner firm 
PAE 1 
Interdependence INTE 1 
Reputation REP 1 
Expected longevity of IJV EL 1 
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Next, the composite reliability of constructs was assessed by using the internal 
consistency measure developed by Fornell and Larcker (1981), who argue that 
their measure of internal consistency is superior to Cronbach’s alpha since the 
loadings estimated within the causal model are used in its computation. The inter-
nal consistency values for the constructs are reported in table 32. All constructs 
exhibit composite reliabilities of more than .7, thus indicating that the reliabilities 
of all the constructs are adequate (Hulland 1999; Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 
2010). 
In addition, Average variance extracted (AVE) is also used to examine the 
composite reliability. It is recommended that AVE should be over 0.5 in order to 
demonstrate composite reliability (Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 2010). As can 
be seen in table 32, all the constructs have AVE greater than 0.5, which is an in-
dicative of good composite reliability. 
Further, AVE analysis can also be used to assess the discriminate validity of the 
measurement model.  For  discriminant  validity,  the  square  root  of  AVEs of  the  
latent variables should be greater than their inter-correlation, i.e. each latent vari-
able should share more variance with its own indicators than with another (For-
nell & Larcker 1981 referred in Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 2010). From Table 
32,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  square  of  the  AVEs of  the  latent  constructs  is  higher  
than the correlation among any other latent variables. Thus, indicators for each 
latent variable shared more variance between their respective latent variable com-
ponents. 
Finally, it is suggested that discriminant validity can also be evaluated by looking 
at the indicator cross-loadings (Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 2011). Each latent vari-
able should share more variance with its own block of indicators than with other 
latent variable indicators. This means that all the loadings of the measurement 
items on their assigned latent variables should be larger than any other loading. 
As can be seen in Table 33, all measures loaded higher on intended constructs 
than on other constructs. Overall, these statistics indicate that the measurement 
model is sufficiently strong to enable interpretation of structural estimates. In the 
followings, the structural model evaluation, and the results are discussed. 
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5.4 Assessment of the overall structural model 
It is recommended that the assessment of the structural model should be conduct-
ed by 1) looking at R² (coefficient of determination) for dependent latent varia-
bles, 2) path loadings, and 3) significance levels (Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 
2010; Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 2011). Therefore, R² (coefficient of determination) 
and the sign and significance of path coefficients are used to assess the structural 
model. Assessment of the structural mode is depicted in figure 19. An examina-
tion of the R² values revealed that the variance explained in endogenous con-
structs ranges from .4007 to .8052. The structural equation related to trust repre-
sents the highest R² value (0.8696) meaning that the research model can explain 
86,96% of the variance in that dependent model. In the case of opportunism and 
performance, R² values are .8052 and .4007 respectively. Overall, R² values of 
trust, opportunism and performance are sufficiently high, which shows the quality 
of structural model.    
Further the assessment of the significant levels reveals that 11 out of 17 structural 
relationships in the model are statistically significant, while 6 are not. When as-
sessing the impact of social and structural antecedent factors on trust, reputation 
?? = .23, p < .01), communication (? = .28, p < .01), cultural sensitivity (? = .14, p 
= .05), and expected longevity of IJVs (? = .16, p = .01) have a statistically signif-
icant positive relationship with trust. When assessing the impact of social and 
structural antecedent factors on opportunism, reputation (? = -.21, p < 0.01), 
communication (? = -.33, p < .01), cultural sensitivity (? = -.40 p < .01), and in-
terdependence (? = –.14, p = .05) have a statistically significant negative relation-
ship with opportunism. While ownership share (? = .19, p < .01) has significant 
positive relationship with opportunism. Regarding the impact of opportunism on 
trust, the relationship is negative and significant (? = -.28, p < .01). Further, eval-
uating the relationships between trust and IJV performance, trust has statistically 
significant  and  positive  relationship  with  IJV  performance  (? =  .55,  p  <  .01).  
Thus, when looking at the p-levels, almost 64 % of the structural relationships are 
statistically significant. However, according to Falk and Miller (1992), all path 
coefficients give a relevant empirical contribution to the predicted construct if 
path coefficients reach or exceed 0.10. If the same rule was used here, altogether 
11 structural relationships would have been declared significant, because of re-
gression coefficient of 0.10 or above. This would have led to the conclusion that 
11 structural relationships make a statistically significant impact. However, the 
minimum path coefficients found in international business studies on trust in in-
ternational strategic alliances and IJVs is .12 (e.g. Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay 
1996). Following this base of path coefficients also results in 11 structural rela-
tionships. 
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5.5 Analyzing the individual structural models 
This section aims to assess the structural models of the study. It is recommended 
that the assessment of the structural model should be conducted by 1) looking at 
R² (coefficient of determination) for dependent latent variables, 2) path loadings, 
and 3) significance levels (Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers & Krafft 2010; Hair, Ringle & 
Sarstedt 2011). Therefore, R² (coefficient of determination) and the sign and sig-
nificance of path coefficients are used to assess the structural model. In the fol-
lowing the results of the structural model are discussed in detail. 
5.5.1 Impact of social antecedent factors on opportunism and trust 
An examination of the R² values revealed that the variance explained in endoge-
nous constructs of opportunism is 0.8052 (i.e. model can explain 80,52% of the 
variance in opportunism). In the case of trust, R² value is .8696 (i.e. model can 
explain  86,96% of  the  variance  in  trust).  Overall,  R²  values  of  opportunism and  
trust are sufficiently high, which shows the quality of structural model (see figure 
20).    
The structural relationship between prior alliance experience and trust was cap-
tured in terms of hypothesis H1a, and the structural relationship between prior 
alliance experience and opportunism was captured in terms of H1b. Hypothesis 
H1a stated that prior alliance experience with the partner will have a positive rela-
tionship with the trust. Hypothesis H1b stated that prior alliance experience with 
the partner will have a negative relationship with the opportunism. However, pri-
or alliance experience is neither related to trust (? = -.02, p = .61) nor to opportun-
ism  (? =  .09,  p  =  .12).  Therefore,  no  support  is  found  for  Hypotheses  H1a  and  
H1b. 
The structural relationship between reputation and trust was captured in terms of 
hypothesis H2a, and the structural relationship between reputation and opportun-
ism was captured in terms of H2b. Hypothesis H2a stated that reputation will 
have a positive relationship with the trust. Hypothesis H2b stated that reputation 
will have a negative relationship with the opportunism. According to expecta-
tions, reputation is positively related to trust (? = .23, p < .01) and negatively re-
lated to opportunism (? = -.21, p < 0.01), thereby supporting Hypotheses H2a and 
H2b. 
The structural relationship between communication and trust was captured in 
terms of hypothesis H3a, and the structural relationship between communication 
and opportunism was captured in terms of H3b. Hypothesis H3a stated that com-
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munication will have a positive relationship with the trust. Hypothesis H3b stated 
that communication will have a negative relationship with the opportunism. Re-
sults  indicate  that  the  effect  of  communication  on  trust  is  positive  (? =  .28,  p  <  
.01), and its effect on opportunism is negative (? = -.33, p < .01). Therefore Hy-
potheses 3a and 3b are supported. 
The structural relationship between cultural sensitivity and trust was captured in 
terms of hypothesis H4a, and the structural relationship between cultural sensi-
tivity and opportunism was captured in terms of H4b. Hypothesis H4a stated that 
cultural sensitivity will have a positive relationship with the trust. Hypothesis H4b 
stated that cultural sensitivity will have a negative relationship with the opportun-
ism. Results suggest that the effect of cultural sensitivity on trust is positive (? = 
.14, p = .05), and its effect on opportunism is negative (? = -.40 p < .01). There-
fore Hypotheses 4a and 4b are supported. 
Finally, the structural relationship between expected longevity of IJVs and trust 
was captured in terms of hypothesis H5a, and the structural relationship between 
expected longevity of IJVs and opportunism was captured in terms of H5b. Hy-
pothesis H5a stated that expected longevity of IJVs will have a positive relation-
ship with the trust. Hypothesis H5b stated that expected longevity of IJVs will 
have a negative relationship with the opportunism. Results indicate that the im-
pact  of  expected  longevity  of  IJVs  on  trust  (? =  .16,  p  =  .01)  is  significant  and  
positive, however its impact on opportunism (? = -.06, p = .35) is not significant. 
Thus Hypothesis H5a is supported, but not Hypothesis H5b. 
5.5.2 Impact of structural antecedent factors on opportunism and trust 
The impact of structural antecedent factors on opportunism and trust are depicted 
in Figure 21.The structural relationship between interdependence and trust was 
captured in terms of hypothesis H6a, and the structural relationship between in-
terdependence and opportunism was captured in terms of H6b. Hypothesis H6a 
stated that interdependence will have a positive relationship with the trust. Hy-
pothesis H6b stated that interdependence will have a negative relationship with 
the opportunism. Regarding the impact of interdependence on trust (? = –.025, p 
= .76), the path coefficient is statistically non-significant and sign is reversed. 
However, its impact on opportunism is significant and sign is according to hy-
pothesized direction (? = –.14, p = .05). Thus Hypothesis 6a is thus not supported, 
but Hypothesis 6b is supported. 
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Figure 20. Impact of social antecedent factors on opportunism and trust 
The structural relationship between ownership share and trust was captured in 
terms of hypothesis H7a, and the structural relationship between ownership share 
and opportunism was captured in terms of H7b. Hypothesis H7a stated that own-
ership share will have a positive relationship with the trust. Hypothesis H7b stated 
that ownership share will have a negative relationship with the opportunism. The 
results reflect interesting impact of ownership share on trust and opportunism. 
Contrary to expectations, ownership share is not significantly related to trust (? = 
.01,  p  =  .89),  and  further  its  relation  to  opportunism  is  significant  but  with  re-
versed sign (? = .19, p < .01). Therefore, neither Hypothesis 7a is supported, nor 
the Hypothesis 7b. 
5.5.3 Impact of opportunism on trust 
The impact of opportunism on trust is depicted in Figure 22. The structural rela-
tionship between opportunism and trust was captured in terms of hypothesis H8, 
which stated that opportunism will have a negative relationship with trust in IJVs. 
The results (? = -.28, p < .01) indicate that the path coefficient is statistically sig-
nificant and ? is in the hypothesized direction, thereby supporting Hypothesis H8. 
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Figure 21. Impact of structural antecedent factors on opportunism and trust 
5.5.4 Impact of trust on IJV performance 
The R² value of IJV performance is .4004 which reveals that  the model can ex-
plain  40,04%  of  the  variance  in  IJV  performance.  The  R²  value  of  IJV  perfor-
mance and the impact of trust on IJV performance are depicted in Figure 23. The 
structural relationship between trust and IJV performance was captured in terms 
of hypothesis H9, which stated that trust will have a positive relationship with IJV 
performance. As expected, trust is significantly related to IJV performance (? = 
.55, p < .01), thereby supporting Hypothesis 8. 
 
Figure 22. Impact of trust on IJV performance 
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Figure 23. Impact of trust on IJV performance 
5.5.5 Moderation Impacts on trust-performance relationship – resource 
complementary 
The moderating impact of resource complementary on trust-performance relation-
ship is depicted in Figure 24. The structural relationship about the impact of re-
source complementary on trust-performance relationship was captured in terms of 
hypothesis H10, which stated that resource complementary will have a positive 
impact on trust-performance relationship in IJVs. Contrary to expectations, the 
moderating impact of resource complementary is not significant and further sign 
is reversed (? = -.07, p > .05), thus indicating no support for Hypothesis 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24.  Moderation impact of resource complementary on trust-performance 
relationship 
Finally,  the  results  of  the  structural  model  are  summarized  in  Table  34.  The  R²  
values reveal that the variance explained in endogenous constructs ranges from 
 
 
IJV perfor-
mance Trust 
? = -.07 
(p = .71) 
 
Resource comple-
mentary 
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.4007 to .8052. The structural equation related to trust represents the highest R² 
value (0.8696) meaning that the research model can explain 86,96% of the vari-
ance in that dependent model. In the case of opportunism and performance, R² 
values are .8052 and .4007 respectively. Overall, R² values of trust, opportunism 
and performance are sufficiently high, which shows the quality of structural mod-
el. 
Regarding the social and structural antecedent factors of trust, results depict that: 
reputation, communication, cultural sensitivity, and expected longevity of IJVs 
have significant and positive relationship with trust. Therefore, Hypotheses H2a, 
H3a, H4a, and H5a are supported. Regarding the impact of social and structural 
antecedent factors on opportunism, results depict that: reputation, communication, 
cultural sensitivity, and interdependence have significant and negative relation-
ship with opportunism. Therefore, Hypotheses H2b, H3b, H4b, and H6b are sup-
ported. Further the impact of opportunism on trust is negative, and the impact of 
trust on IJV performance is positive. Therefore, Hypotheses H8 and H9 are sup-
ported. 
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter starts with a summary discussion of the key results of this study. The 
next section presents the key theoretical and empirical contributions of the study. 
This discussion is followed by the managerial implications based on the findings 
of  the  study.  The  last  section  refers  to  the  limitations  of  the  study,  and  the  re-
search areas that can be explored in future research. 
6.1 Key results of the study 
The central concern in the IJV literature has been the parent’s dissatisfaction with 
the performance of IJVs, and trust has been suggested as a key determinant of it. 
However, limited empirical evidence exists to substantiate a positive relationship 
between trust and performance of IJVs, and further there is a limited understand-
ing  of  the  antecedents  of  trust.  The  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  investigate  the  
antecedents of trust and to examine the trust–performance relationship in IJVs. In 
this study the conceptual framework of the antecedents of trust and trust-
performance relationship is drawn from social exchange theory (SET) and trans-
action cost theory (TCT). The framework consists of five social factors (i.e. prior 
alliance experience with partner, reputation, communication, cultural sensitivity, 
and expected longevity of IJVs) from SET and two structural factors (ownership 
share, and interdependence) from TCT that are considered as potential antecedent 
factors of trust. Further, the framework proposes a positive linkage between inter-
partner trust and IJV performance based on the logic of SET, and it is suggested 
that inter-partner resource complementary (an important structural factor from 
TCT) moderates the trust-performance relationship. The empirical testing is based 
on quantitative analysis of 89 Nordic IJVs operating in Asia, Europe, and Ameri-
ca. The quantitative data is analyzed by using the structural modeling approach 
with PLS method and some interesting results were discovered. 
Among the social antecedent factors of trust, four of five antecedent factors have 
found support. Unexpectedly the hypothesis H1a, predicting a positive relation-
ship between prior alliance experience with the partner and trust, was not sup-
ported. This finding contradicts with the logic of SET (e.g. Blau 1964; Parkhe 
1998a, 1998b; Inkpen & Currall 1998; Nielsen 2001) and with finding from prior 
empirical studies (e.g. Jennings et al. 2000; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; 
Dyer & Chu 2011). This suggests that experience gained from prior alliance with 
the partner either has little transferability to the new IJV setting or it loses its im-
portance during the course of IJV operations. However, this finding is in accord-
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ance with the finding of Inkpen and Curral (1997) study that analyzed 35 Japa-
nese IJVs operating in North America. 
The results of the remaining four social antecedent factors of trust indicate that 
reputation, communication, culture sensitivity, and expected longevity of IJVs 
have a positive influence on the development of trust, thus providing support for 
H2a, H3a, H4a and H5a. These findings are in accordance with the logic of SET 
(e.g. Blau 1964; Parkhe 1998a, 1998b). Further, these findings are also consistent 
with the earlier empirical research that has examined the reputation (e.g. Ganesan 
1994; Jennings et al. 2000; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003), cultural sensitivity 
(e.g. Johnson et al. 1996; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Voss et al. 2006), 
communication (e.g. Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay 1996; Kwon 2008; Ybarra & Turk 
2009; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012), and expected longevity (e.g. Aulakh, Kotabe 
& Sahay 1996; Sako 1998; Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Poppo, Zhou & 
Ryu 2008) as important determinants of trust.  
Regarding the impact of these five social antecedent factors on opportunism, three 
of five antecedent factors have found support. Except for prior alliance experience 
(i.e. H1b) and expected longevity of IJVs (H5b), the remaining three social ante-
cedent factors of reputation, communication and culture sensitivity are found to 
reduce opportunism, thus supporting for H2b, H3b, and H4b. This suggests that 
these three social antecedent factors are not only determinants of trust, but also 
reduce the opportunism. These findings have important implications for transac-
tion cost scholars that only consider structural characteristics of IJV as deem nec-
essary to prevent opportunistic behavior (e.g. Hennart & Zeng 2005).  
Further, the structural antecedent factors of interdependence and ownership share 
are not found to have a positive influence on the development of trust, thus 
providing no support for hypotheses H6a and H7a. These findings are in direct 
contrast to Parkhe (1998a, 1998b) and Lui, Wong and Liu (2009) suggestions that 
chosen structural characteristics of IJV can be interpreted as a symbol or sign of 
commitment that leads to trust. These findings are also in direct contrast to trans-
action cost economists (e.g. Hennart & Zeng 2005) logic that chosen structural 
characteristics of IJV can engender trust because they limit the opportunistic be-
havior of IJV partners. In relation to the impact of these structural antecedent fac-
tors on opportunism, increase in symmetric interdependence (i.e. H6b) is found to 
reduce opportunism and increase in equivalent ownership share (i.e. H7b) is 
found to increase opportunism. Therefore findings support H6b and reject H7b. 
The significant and negative relation between increases in symmetric interde-
pendence and opportunism (? = –.14, p = .05) is in accordance with the sugges-
tion of Das and Rahman (2002) and the findings of Zeng (1998) based on transac-
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tion cost theory. This suggests that increase in symmetric interdependence reduc-
es the partner’s opportunism in IJVs. However, a significant and positive relation 
between increases in equivalent ownership share and opportunism (? = .19, p < 
.01) is found. This finding challenges the argument advanced by Bleeke and Ernst 
(1991) and Madhok (1995a) that when each partner puts in an equal ownership 
share, commitment to an IJV is maximized and therefore risk of opportunistic 
behavior is minimized.  
Further in relation to H8, the findings suggest that opportunistic behavior has a 
negative influence on trust. This supports H8 and is corroborated by the findings 
of Morgan and Hunt (1994), and Silva, Bradley and Sousa (2012), who found that 
opportunistic behavior has a significant negative impact on trust. Inkpen and Cur-
rall (1997) also found that forbearance from opportunistic behavior indicates 
trusting behavior. Further results support H9, which states that trust exerts a posi-
tive influence on performance of IJVs. This result is in line with previous research 
findings (e.g. Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001; Ng, Lau & Nyaw 2007; Nielsen 2007; 
Kwon 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Bener & Glaister 2010) and shows that 
trust  plays a key role in achieving the superior IJV performance. Finally,  the re-
sults  do  not  support  H10,  which  states  that  resource  complementary  among  the  
IJV partners enhances the positive relationship between trust and performance. 
This finding is in contrast to argument advanced by Madhok (1995b) that trust is 
not sufficient in and of itself to hold IJV performance for long time until structur-
al base of IJV in the form of resource complementary is strong. This suggests that 
resource complementary does not explain the trust-performance relationship in 
IJVs. 
In conclusion, the results of the study suggest that trust has a positive effect on the 
performance of the IJVs. The findings also indicate that reputation, communica-
tion, cultural sensitivity, expected longevity of IJVs, and opportunism are the key 
antecedents of trust. Further, reputation, communication, cultural sensitivity, and 
interdependence are the factors which attenuate opportunism. Contrary to expec-
tations, the moderation effect of resource complementary on trust-performance 
relationship is not significant. 
6.2 Theoretical and empirical contributions 
This dissertation offers useful theoretical and empirical contributions to the exist-
ing literature on trust in IJVs. Firstly, this study examines the social and structural 
antecedent factors of trust in the context of IJVs. Most previous empirical studies 
on the antecedents of trust have only addressed the social antecedents of trust 
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(e.g, Inkpen & Currall 1997; Jennings et al. 2000; Brouthers & Bamossy 2006; 
Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008; Kwon 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009; Silva, 
Bradley & Sousa 2012). Parkhe (1998a, 1998b) in his theoretical papers and Bo-
ersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003) in their case study based paper addressed both 
the social and structural antecedents of trust. However, no survey based study so 
far has addressed the social and structural antecedents of trust in the context of 
IJVs.  
The theoretical contribution of this dissertation is also reflected by the fact that it 
is one of the first studies to use transaction cost theory and social exchange theory 
in  studying  the  social  and  structural  antecedents  of  trust  in  the  context  of  IJVs.  
Therefore, this dissertation develops an integrated theoretical framework of social 
exchange theory and transaction cost theory while addressing the social and struc-
tural antecedents of trust in the context of IJVs. Hennart and Zeng (2005) in their 
theoretical paper suggested integrating the social exchange theory and transaction 
cost  theory to study the antecedents of trust.  However,  no study so far has used 
these two theories in a unified theoretical framework to investigate the social and 
structural antecedents of trust in the context of IJVs. Another important theoreti-
cal  contribution  of  this  dissertation  relates  to  the  social  antecedents  of  trust  
grounded in social exchange theory. A review of prior empirical studies on ante-
cedents of trust in IJVs reveals that researchers investigated limited but different 
antecedents of trust and therefore lack a comprehensive framework of social ante-
cedents of trust. Parkhe (1998a, 1998b) seminal study on the antecedents of trust 
identified a comprehensive model of five social antecedents of trust that comprise 
of prior alliance experience with the partner, reputation, communication, cultural 
sensitivity, expected longevity of IJVs. This model has been tested in decade 
award winning article of Dyer and Chu (2011) on 453 supplier-automaker rela-
tionships in the US, Japan, and Korea. However, this model has not been tested in 
the context of IJVs. Therefore, testing a comprehensive model of five social ante-
cedents of trust in the context of IJVs is an important contribution of present dis-
sertation.  
Further an important theoretical contribution of this dissertation is reflected by the 
fact that it analyses the social and structural antecedents of trust by two pathways: 
(1) a direct path to analyze the social and structural antecedent factors of trust, 
and (2) an indirect path of social and structural antecedent factors of trust by in-
fluencing opportunism. These direct and indirect pathways are added because 
prior literature suggests that structural antecedent factors are subject to two dif-
ferent interpretations. Proponents of transaction cost theory like Hennart and 
Zeng (2005) suggest that structural characteristics of IJV engender trust by limit-
ing the extent to which partners can be opportunistic. However, some other stud-
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ies (e.g. Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Lui, Wong & Liu 2009) suggest that chosen struc-
tural characteristics of IJV can be interpreted as a symbol or sign of commitment 
that leads to trust. Therefore, investigating the direct and indirect path of social 
and structural antecedent factors to trust is an important contribution to the litera-
ture on antecedents of trust by clarifying that which social and structural anteced-
ent factors directly lead to trust and which indirectly leads to trust by reducing 
opportunism.  
Another important contribution of present dissertation is that it empirically veri-
fies the direct association between trust and IJV performance. Given the fact that 
limited empirical evidence exists to substantiate a positive relationship between 
trust  and IJV performance, it  is  an important contribution. This dissertation also 
contributes to the literature on trust in IJVs by analyzing and empirically testing 
the moderating effects of resource complementary on the influence of trust on IJV 
performance. The prior empirical research on trust-performance relationship in 
IJVs, although equivocal, has been widely criticized by Hennart and Zeng (2005) 
for ignoring the structural factors of IJV. Specially, they assert that: “Researchers 
in the process tradition have typically regressed performance on variables such 
as trust, communication, and commitment, often without much control for struc-
tural variables. This raises the possibility that much of the variance in perfor-
mance attributed to process variables may in fact be due to structural conditions 
(2005: 113)”. Although, the expected support for possible moderation impacts of 
resource complementary on trust-performance relationships is not received in 
present dissertation, but it is a preliminary effort to investigate the possible mod-
eration impacts of structural characteristics of IJV on trust-performance relation-
ship. Future research can further refine the measurement of resource complemen-
tary and investigate its role on trust-performance relationship in IJVs.  
Finally, a noteworthy contribution of this dissertation pertains to the empirical 
setting of the study. So far the studies addressing the antecedents of trust and 
trust-performance relationship in IJVs have used sample based on IJVs made by 
Japanese firms (Inkpen & Currall 1997), United States firms (Muthusamy, White 
& Carr 2007), United Kingdom firms (Kauser & Shaw 2004), Danish firms (Niel-
sen 2007; Nielsen & Nielsen 2009), United States, United Kingdom, and Japanese 
firms (Kwon 2008; Luo 2008); United States, Western Europe, and Far East firms 
(Robson, Katsikeas & Bello 2008). This dissertation focuses on Nordic firm’s 
(Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish) IJVs operating into Asia, Europe, and 
America to analyze the antecedents of trust and trust-performance relationship in 
IJVs. Outward FDI from Nordic region is significantly increasing (e.g. Danish 
outwards FDI increased from 8206 million dollars in 2006 to 23413 million dol-
lars in 2011, and similar trends can be observed for Finnish, Swedish, and Nor-
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wegian outward FDI) (UNCTAD 2012). Therefore, this empirical setting pro-
vides new evidence on the antecedents of trust and trust-performance relationship 
in IJVs. 
6.3 Managerial implications 
Firms ought to establish IJVs with other firms in order to reap the benefits of co-
operation. These IJVs usually grow in rather complex and uncertain environments 
in which all possible contingencies are not considered beforehand. Therefore, IJV 
partners have to respond to these external complexities together and develop good 
relationship with each other. They should know how to work with each other, to 
each other, and through each other during the course of IJV to reap the benefits of 
cooperation. A trustful relationship between IJV partners is considered very cru-
cial towards attaining the goals of IJVs. This dissertation addresses the important 
role of trust in IJVs and offers a number of important suggestions for managers to 
understand the main building blocks of a trustful relationship and the benefits of 
trustful relationship in IJVs.  
Present dissertation suggests that trust is not a commodity that can be bought or 
sold in market place, but the managers of the IJVs have to develop this attribute. 
The findings of the dissertation show that establishing IJV with reputable part-
ners, establishing quality of communication practices between IJV partners, un-
derstanding and aligning each other’s cultural values, continuing IJVs for longer 
period of time, and forbearance from opportunistic behavior can indeed foster 
trust between IJV partners. Further, the presence of symmetric interdependence 
and equivalent ownership share do not play an important role in promoting inter-
partner trust in IJVs. However, once trust is developed between partners, it in-
creases the performance of the IJV. 
The positive relationship between trust and performance shows managers that 
trust is a key determinant of IJV performance. Despite the moral connotation as-
serted to trust, managers now have economic reasons to invest in the quality of 
their relationships by building up interactions characterized by trustworthiness. In 
today’s business environment, the relations between firms are often characterized 
by hidden agendas and firms with different objectives, so trust will play an in-
creasingly important role as a counterweight to the potential dangers in forming 
an IJV.  
Given  the  fact  that  trust  pays  off,  the  understanding  the  drivers  of  trust  in  IJVs  
and using this knowledge to build trust becomes crucially important for manage-
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ment. Results suggest that managers when selecting IJV partners need to pay at-
tention to the reputation of potential partner firms. Managers should make an ef-
fort to form IJV with reputable partners because the reputable partners are more 
consistent in their behavior and this build trust between IJV partners. The results 
also indicate that during the course of IJV, managers need to pay attention to the 
differences that exist  between the firms. Managers should make an effort  to un-
derstand the practices of IJV partners, their managerial values, organizational 
culture,  and internal procedures and try to bridge them with their  own practices,  
managerial values, organizational cultures and internal procedures. It is important 
to bear in mind that such efforts help to reduce misunderstandings between IJV 
partners and build trust.  
The results also propose that communication is a significant factor that positively 
influences trust. Managers should, therefore, foster inter-partner communications 
to allow partners to learn about each other and develop a deeper understanding 
between the partners. The frequent, open, clear, and timelier exchange of infor-
mation between IJV partners minimizes unpleasant surprises, resolves disagree-
ments quickly, and builds trust. Further, the positive relationship between longer 
time horizons of IJV relationship and trust suggests that managers should form 
IJVs for longer duration. The long duration of IJV is a perception that IJV part-
ners have long term objectives to achieve and have to work together for long pe-
riod  of  time.  This  perception  aligns  their  interests  and  builds  trust.  Further,  the  
dissertation suggests that opportunistic behaviors have a negative impact on trust. 
While a partner firm may engage in opportunistic behavior in order to exploit the 
other for short-term gains, managers need to be aware that this behavior will have 
a detrimental effect on trust and create difficulties for a successful long-term IJV 
relationship. Therefore, it is important for managers to realize that trust is fragile, 
and once damaged it is difficult to re-establish. Knowing this should help reduce 
opportunistic behaviors. Finally, an important implication for managers is that 
symmetric interdependence and equivalent ownership share do not have a signifi-
cant impact on trust. Therefore, the managers need to understand that presence of 
symmetric interdependence as well as equivalent ownership share do not play an 
important role in promoting inter-partner trust in IJVs.  
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6.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research  
Limitations 
As with any study there are few research limitations of the present dissertation 
that should be taken into consideration. The first limitation relates to the concep-
tual framework of the dissertation. This dissertation incorporates only one struc-
tural factor of ‘resource complementary’ as an important moderator of trust-
performance relationship in IJVs. However, the other structural characteristics of 
IJV (e.g. equity ownership and interdependence) could also be incorporated as 
moderators of trust-performance relationship. But doing so would make the 
framework more complex because of overlap between structural antecedents of 
trust, and the structural factors as moderators of trust-performance relationship. 
Therefore, the construct of resource complementary is only investigated as a 
moderator of trust-performance relationship in present dissertation. 
Second limitation of the present dissertation is that it only includes the perspec-
tive  of  Nordic  parents  of  the  IJVs  and  therefore  does  not  incorporate  the  view  
point of both parents of the IJVs. Previous research (e.g. Fryxell, Dooley & Vryza 
2002; Luo 2002) suggests for incorporating the perceptive of both parents of the 
IJV. However, gathering such information is very challenging (time and expense 
considerations) especially when parent firms originate from many countries 
around the world, as in our sample (Asia, Europe, and America).  
Third limitation of present dissertation is that it relies on the information collected 
from a single key informant of the Nordic parents of IJVs. This may cause bias in 
the data, as it is based on one person’s views only. Although, the data of present 
dissertation was collected from the key respondents that comprise of CEOs, pres-
idents, vice presidents, and directors, which were highly knowledgeable and in-
volved with specific IJVs. But the use of single informant remains a key limita-
tion of the present dissertation. Another possible limitation of the present disserta-
tion is that only Nordic firm’s IJVs operating into Asia, Europe, and America 
were surveyed, and thus results may not be generalizable to the IJVs from other 
countries or regions.  
Further an important limitation of present dissertation relates to the use of subjec-
tive measures of IJV performance. Some IJV studies suggest for using objective 
financial measures of IJV performance (e.g. Luo 2002). However, given the diffi-
culties of getting access to financial data, it was not possible to use objective fi-
nancial measures of IJV performance. Using subjective measures of IJV perfor-
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mance, however, has become an accepted practice in IJV research (e.g. Nielsen 
2007; Muthusamy, White & Carr 2007; Kwon 2008; Lin & Wang 2008). Further 
the studies of Geringer and Herbert (1991) and Robson, Katsikeas & Bello (2008) 
have found a correlation between subjective and objective measures of IJV per-
formance. This further justifies the reliance on subjective measures of IJV per-
formance.  
Final limitation of present dissertation is that it relies on cross-sectional survey 
data to study the antecedents of trust and trust-performance relationship in IJVs. 
Longitudinal studies are assumed as a potential approach to drive strong claims 
about the direction of causal links between the antecedents of trust and trust-
performance relationship in IJVs. Although, the developed model of present dis-
sertation lends support from theoretical considerations in previous studies (e.g. 
Parkhe 1998a, 1998b; Hennart & Zeng 2005; Silva, Bradley & Sousa 2012), 
however the possibility of feedback loops between the constructs cannot be ruled 
out.   
Suggestions for further research 
Building upon the theoretical discussion and empirical findings of the present 
dissertation, there are some areas that merit further discussion and hold the most 
promise for further research. Some of these areas of potential research arise di-
rectly from the present dissertation, although others are notable primarily due to 
the lack of research attention paid to them. Firstly, the present dissertation sug-
gests that trust leads to the performance of IJVs, the argument that performance 
may lead to trust has merit as well. Inkpen and Currall (1997) suggested that per-
formance may have a feedback effect on trust. Poor performance may cause dis-
trust between the partners, which leads to poor long-term IJV performance. 
Therefore, If IJV performance is worse than expected; the level of trust between 
IJV partners  will  therefore  suffer  accordingly.  Therefore,  it  is  worthwhile  to  in-
vestigate the impact of IJV performance on trust between the IJV partners.  
Secondly, the moderating role of resource complementary on trust-performance 
relationship was not verified. However, this should not trivialize the important 
role of resource complementary in IJVs. Further research should attempt to im-
prove the measurement of resource complementary. Further, it is possible that 
resource complementary has impact on other measures of IJV performance, such 
as longevity of IJVs (e.g. Deitz et al. 2010). Therefore, further research should 
improve the measurement of resource complementary and investigate its role on 
trust-performance relationship by using different measures of IJV performance.  
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Thirdly, present dissertation only investigates the moderation role of resource 
complementary on trust-performance relationship; a further development of this 
work will be to investigate the moderation roles of ‘ownership share’, and ‘inter-
dependence’ on trust-performance relationship in IJVs. This is very important 
future research avenue as Hennart and Zeng (2005) had criticized the prior re-
search on trust-performance relationship for ignoring the role of structural charac-
teristics of IJV. Fourthly, an interesting avenue for further research could be to 
examine the implications of other structural characteristics of IJV for trust, and 
trust-performance relationship. For example, Gong et al. (2007), and Hennart and 
Zeng (2005) suggest that nature of stipulations involved in IJV contract, and 
number of partners involved in IJV are important IJV structural arrangements to 
examine. 
Fifthly, future research could examine the relationship between trust and IJV per-
formance using IJV samples from service industries. This would provide valuable 
insights into whether the findings of the present dissertation differ depending on 
industry characteristics. Furthermore, concerning IJV performance measurement, 
future research on trust and IJV performance using the presented framework 
could use both objective and subjective measures of IJV performance to enrich 
the findings about the impact of trust  on IJV performance. Sixthly,  the temporal 
element of trust development in IJV studies has been given very less attention. 
The limited studies on the development of trust over time remains at conceptual 
level (Nielsen 2003) or case based (e.g. Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003). 
Therefore, the temporal development of trust in IJVs is a fruitful arena for further 
research. Seventhly, research on trust in IJVs collects data from only one parent 
of the IJV and implicitly assumes that trust between the IJV partners is essentially 
symmetric. However, research has not examined the empirical validity of this 
assumption. Future research should investigate this issue because there may be 
performance implications of symmetry trust and asymmetry trust between IJV 
partners.  
Eighthly, the topic of trust repair and rebuilding is notably absent from the empir-
ical research on trust in IJVs. Although trust scholars have declared a theoretical 
interest  in  the  problem of  repair  and  rebuilding  trust  between IJV partners  (e.g.  
Krishnan 2006), there has been no empirical research investigating the trust repair 
and rebuilding between the IJV partners. Therefore, given the fact that trust is 
important to achieve superior IJV performance, it is important for future research 
to investigate the issue of trust repair and rebuilding between IJV partners.  
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